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Abstract 
This dissertation examines whether certification by governments and development 
partners promotes investment under a relatively risky modality, and enhances private sector 
ownership in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Infrastructure projects suffer from an 
information asymmetry problem as these projects do not have any prior operational history. 
Private investors are not likely to take an interest in PPP projects if they are uncertain about 
project quality, and when the project‘s risk is perceived to be too high. In an environment 
characterised by asymmetric information, certification by governments and development 
partners can create value by minimising information search costs for private investors.  
To examine the project modality choice, I use a sample of 4,384 PPP projects in 36 
developing countries from 1990 to 2012. I find that certification by governments and 
development partners are necessary for promoting PPP investment under a relatively risky 
modality. Among the project supports offered by the government, exchange rate guarantee is 
significant in explaining the choice of project modality. Among the different support measures 
provided by development partners, loans are significant in explaining the choice of project 
modality.  
I separately test the effect of certification in PPP project ownership as there is a time lag 
between the PPP project modality selection stage and the stage when ownership structuring 
decision is made. The results show that both government and development partner certification 
can increase private sector ownership. There is higher private sector ownership in PPP projects 
that receive development partner certification in the form of guarantees, and risk management 
support from development partners.  
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find evidence that having a prestigious development 
partner (DP) can explain project modality selection and increase private sector ownership, 
suggesting that development partners are heterogeneous in their ability to certify and support 
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PPP projects. While I find that corruption matters to both modality and private sector 
ownership, corruption matters less when the project has government certification.  
This thesis contributes to the PPP project finance literature by conducting a large-scale 
empirical analysis of PPP project level data. Past studies on PPP have mostly utilized a field-
study approach. The study has practical implications because certification by government and 
development partners can assure private investors about project quality. Understanding the PPP 
project financing modality decision is also important as a proper selection of financing modality 
can reduce project failure and improve the long-term viability of infrastructure projects. Finally, 
my findings of the importance of institutional quality in relation to the certification function in 
PPP projects can offer appropriate project planning strategies for policy makers. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1     Background 
Governments in developing countries currently face the challenge of meeting the demand 
for infrastructure services. With increasing budgetary constraints, governments have not been 
able to invest in infrastructure and to support economic growth. For example, Foster and 
Garmendia (2010) estimate that Sub-Saharan African countries need to spend USD 93 billion on 
infrastructure projects annually, nearly double their current infrastructure investment of USD 45 
billion. As available funding from public sources and the ability of governments to implement 
multiple projects continue to be limited, governments are becoming increasingly dependent on 
the private sector to improve the supply of infrastructure services. Public-private partnerships 
(PPPs)1 have become an important economic instrument, contributing around 15 percent of 
total infrastructure investment in developing countries alone (World Bank, 2015). During 1990–
2008, the total global PPP investment committed to infrastructure projects was USD 1.64 trillion 
(Bhattacharyay, 2011). 
There are numerous advantages that can be gained from collaboration with the private 
sector, some of which include improved efficiency in project delivery, operation, and 
management (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). Public infrastructure projects are frequently under-
maintained, as maintenance work is inadequately planned and implemented by public agencies. 
PPP projects often bundle construction and on-going maintenance into a single contract. This 
incentivises the investor to construct the infrastructure project to a high-quality up front, 
minimizing the need for maintenance during the project period. Additionally, PPP projects can 
                                                          
1 A PPP is a contract between private investors and a state for providing a public infrastructure project. In 
a PPP project, the private party bears considerable project risk and management responsibility (World 
Bank, 2012). Unlike Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects, where private investors generate the 
project idea and may ask for land, utility, and other assistance from the government, in PPP projects, the 
government generates the project idea, carries out the feasibility study, and then invites private investors 
to bid for the project. Based on the bidding, the government selects the most preferred private investor 
and awards the PPP project contract accordingly. See Chapter two. 
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promote access to advanced technologies and transfer risks to the private sector. Realizing the 
importance of PPP, a wave of structural reforms, deregulation, and promotion of PPP concept 
in many developing nations spurred a flurry of private investment in infrastructure sector 
(Yanosek, Keever, & Orr, 2007).  
By facilitating innovation and efficient project implementation, PPP projects can ensure 
economic growth. Historically, PPP projects have played an important role in financing 
infrastructure projects in developing countries. The Suez Canal project was implemented as a 
PPP project and many of its features can be seen in contemporary PPPs. Through shortening the 
distance between South Asia and Europe, the Canal facilitated maritime transport and trade 
(Fletcher, 1958). In 1854, the Egyptian government awarded the project to a group of French 
investors. Later, in 1865, the investors created the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) project 
company named the Suez Canal Company for implementing the project. The project was 
completed under a Build Operate and Transfer financing modality with a contract period of 99 
years (Auriol & Picard, 2013). The Egyptian Government had 44% ownership in the project 
company while French investors had the remaining 56% ownership (Bassiouni, 1964). Currently, 
governments around the world see PPPs as a viable option of introducing private sector 
expertise and technology in the infrastructure sector. Nonetheless, investment in PPP projects 
has dried up considerably since the global financial crisis (Connolly & Wall, 2011).  With the 
investment decline, there is an urgency to review project risk and identify possible risk 
management processes for PPP projects.  
A careful examination of PPP project data through the lens of financing modality reveals 
some interesting insights. In the last decade, private investors have shown a preference for less 
risky modalities like Management and Lease contracts (Marin and Izaguirre (2006). In contrast, 
investments under more risky financing modalities like Build, Own and Operate have declined 
by 29% from 2013 to 2014. Private investors are not likely to take an interest in PPP projects if 
they are uncertain about project quality, or when the project‘s risk is perceived to be too high. 
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Even if investors participate in a project, they will like to reduce project risk  by participating 
under a relatively less risky modality.  
Infrastructure projects suffer from a severe information asymmetry problem as these 
projects often have no prior operational history (Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, & Steffanoni, 
2013). Most PPP projects, such as toll roads, are location-specific, and the infrastructure service 
can only be used in the specified geographical area. Assessing the project‘s revenue forecasts is 
difficult due to lack of similar projects in the same geographical area. Hemming (2006) argues 
that the financial assessment of a privatised infrastructure asset can be challenging because it is 
difficult for investors to evaluate project feasibility given the typically large project size and long 
contract period.  
Several studies demonstrate that the intentional underestimation of cost and the 
overestimation of benefit are a major source of risk in infrastructure projects (Wachs, 1989). One 
case in point is provided by Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) for the Suez Canal project, where 
the actual construction cost was 20 times higher than initially anticipated by the government. 
Government agencies carry out feasibility studies and conduct the development process for the 
infrastructure project before inviting private investors to join. As the creators and sellers of PPP 
projects, governments enjoy an information monopoly over private investors. Prior to 
participating in a project, investors require information about the financial, social, and 
environmental risks of PPP projects. Often governments do not share this information and have 
a tendency to highlight the positive aspects of a proposed project without properly addressing 
project risk. Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) provide the example of the Ngone bridge project 
of Lao PDR, where the actual traffic volume and project revenue were substantially lower than 
those forecasted by the government.  
The above highlight the pervasive information asymmetry problem between PPP project 
insiders and outsiders. The information asymmetry is likely to affect investors‘ confidence more 
severely in developing countries than in developed countries due in part to poor institutions and 
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information disclosure in the latter case (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006). 
Government officials often face political pressure to implement projects, which can lead to 
fabrication of project information and make an unviable project look viable.  
 Governments may be tempted to underestimate the cost and/or overestimate the benefit 
of the project since PPP projects that promise to provide high financial benefits at low project 
costs appear more attractive to private investors. The incentive to make the project look 
financially more feasible than is actually the case is greater for large infrastructure projects where 
greater private sector financing is needed (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). Such information 
asymmetry can create unrealistic project outlook among the investors. 
In an environment characterised by asymmetric information, certification by governments 
may be able to create value by minimising information search costs for private investors. Along 
with the government, development partners may also play an important certification role as they 
are able to access additional PPP project information and have technical expertise in PPP 
projects. In the financial market, often sellers or issuers seek certification by a respected third 
party to certify their product. These third parties can include auditors, bond rating agencies, 
underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 1990). In the PPP market, development partners can play a 
similar kind of role by certifying project quality. Development partners can attest to the quality 
of the project as they have significant experience in PPP project investment worldwide. Utilising 
their relationship with governments, development partners can reduce the political risk of PPP 
projects. Since development partners have been known to provide risk insurance to private 
investors and other commercial lenders, their involvement in the PPP project assures investors 
and lenders that they are likely to be protected against losses due to political events, such as 
expropriation, currency transfer risks, and war. A case in point is the Hub power project in 
Pakistan, where on behalf of private investors, the World Bank negotiated with the government 
to avoid project renegotiation (Miller and Lessard (2000). 
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My dissertation empirically tests the effectiveness of certification by governments and 
development partners in PPP projects. More specifically, I examine whether certification from 
these stakeholders can influence project modality selection and enhance private sector ownership 
in PPP projects.The perceived certification role of governments and development partners in 
PPP projects is strengthened by the fact that these stakeholders have a significant amount of 
monetary and reputational capital at stake. Governments and development partners are frequent 
players in the PPP market, and therefore, the success of future PPP projects they are involved in 
hinges on their reputation in clinching past PPP deals. Although dishonesty may benefit 
governments and development partners in the short term, such benefit will be realized at the 
cost of losing their reputation (Klein & Leffler, 1981). Thus, maintaining reputation can be vital 
in the PPP market.  
Since access to project information is crucial for the viability of PPP investment, several 
initiatives to increase the information flow to the private sector were recently taken by 
governments, development partners and other stakeholders. In November 2014, the G20 leaders 
have agreed to set up the Global Infrastructure Hub (GIH). GIH aims to share information 
about infrastructure projects between governments, private investors, international organisations, 
development partners, and national infrastructure institutions. One of the main objectives of 
GIH is to address key data gaps that matter to private investors.  
 If governments and development partners cannot credibly communicate project quality, 
and/or private investors cannot access the necessary project information to evaluate the risks, 
potential market failure of the kind recognised by Akerlof (1970) can result in PPP projects. The 
importance of infrastructure investment for economic growth (Aschauer, 1989), particularly in 
developing countries, suggests that governments and development partners have incentives to 
ensure the risk of market failure is minimised. Previous studies show that macroeconomic 
factors such as investment liberalisation, inflation, aggregate demand and macroeconomic 
stability are important in encouraging private sector investment in PPP projects (Hammami, 
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Ruhashyankiko, & Yehoue, 2006). My study extends this line of research by showing that 
project-level characteristics are also important in PPP projects. My thesis focuses on developing 
countries as this is where the public sector‘s effort to encourage private sector financing is most 
acute. Certification by governments and development partners is of particular importance in 
developing economies as private investors face higher information asymmetry and thus project 
risk compared to investors in developed economies.  
 
1.2     Research Aims and Questions 
My thesis assesses the effectiveness of the certification role of governments and 
development partners in PPP projects. I argue that while private investors in infrastructure 
projects face many challenges (Reilly & Brown, 2011), the uncertainty they face is compounded 
when they invest in developing countries for three reasons. 
First, government officials in most developing countries have limited experience in PPP 
project development, transaction, and certification processes. Second, these government officials 
often face political pressure to quickly implement PPP projects in order to advance the country‘s 
infrastructure development. To make the project look financially appealing, government officials 
are incentivized to hide potential negative project information. Third, developing countries have 
limited resources and ability to conduct comprehensive (and thus costly) due diligence and 
feasibility studies for proposed PPP projects for collecting all the project related information. 
For collecting all the project information the government needs to conduct comprehensive (and 
thus costly) due diligence and feasibility studies for proposed PPP projects. 
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Consequently, when investing in new PPP projects, private investors are more likely to 
turn their attention to secondary sources of PPP project information. In developing countries 
with high levels of project uncertainty, the private sector is likely to shift the emphasis from PPP 
project data, which are lacking, to indirect secondary indicators of project quality. Two such 
indicators of quality for PPP projects, which this thesis focuses on, are the ―stamp of approval‖ 
by governments and development partners.  
By providing project certification, the government and development partners assure the 
market that there is a transparent project information sharing process in place. External 
stakeholders expect development partners to have conducted comprehensive due diligence and 
assess project viability prior committing to the project. Through this transparent information 
sharing process supervised by the development partners, the private investors have a clear 
understanding of the project risk and can better negotiate project risk distribution terms. 
 I answer four sets of research questions relating to the certification effects of 
governments and development partners in PPP projects. My first set of research questions asks 
whether certification by government influences the choice of modality selection and project 
ownership. Project modality2 refers to the spectrum of private participation alternatives that 
could be applied to finance a given PPP project (Vives, Benavides, & Paris, 2009). If a given 
project and its modality is perceived too risky for the private sector, the government can assure 
investors by providing project certification. With such assurances or guarantees, the government 
signals its confidence in the PPP project viability and planning process. I thus predict that 
investors are more likely to participate in PPP projects with a more risky modality in the 
presence of explicit government guarantees or certification. Throughout the thesis, I mainly 
focus on the risk perspective from the private sector‘s point of view.3 Mirroring my question 
related to PPP project modality, I ask whether certification by governments, through project 
                                                          
2 In the finance literature, the terms project modality, project type, design options, and project structure have been 
used to refer to PPP modalities. The legal literature uses the term contractual type to indicate PPP modalities. 
3 Unless otherwise stated, project risk used in the context of this thesis is from the perspective of the private sector. 
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guarantees, can enhance private sector ownership in PPP projects. The sequence of the research 
questions asked reflects the chronological order of the decisions made in PPP projects, where 
modality selection is one of the very initial project decisions. However, private sector‘s 
ownership decision is made during the final stage of project planning process. Certification from 
government can assure the market about the project's financial viability and encourage investors 
to increase project ownership. 
My second set of research questions asks whether certification by development partners 
influence the choice of modality selection and ownership. Since different modalities vary in 
terms of project risk, certification from development partners can contribute through assuring 
private sector participants. I argue that development partners can attest to the quality of the PPP 
project as they enjoy exclusive access to feasibility study documents. Participation of 
development partners thus provides an institutional stamp of approval (Brealey, Cooper, & 
Habib, 1996), allowing a relatively risky modality PPP project to be implemented, and attract 
more private sector ownership. 
 My third set of research questions asks whether more reputable development partners 
have greater ability to encourage PPP sector participation under a relatively risky modality. Due 
to reputational differences, development partners are heterogeneous in their ability to certify a 
PPP project. Similar to the notion of differentiation in the reputation effects of credit rating 
agencies (Mody, 2002) and auditors (Simunic and Stein, 1987), I argue that reputable 
development partners are better able to certify the value and risk of PPP projects credibly. The 
credibility of certification by reputable development partners is strengthened by the reputational 
capital they have at stake, in line with the reputational capital paradigm expounded by Klein and 
Leffler (1981). Related to this question, I also ask whether the reputation of the development 
partner matters to private sector ownership in PPP projects. Based on the reputational capital 
paradigm (Klein and Leffler, 1981), I argue that it does, and predict that PPP projects associated 
with more reputable development partners have higher private sector ownership. 
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In the final set of research questions, I ask whether institutional quality interacts with 
certification in relation to project modality and private sector ownership. Doh and Teegen (2003) 
argue that country-level policies have significant influences on the relative attractiveness of a 
given PPP project. For instance, research on corruption has emphasised its effect on investors‘ 
decision (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Currently, there is little research examining the importance 
of institutional quality in explaining PPP modality selection and private sector ownership. 
Thobani (1998) argues that investors are less likely to value project guarantees when investing in 
a country with a sound institutional framework. He contends that stable economic policy reduces 
the possibility of large changes in interest rates and exchange rates, thereby making it less 
obligatory for the government to offer exchange rate guarantees. As institutional quality cannot 
be improved overnight, in many countries, private investors will not participate in PPP projects 
unless governments assume certain risks through guarantees, and development partners provide 
some assurance about project quality. It is thus essential to examine how governments and 
development partners can deal with concerns about institutional quality by offering project 
certification4. 
 
1.3      Motivations and Contributions 
 My study is motivated by the significant expansion of the global PPP market in the last 
two decades. According to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database, a total of 
5,781 PPP projects have been implemented between 1990 and 2012 in developing countries 
alone. The total investment commitment of these projects are USD 1,826.20 billion. The sheer 
size and significant growth in PPP investment over the last two decades make an empirical 
analysis in its own right valuable.  
                                                          
4 World Bank group‘s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) protects investors' against-non-
commercial risks. Since its inception in 1988, MIGA has provided around USD28 billion in risk insurance to the 
private sector. 
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The study focuses on developing countries where it can be difficult to verify project 
information. For one, the number of existing PPP projects which investors can use as 
benchmarks is often scarce in developing countries.  Information asymmetry is particularly 
prevalent in these countries. Indeed, Eichengreen (1995) argues that the main reason why 
investors are reluctant to invest money in infrastructure projects in developing countries is due 
to the difficulty in assessing project quality. 
 Empirical research on PPP project financing is relatively thin, due in part to the difficulty 
in obtaining project-level data for PPP projects. The primary research methodology for PPP 
projects has been field-based studies rather than large sample statistical analysis. With case 
studies it can be difficult to generalise the results to the population of infrastructure projects and 
draw conclusions. Research about accessing PPP project quality is important as investors may 
not invest in the PPP project if they cannot access PPP project information.  My thesis thus 
contributes to the PPP literature by providing a large-scale empirical analysis of project-level data 
for 4,384 PPP projects collected from the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database. 
PPP projects are attractive research subjects for testing the effect of certification as these 
projects possess unique structural characteristics. For instance, most PPP projects are 
implemented as a stand-alone project company. This makes it possible to observe the impacts of 
project certification from different stakeholders in a more transparent process than other 
corporate settings. Research on existing companies can be influenced by the confounding effects 
of previous corporate history. Since PPP project companies, as new companies, have limited or 
no historical track record, they provide researchers with a unique opportunity to effectively 
analyse project certification decision in an environment where information asymmetry problem 
is high. Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) investigate the certification role of 
lead commercial banks in project financing. My thesis extends this line of research by exploring 
the certification role of development partners in PPP project modality and ownership. 
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Assessing PPP project financing modality decision is important for several reasons. First, 
selecting the proper financing modality can improve the long-term viability of infrastructure 
projects and reduce project failure. Vives, Benavides, and Paris (2009) contribute to this literature 
by focusing how macro-economic variables can influence project modality selection. Vives, 
Benavides, and Paris (2009) also highlight a number of significant project failures in the 
infrastructure sector which can be attributed to the poor choice of financial structure used. 
Governments often invite prospective investors to bid for inadequately prepared PPP projects 
without an adequate understanding of the modality requirements of the private investor and are 
often disappointed by the poor response. After a period of reconsideration, the modality is 
modified with the public sector offering lower risk exposure to the private investors and a new 
bidding process begins. 
Second, understanding the implications of the choice of financing modality is important as 
it directly impacts on project risk and capital contribution by the private sector to PPP 
investment (Hine, Queiroz, & Chelliah, 2009). Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) provide an 
example where the Turkish government planned 179 PPP projects under the Build, Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) modality during the 1990s, which were expected to bring in USD32.4 billion 
worth of private sector investment. From the government‘s point of view, the BOT modality 
was ideal as it allowed the government to bear minimum project risk. Despite the fact that PPP 
was a new concept in Turkey during the 1990s, the government did not provide any certification 
through guarantee and continued to enforce the BOT modality for all its PPPs projects. Since 
investors have to absorb most of the project risk under the BOT modality, most decided to turn 
away, resulting in only four PPP projects being successfully implemented with an investment 
value of around USD126 million.  
The PPP project of Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), however, tells a different 
story as the government was willing to revise the project modality. Private investors were initially 
invited to invest in the PPP project under a lease contract modality. However, this modality was 
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viewed to be too risky, and the PPP project failed to take off. In response, the government 
modified the project design to a management contract modality, which is relatively less risky to 
the private investors. Along with the government, development partners also supported the 
project, including International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provided loan 
support of around USD 103 million for the project. Selecting the management contract modality, 
which is relatively more risky to the government, ultimately changed the fate of the PPP project 
as it was subsequently successfully implemented (Fuest & Haffner, 2007). A detailed description 
of the project is given in Appendix A.  
In the last decade, PPP investments under relatively risky modalities like Management 
Contract and Lease modalities have increased in developing countries (Marin & Izaguirre, 2006). 
This raises the research question under what circumstances  investors are willing to participate in 
relatively risky financing modalities. My research answers part of this question by examining the 
certification role of governments and development partners in the selection of project modality 
in developing countries.  
In the policy arena, private sector ownership of PPP projects is receiving increasing 
attention. In the U.K., the government has replaced the previous PPP guideline called the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) by Private Finance 2 (PF2). One of the key differences between PFI and 
PF2 is that public equity participation is encouraged as a minority co-investor in PPP projects 
(HM Treasury, 2012).5 So far, limited attention has been devoted to examining empirically the 
effect of project certification on PPP project ownership. Still, the financial aspects of project 
ownership structure remain ill-understood. A better understanding of PPP ownership structure is 
necessary because it may affect project risk management and the incentives for investors to 
participate in the project. Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) report that private 
sector participation in PPP projects is higher in countries with better control of corruption. Doh, 
Teegen, and Mudambi (2004) find that private sector ownership is positively associated with 
                                                          
5 In a mixed ownership structure, both public and private sectors provide equity to the project. 
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investment liberalisation in the country. Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi (2004) provide the scope 
for carrying out further research into PPP project ownership.  
First, their study only considers the role of government agencies and private investors in 
telecommunication projects. I extend this research by examining whether the involvement of 
development partners and their reputation affects private sector ownership. Further, by focusing 
on the ownership structure of telecommunications projects only, their findings may not be 
applicable to other industries such as energy, water and telecommunication. These latter sectors 
involve significant land acquisitions and politically more sensitive issues compared to the 
telecommunication sector. My sample from the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database consists of project-level data, goes beyond the telecommunication sector to include the 
energy, transportation, water and sewerage sectors as well. 
I contribute to the literature by identifying the type of support mechanisms by the 
government that contributes to certifying project quality. Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle 
(2005a) argue that government guarantees are essential if private investors are not confident with 
government policy. However, from the literature, we do not know which particular type of 
government support is important for PPP projects. The government can support PPP projects 
through seven different types of guarantee: debt guarantee, revenue guarantee, exchange rate 
guarantee, fixed government payments, variable government payments, interest rate guarantee, 
and a payment guarantee. Therefore, it is essential to assess which particular type of guarantee is 
most effective for certifying project quality. 
 A further concern of my study is determining which particular support mechanisms of 
development partners are effective in certifying project quality. Harris, Hodges, and Schur (2003) 
argue that the participation of reputable development partners can provide legitimacy to a 
project. Development partners can support PPP projects through seven different types of 
instruments: loan, syndication, insurance, risk management, equity, quasi-equity, and guarantee. 
In recent times, development partners have recognised the importance of redesigning PPP 
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support measures. According to the lead lawyer of World Bank‗s PPP group, the Bank is trying 
to modify it's exisiting project guarantee and introduce a new form of guarantee (White, 2015).  
 It is important to test the effects of certification on modality and initial ownership 
decision separately for two reasons. First, while bidding for a PPP project, investors have to deal 
with a variety of project assessment issues, including project financing, negotiating, and finalizing 
the legal framework. Often investors lack the necessary project assessment expertise and have to 
employ external advisors. During the initial stage, potential investors should not be expected to 
spend significant resources in reviewing the project. Therefore, at the initial period, such as the 
modality structuring stage, investors are more like to consider participating in a project without 
an external advisor. Certification from government and development partners can be critical at 
this stage.  
 Second, there is a time lag between the modality and ownership structuring decisions in 
PPP projects. In the chronology of decisions made by governments and private investors, 
project modality is one of the initial project decisions, while private sector ownership is one of 
the last decisions to be made. The entire project development and implementation stage can be a 
time-consuming process. Currently, few empirical studies analyze the time requirement for 
completing the development and transaction process of a PPP project. Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, 
& Hardcastle (2005) argue that in PPP project investors have to spend considerable time on the 
project implementation and contract formulation process.  
 In a dynamic business environment, the information available to both signalers and 
receivers can constantly change. Similarly in PPP projects, project information can change 
between the stage when project modality is determined and the ownership structuring stage. 
With a long project planning and implementation process, project stakeholders need to 
communicate additional project information. The planning and financing stage can be a time 
consuming process and by incorporating a longer period of time, my analysis can provide further 
insights into the PPP project planning and financing process. 
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Lastly, i examine the impact of institutional quality on PPP projects by analysing the effect 
of certification in countries with poor institutional quality. Institutions can provide information 
about potential business stakeholders and their probable behaviour, which minimizes 
information asymmetries (Casson, 2001). In many developing countries, weak institutional 
arrangements can increase information asymmetries. Therefore, investors may face significant 
partner-related risks in these countries (Meyer, 2001). To mitigate this risk, investors will have to 
incur significant information search costs (Tong, Reuer, & Peng, 2008). While project 
certification can be crucial for private investors, certification strategies can be moderated by the 
institutional characteristics of the host country.  
1.4     Summary of Major Findings  
To test the choice of project modality, I use a sample of 4,384 PPP projects in 36 
developing countries from 1990 to 2012, sourced from the Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI) database. The result shows that government certification encourages private investors to 
participate in a relatively risky modality. Of the various forms of support provided by 
governments exchange rate guarantee matters most, with a positive and significant coefficient. 
Further, along with government certification, PPP projects implemented under a relatively risky 
modality are more likely to have development partner certification. Among the various forms of 
support provided by development partners during the modality structuring, only loans is 
statistically significant and has a positive coefficient.  
I find evidence that government certification promotes private sector ownership in PPP 
projects. My findings also show that PPP projects with higher private sector ownership receive 
greater support from development partners, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of 
development partners‘ certification in attracting private investment. This suggests that both 
government and development partners can act as a trusted certifier and influence project 
modality and ownership decision process.  
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Of the support measures provided by development partners guarantees and risk 
management are associated with greater private sector ownership. However, other support 
measures, including loans, quasi-equity and syndication support, I find no evidence that it 
promotes private sector ownership. The lack of significant results for some widely used 
development partners‘ support instruments may be due to development partners and private 
investors having different priorities. PPP projects that involve development partners are likely to 
be subjected to various compliance requirements and regulations. From the private sector's 
viewpoint, meeting these compliance requirements equates costs. The results are subject to the 
caveat that only financial aspects of development partners‘ support are considered; social and 
environmental benefits that could be gained from the development partner‘s participation are 
ignored due to lack of available data. 
 Consistent with my predictions, I find evidence that having a prestigious development 
partner (DP) can influence project modality selection and enhances private sector ownership. 
Therefore, development partners appear to be heterogeneous in their ability to certify PPP 
projects. This result may be due to the fact that reputed development partners have expertise in 
PPP project assessment and risk management. While I find that corruption matters to both 
modality and private sector ownership, corruption matters less when the project has government 
certification. However, for development partner certification, I find limited evidence to support 
the certification effects on private ownership.  
 
1.5     Thesis Layout 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two provides a brief background 
on PPP projects and project finance. Chapter Three presents a literature review related to PPP 
projects. Chapter Four discusses the theoretical background of project modality and ownership, 
and develops the testable hypotheses. Chapter Five outlines the data and research method. 
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Chapter Six presents the main empirical results. Chapter Seven contains a summary and 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND OF PPP 
2.1  Introduction  
 This chapter outlines the key principles and concepts underlying PPP project financing in 
developing countries that are of direct relevance to my thesis. Developing countries can differ 
from developed countries in PPP project development and contract formulation processes. 
Section 2.2 starts with a discussion of what PPP projects are, followed by the importance of PPP 
projects in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the key aspects of public sector projects and PPP 
projects, highlighting the differences between these two project types. Section 2.5 discusses the 
key concepts related to project modalities, and Section 2.6 discusses the stages of a PPP project, 
followed by the role of government and development partners in Section 2.7. Since most PPP 
projects are financed through a project financing structure, the principles of the project financing 
approach are discussed in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 provides a brief summary of this chapter.  
 
2.2   What is Private-Public Partnership (PPP)? 
 Empirical research has long recognised the importance of infrastructure development for 
economic growth (Aschauer, 1989). Road infrastructure projects, for instance, can increase 
profitability for exporters while expanding the linkages to the global supply chain. Properly 
designed infrastructure projects can also facilitate inclusive growth by sharing economic benefits 
with poorer communities, especially by linking remote areas to major business centers. Indeed, 
infrastructure is a key determinant of export volume and the likelihood of exporting by a country 
(Francois and Manchin, 2007).  
The Millennium Declaration of the United Nation General Assembly indicates the 
importance of other infrastructure services including electricity, water, and telecommunications 
in achieving health, education, and income poverty goals, and has explicitly targeted at increasing 
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access to water supply and sanitation service in the Millennium Development Goal (Moe & 
Rheingans, 2006). The World Bank (2015) holds the view that investment in infrastructure can 
increase productive gains for industry, ensure market access for agriculture, and promote 
sustainable development.  
Shortages of infrastructure are currently affecting both developing and developed 
countries. Such infrastructure deficit, where infrastructure service is either non-existent or 
existing infrastructure projects are in need of repair, can necessitate significant capital 
investment. With increasing budgetary constraints, developing countries are now turning to 
alternative sources of infrastructure investment, including PPPs (Fay & Yepes, 2003). PPPs offer 
options to implement infrastructure in which the private sector can share the up-front capital 
investment. Access to private sector financing allows increased investment in important 
infrastructure projects, as compared to raising additional funds through taxes and other sources. 
In 1865, the Suez Canal project marked the introduction of the modern concept of PPP where 
private sector investors had exclusive rights to build and use the canal for 99 years (De Lemos, 
Betts, Eaton, & De Almeida, 2000). About 160 years on, much about the PPP concept is still not 
well understood, and there is currently no one single internationally recognized definition of 
PPP.  
 The term PPP is generally used to describe broad types of project agreements between 
the government and private sector stakeholders. Often governments have their own definition of 
PPP, reflecting the overall industry practice. The World Bank (2015) defines PPP as ―[a] long-
term contract between a private party and a government agency, for providing a public asset or 
service, in which the private party bears the significant risk and management responsibility.‖ An 
example of an early PPP project is the toll roads in the 17th century. In England, the government 
gave franchises to the private sector for the maintenance of roads, and at the same time allowing 
them to charge tolls for road usage (Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010).   
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2.3      Importance of PPP 
 Promoting private sector investment through PPPs is important for at least two reasons. 
First, infrastructure investment can yield significant economic gains. For example, building roads 
immediately boosts jobs and thus helps stimulate future economic growth. Better transportation 
facilities help farmers get their products to cities and facilitates manufacturers in exporting their 
goods. Infrastructure development through PPP mechanisms thus plays an essential and 
significant role in a competitive and productive economy, and it is not surprising that 
governments are keen to promote private sector investment through PPPs. Indeed, PPP projects 
represent a significant portion of infrastructure project investment in developing countries.   
Second, countries around the globe currently face a large infrastructure deficit. The rapid 
economic and population growth in developing countries has put huge pressure on 
infrastructure, especially in the energy, transportation, sanitation water, and telecommunications 
sectors. Alarmingly, there are currently over 1.3 billion people worldwide who do not have 
electricity supply, and about 768 million people do not have access to clean water. This lack of 
infrastructure not only limits future growth of developing countries but is also a threat to 
poverty reduction. The investment needed to meet this unmet demand for infrastructure projects 
in developing countries is estimated to be around USD1 trillion a year-twice the amount 
estimated over the 2005-2010 period by Fay and Yepes (2003), and presents a financing 
challenge for governments (World Bank, 2015). One potential reason for this investment 
shortfall is the apparent riskiness of different infrastructure sectors. Overall, infrastructure 
projects involve significant sunk costs with a long investment recovery period (Jamison, Holt, & 
Berg, 2005). 
With economic growth, the need for new infrastructure is expected to rise even further 
since existing infrastructure services are often insufficient to meet growing infrastructure 
demand. Especially after the GFC, it has become harder for governments to fund the growing 
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infrastructure. Besides being a potential obstacle to economic growth, deficits in basic 
infrastructure can also lead to greater economic and social inequality.  
Historically, the public sector has been responsible for developing infrastructure projects. 
If the public sector solely finances all the infrastructure projects, it will impose immense pressure 
on the country‘s financial status. By promoting PPP projects to the private sector, governments 
can bring private investment to public services (Cheung, Chan, & Kajewski, 2009), thus allowing 
governments to minimise or defer spending on infrastructure without forgoing its benefits. In 
this respect, PPP can be especially attractive to governments that are restricted in their current 
ability to spend. However, as the concept of PPP developed over the years, other apparent 
advantages of PPP have become evident. For example, a partnership between the state and the 
private sector can foster innovation as PPPs combine the skills and resources of both sectors. 
A case in point is the Sao Paulo Metro Line 4 PPP project, which improved the urban 
transport system in Brazil by interconnecting the existing subway, commuter rail, and bus 
networks in Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region. The USD 450 million project was built by the 
ViaQuatro consortium, which involved investors from Brazil, Portugal, and Argentina. In this 
project, the government guaranteed a minimum level of revenue, signalling its confidence about 
the project and assuring the investors about the projected return. The Inter-American 
Development Bank also assisted the project by providing a USD 69.2 million loan. Also, with 
MIGA‘s credit enhancement support, the overall cost of the loan was reduced. The project was 
effective in terms of reducing the commuting time, the risk of accidents, and pollution 
(Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe, 2011). PPP projects like this can allow the state to benefit 
from the expertise of the private investor and let the government focus on policy development, 
project planning, and regulatory activities. The reasons for promoting PPP projects have thus 
gone well beyond relieving the government‘s financial burden.  
 
22 
  
2.4     Differences Between PPP and Public Sector Projects 
To understand the financial aspects of PPPs, it is essential to reflect on the development 
process of public and private infrastructure projects. Another key issue is that regardless of 
whether the investment comes from the government or the private sector through PPP, 
financing infrastructure projects haves certain distinct features from the perspective of an 
investor. This section briefly highlights some of these characteristic features. 
Infrastructure projects generally need large up-front capital investment during the 
construction phase, with a relatively smaller operational expense. Hydroelectric projects, for 
instance, are very expensive to build, but after the construction stage, have significantly lower 
operating and maintenance costs. In a PPP project, the government mainly focuses on 
supervision and regulation, with the private entities assuming greater responsibilities and risks in 
project development, financing, procurement, engineering, construction, and commissioning. A 
PPP project is typically project financed, with assets and cash flows generated being used for the 
placement of debt finance from the bank. 
Public sector projects are different from PPP projects as they are funded, owned, and 
operated by government authorities. The implementation of state infrastructure projects in most 
developing countries are supported by loans from multilateral and commercial banks, soft-term 
loans from donor countries, and internally generated funds. The loans are usually secured by 
sovereign guarantees and are therefore a liability to the country as they use up the country‘s debt 
capacity.  
PPP projects have other unique characteristics that set them apart from public sector 
projects. First, the risk-return relationship of PPP projects is different from that of other 
business ventures. Infrastructure service is socially important and, therefore, there is political 
pressure on states to ensure that the prices for using infrastructure service remain within socially 
tolerable levels. The tendency of the host government to manage returns on infrastructure 
projects mean that private investors in PPP projects will encounter challenges in project pricing 
23 
  
(Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranganathan, 2006). Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster (2005) find that 
the financial returns of PPP projects have been modest and that the returns have in fact been 
below the cost of capital for many projects. In spite of assuming significant  project risks, private 
investors may be forbidden from getting above-average returns.  
Second, unlike in public sector projects, contracts play a crucial role in PPP projects. PPP 
financing is provided via a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which can be a consortium of 
companies responsible for all aspects of the project. The SPV signs the PPP project contract 
with the government.After the project signing, the SPV enter into different project contracts 
with banks, suppliers, contractors and other stakeholders. For instance, private investors can 
obtain project land through signing a land lease agreement. These contracts reflect the 
accountability and acceptance of obligations between two or more parties. In this context, a PPP 
can be defined as a project that is based on a agreement between the state and a private sector 
participant for providing an infrastructure service.  
 Third, in PPP projects, the government carefully carries out the bidding process to select 
the ―best‖ private investor who has to obtain approvals from the government before embarking 
on the project implementation process. Despite participation by the private sector, citizens 
continue to consider the state responsible for the quality of infrastructure services provided, thus 
compelling the state to select the private investor and to prepare the PPP project carefully. This 
is in contrast to non-infrastructure projects such as building a cement factory. In non-
infrastructure projects, no bidding is required and the private investors are free to take up and 
implement the project at any time. When the government evaluates proposals from private 
investors, it must be able to assess whether the proposed PPP project is bankable and whether 
the proposed financing plan is feasible. 
Fourth, revenues from PPP projects may depend on the functionality of other 
infrastructure projects. A PPP port project may have limited cargo if the government fails to 
build a connecting road and rail network. Therefore, to be functional, infrastructure projects 
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must interconnect with other utility networks like electrical lines and road networks. Also, 
infrastructure projects cannot be easily converted to another use. For instance, after constructing 
a road in a particular area, the investor may not be able to use the road for a different purpose. 
Therefore, infrastructure projects are defined as an investment in single-purpose assets, which 
can be considered risky by investors and lenders. 
Fifth, forecasting the revenue of PPP projects is often problematic and require special 
expertise (Ramamurti, 1992). Many toll PPP road projects have significantly overestimated traffic 
demand and faced problems in fulfilling debt obligations. For instance, the M1 Motorway of 
Hungary attracted only 50% of forecasted traffic in its first year. In Mexico, traffic volume was 
only 20% of the forecast levels during 1990. The Dulles Greenway of USA initially attracted only 
33% of its forecasted traffic volume. Interestingly, with a toll reduction of around 40%, the 
project was able to accomplish only 66 percent of its forecasted volume (Estache, Juan, & 
Trujillo, 2007). Such forecasting error can affect the debt repayment ability of the private 
investors. With a very high debt-to-equity ratio, even a small decrease in project revenue can lead 
to the risk of a loan default by the project company, possibly terminating the project. 
 
2.5 PPP Project Modalities 
Project modality refers to the range of private participation options that could be used to 
finance a given PPP project (Vives, Benavides, & Paris, 2009).Modality determines a private 
sector‘s project risk and capital contribution requirements for the PPP project (Hine, Queiroz, & 
Chelliah, 2009). Therefore, project modality can influence a private sector‘s risk perception about 
the project. In some modalities, the market risk is transferred to the private sector; in others, it is 
taken up by the government. Project modalities can be categorized as low- or high-risk 
modalities. However, currently in the literature, we do not have a recognized modality risk 
categorization process. 
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There can be different types of financing modalities for PPP projects, characterised by 
joint working and risk sharing between the private and public sectors. Following , Hammami, 
Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) the types of modality, ranging from the highest to the lowest 
risk level, are: management contracts; lease contracts; rehabilitate, operate and transfer; 
rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer; merchant; build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer; build, 
operate and transfer; build, own and operate;  partial; and full.  
Lease contracts; Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (rot); and Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent, 
and Transfer (RLRT) can be categorized as low-risk modalities as the private sector manages 
limited project risk and capital contribution responsibilities under these modalities. Whereas, 
Merchant; Build, Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (BROT); Build, Operate and Transfer 
(BOT); Build, Own and Operate (BOO); Partial; and Full can be classified as high-risk modalities 
as the private investor's share significant project risk and capital contribution responsibilities 
under these modalities. Recently, different hybrid modalities incorporating certain characteristics 
of two or three separate modalities have also been introduced in many developing countries. 
One of the key decisions in the PPP project development process is in selecting the 
appropriate financing modality. If the project is too risky, the government needs to assure the 
market about the project development process and select a modality where the government can 
support investors in managing project risk. If the government fails to assure private investors, 
banks, and other stakeholders about the chosen project modality, the project is likely to be 
delayed or even cancelled. To mitigate potential market failure, governments should select a 
suitable financing modality in the interest of investors, banks, and other stakeholders. An 
appropriate project identification and development process can ensure favourable project 
outcomes (Qiao, Wang, Tiong, and Chan, 2001).  
Nonetheless, there is an incentive for governments to select PPP projects with the riskiest 
modality (from the private sector‘s perspective) as this ensures minimum project responsibility 
and financial risk for governments, even though the selected modality may be a poor ―fit‖ for the 
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project. In Turkey, for example, the government failed to attract investment under the BOT 
modality in energy PPP projects. Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) argue that it was not possible 
to implement all the projects with the BOT modality. As the Turkish government was also 
unwilling to provide any guarantee for the projects, private investors showed little interest in the 
projects which were considered to be highly risky. As governments have more information about 
the PPP project, it is important that they provide the necessary information about project quality; 
otherwise, it will be difficult to attract private investment to a PPP project with a risky modality.  
 
2.6 Stages of the PPP Process 
In PPP projects, the government initially plans the project and offers them to the private 
sector. Investors can either accept or reject the offer. Since governments plan the project, they 
are the informed party and also act as the first mover. Most infrastructure projects involve 
dealing with multiple ministries. Therefore, it is important that different ministries plan the 
project in a coordinated manner and develop the project properly. Failure in project 
development can create reputational damage for the government who sells the right to 
implement the project to the private sector.  
The competence of the public sector project team and the manner in which project 
information is released to the market can also signal the quality of the project development 
process. As in the Turkey example, if potential investors view most of the project development 
ideas proposed by the government are likely to fail, they will view the government as not having 
the required skill to develop PPP projects. Anecdotal evidence shows that governments do 
intentionally conceal negative information to make a PPP project look more feasible that it 
actually is.  
Interactions with potential investors, banks, and development partners during the project 
development stage are an essential part of the PPP project planning process. Both the 
government and investors need to convince the lenders about the viability of the project. 
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Devapriya (2006) argues that a lender‘s long-term debt commitment in PPP projects is 
synonomous to equity participation. Lenders can exercise significant control over PPP project 
operation, which Devapriya (2006) compares to the role of shareholders. The project preparation 
stage is likely to be ineffective if it is not based on a proper understanding of how private 
investors and lenders will view the project risk. Market sounding is a tool that can provide the 
government the opportunity to cross-check its thinking about the PPP project with that of 
investors, lenders, and other stakeholders.  
Early interactions with the stakeholders can assure the government that there will be 
enough interest about the PPP project in the private sector. The interaction can be achieved by 
conducting conferences, meetings, or road shows where the government can provide 
information about project quality, and where investors can provide feedback on the project 
structure, modality, and key financing parameters. It is important that governments incorporate 
the feedback during the project design phase, and address concerns of stakeholders during the 
planning stage; the latter is because investors need to submit a formal financing intention letter 
from the lenders before bidding for a project (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003). If banks, 
development partners, and other stakeholders are not satisfied with the project structure or 
modality, investors may find it difficult to convince banks to provide finance.  
Recently, governments and development partners have introduced a number of strategies 
to ensure effective information transfer in PPP projects. For instance, in the Asian Development 
Bank‘s project preparation facility, development partners are creating and overseeing PPP project 
data rooms. One of the key focus of the Asian Development Bank‘s project preparation facility 
is to disseminate project information to potential investors. PPP project information is crucial 
for private investors given the need for long-term debt capital and non-tradable nature of most 
infrastructure investments. Besides, infrastructure projects are associated with forecasting errors, 
specifically in terms of the revenue and project cost (Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranganathan, 2006). If 
investors can not access project information and invest in the project based on limited available 
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information, investors may face difficulty during the operation stage. In the long run, other 
investors may view PPP projects as a risky investment option. Understanding the importance of 
project information, development partners use a range of channels for sharing project details, 
including managing investor road shows. Through such innovative strategies, development 
partners aim to reduce information asymmetries in PPP projects and promote interaction 
between government and project stakeholders.  
The initial interaction between different stakeholders is followed by an Expressions of 
Interest (EOI). The government often publishes a short description of the project structure 
during the EOI stage. The EOI document is advertised broadly through appropriate channels 
and is sent directly to known interested parties. The advertisement allows the government to 
build its target list of investors, and to continue with intensive communication. The continued 
close communication with investors who have expressed an interest, up until the formal launch 
of the bidding process, is essential as it not only serves to maintain investors‘ interest but also 
allows the government to ensure the project is structured in a way that appeals to investors.  
Following the EOI stage, there are several stages in the PPP project implementation 
process which can vary depending on the country. In many developing countries, such as in 
Bangladesh, the government carries out a bidder qualification process after the EOI. During this 
stage, the government issues a Request for Proposal (RFP) document, which details the project 
structure and indicates the selection criteria of private investors. Based on the RFP document, 
the investors carry out an individual due diligence check on the project. If the investors and 
other stakeholders have any query about the RFP document, they can raise them in the pre-bid 
conference arranged by the government.  
One critical aspect of the investor's due diligence check is the demand forecast of the 
project since an over-optimistic demand forecast can lead to financial difficulties for the 
investors. Access to PPP project information is necessary for private investors; otherwise, 
investors may prepare an erroneous revenue forecast. The impact of a forecasting error can be 
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catastrophic for private investors. For instance, the Clem7 motorway project in Brisbane was 
able to achieve only 25 percent of the predicted toll forecast. With such poor revenue, the 
investor's faced difficulty in loan repayment. The AUD 3 billion project was eventually sold at a 
heavily reduced price of AUD 618 million to Queensland Motorways. Developing a precise 
demand forecast is inevitably a challenging task. Project lenders take a strong interest in project 
forecasts as they are related to the long-term financial viability of the PPP project.  
Based on the project viability assessment, investors submit their PPP project investment 
proposal to the government, which then forms an evaluation team to assess the proposal. The 
evaluation team determines project selection criteria and selects a qualified firm or consortium 
based on fulfilling the selection criteria. The selection criteria can be both technical and financial. 
For instance, if the government intends to establish a power plant, the financial selection criteria 
for the private sector can include the minimum levelised cost of electricity. If the government 
intends to use combined cycle power plant technology for the project, then the technical 
selection criteria for the private sector can include previous experience in implementing a 
combined cycle power plant.   
 Based on the advice of the evaluation team, the government selects the most preferred 
private firm or consortium. Once a private firm or consortium is deemed to have met the 
necessary threshold, the government initiates negotiations on the more specific terms of the PPP 
project agreement. After project negotiation, the government signs the project contract and 
invites investors to start project implementation and the subsequent operation process. The 
successful investor or consortium must form a project company for the sole purpose of 
implementing and operating the PPP project. Creation of such a project company is a pre-
requisite for project financing structure. The project company can operate only one PPP project 
at a time. If the same investor or consortium wins more than one PPP project, it must create 
several PPP project companies, one for each project.  
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Depending on the project risk, the government may need to share some project ownership 
with the private sector. Although project ownership does not always equal project control, it 
fundamentally reflects the administrative responsibility of an infrastructure project (Doh, 
Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004). As PPP projects are capital intensive and involve a long contract 
period, investors must be assured of project quality during the ownership structuring process. 
After the construction stage, the PPP project starts the operation process. The long-term nature 
of a PPP project means that the government has to manage a relationship with the private 
investors during the operation stage to address any unexpected project events. 
While many PPP projects have operated smoothly, there exist controversial PPP projects 
that have shaken investors‘ confidence. In 1870s, a French company won the contract to build 
the Panama Canal, linking the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. Project financing was 
raised, and canal construction began in 1882. However, the investors ran into problems because 
of a flawed project design. In 1888, the investor ceased construction work and went into 
bankruptcy (Tang, Shen, & Cheng, 2010). In Asia, the earliest high-profile controversies 
occurred when the Thai government seized an elevated private expressway in Bangkok in 1993. 
In 1994, the State of Maharashtra in India cancelled Enron‘s PPP power plant. After the Asian 
financial crisis, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia forced many independent private power 
producers to renegotiate their project contracts.  
In Latin America, the first dramatic failure was the bankruptcy of around two dozen PPP 
toll projects in Mexico, which happened after the unexpected devaluation of the peso. This 
failure was followed by the seizure of water concession in Argentina in 1996. In 2007, Venezuela 
nationalised its electricity and telephone companies (Gomez-Ibanez, 2008).  
In Europe, the M1/M15 PPP project of Hungary went bankrupt in 1998 due to a lack of 
traffic. The project was ultimately nationalised in 1999 (Gomez-Ibanez, 2008). In Brisbane, 
private investors faced major financial losses from the Clem7 motorway project. Three years 
after the construction, Queensland Motorways acquired the AUD3 billion dollar project for just 
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AUD618 million. While the Clem7 motorway is still in operation, the financial trouble of 
projects like the Clem7 motorway had a considerable impact on the private sector‘s confidence. 
This kind of project failures can have a dampening effect on governments‘ efforts to encourage 
private investment through PPP.   
In 2012, the European market recorded its lowest volume of PPP investment in a decade 
(European Investment Bank, 2012). A similar trend is also happening in most developing 
countries with total PPP project investment reaching USD150.3 billion in 2013 – a 24.1 percent 
decline from the 2012 level. More alarming is the 40 percent drop in PPP project investment in 
key sectors such as transport and water (World Bank, 2015). As the seller of PPP projects, 
governments share parts of the blame. Worldwide, there is an urgency to review the project 
development and implementation roles of governments in PPP projects.   
 
2.7    The Role of Government and Development Partners in PPP Projects 
Governments play a vital role in PPP projects through various channels. First, 
governments act as an important consumer of the output of a PPP project. Governments may 
privatise the upstream infrastructure business, but remain active in direct infrastructure service 
delivery. Such practice is particularly common in energy and water infrastructures, where 
government privatise the generation process but retains state control over the transmission and 
distribution processes. In the latter, governments negotiate long-term purchase agreements with 
private investors, and then distribute electricity and water to end users.  
Second, governments play a central role in regulating the infrastructure sector. In many 
countries, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, the government regulates the 
infrastructure service price and approves any price increase. Payments for infrastructure services 
are often a politically sensitive issue, and any price increases may lead to public unrest. In many 
developing countries, consumers pay below the efficient market price for public infrastructure 
due to government subsidies provided to public utility companies. 
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Third, governments can provide project guarantee and thus help mitigate project risk. The 
guarantee provided by governments could be on the revenue, debt, exchange rates, and input 
supply associated with the PPP project. In the Sao Paulo Metro Line 4 project, for instance, the 
government guaranteed a minimum level of revenue, which protects private investors from 
earning a lower than expected revenue (Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe, 2011). Depending on 
the project, governments can also provide a range of support mechanisms including comfort 
letters, insurance, and risk management support. Through guarantees, the government shares 
significant project risk.  
Fourth, governments can provide financial support for PPP projects through, for example, 
direct financing and grants. In many developing countries, such as India, the government set up 
public sector development banks to work closely with commercial lenders for infrastructure 
financing. These public sector development banks provide additional government-backed co-
financing support for PPP projects, as seen in India where the government set up the India 
Infrastructure Finance Company to assist infrastructure projects (Farquharson, Mastle, & 
Yescombe, 2011).Governments can also provide local currency term loans through subordinated 
loans6. Such loans can assure other creditors, and work as an inducement to foreign banks. 
Direct financing support from the public sector can occur when governments provide an equity 
contribution to the PPP project through joint venture participation. Governments can also 
encourage private sector participation through tax incentives, including favorable tax treatments 
of income, reducing/exemption of duties on project machinery, and special depreciation 
allowances.  
Fifth, the government prepares the project feasibility report, which includes the project 
revenue forecast and cost estimate. Forecasting the PPP project revenue can be very challenging 
as most of the developing countries lack a benchmark PPP project. Without a previous 
                                                          
6 Government can indirectly support PPP project investors through providing project financing from the state 
owned banks. 
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benchmark project, it can be difficult to assess the viability of a revenue forecast. For instance, in 
the road sector, traffic volumes are very sensitive to economic growth and income level. Also, 
motorisation and the number of passenger trips can increase more rapidly than income levels. 
This high-income elasticity makes toll roads sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. It is thus 
important to forecast the PPP project revenue according to realistic macroeconomic growth 
assumption. Otherwise, projects can have very optimistic revenue forecast, and failure to achieve 
such revenue forecast can lead to project failure (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007).  
Along with the government, development partners also play a critical role in PPP projects. 
Participation of development partners in project financing deals can have significant implications. 
First, the developing partner‘s financing institutions provide relatively cheap financing sources 
for infrastructure projects. In many developing markets, the domestic banking channel may not 
have the capacity in accessing PPP project quality. On the other hand, international banks may 
also have concerns about long-term country risk exposures of developing countries. Under such 
circumstances, domestic and international banks are likely to charge an extra margin for their 
loans. Development partners can address these financing issues by providing long-term financing 
to the PPP project company. Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe (2011) provide the example of 
the Queen Alia Airport expansion project, where IFC provided an early endorsement of project 
quality by issuing indicative and conditional terms of finance. Such early endorsement from IFC 
assured other banks about the viability of the project. 
Second, the participation of development partners provides an institutional stamp of 
approval that attracts private investors into the project (Brealey, Cooper, & Habib, 1996). The 
long-term viability of private infrastructure projects is closely linked to environmental 
sustainability. The issue for PPP projects is not simply to comply with existing environmental 
standards, but rather to develop a deliberate strategy for linking long-term profitability to sound 
environmental management practice. Lenders such as ADB encourage governments to deal with 
environmental issues properly. The involvement of development partners in a PPP project may 
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be expected to have a catalytic effect on private investors when the credibility of PPP project 
planning process is increased as a consequence. Development partners‘ knowledge and 
understanding of the business environments of developing countries can also facilitate the 
infrastructure project implementation process. Most development partners value transparency, 
environmental, and social sustainability, and reputed ones have strict policies for ensuring 
environmental and social sustainability. For instance, in 1994, IFC implemented a revised 
environmental review procedure that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of staff and 
private investors and strengthens the requirements for public disclosure of environmental 
information about proposed projects (Carter & Bond, 1996).  
Third, development partners provide political risk insurance to private sector investors and 
other commercial lenders. Political risk guarantees protect investors and lenders against losses 
due to political events, such as expropriation, currency transfer risks, and war. A government‘s 
mandates are typically far shorter than the duration of a project. Therefore with a change in 
political leadership, the new government may try to modify the project contract to achieve its 
own political objective. Development partners can be an ideal intermediary to coordinate with 
the government. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) argue that large infrastructure projects are exposed 
to political inference by host governments. Analysing a sample of 4,978 loans in 64 countries, 
they find that on average, political risk guarantees from development partners can reduce credit 
spreads by one-third.  
Development partners have strong political support from the international community, 
and often are prepared to offer political risk insurance as they have the capacity to assess and 
manage political issues. Miller and Lessard (2000) provide an example of the Hub power project 
in Pakistan where the World Bank negotiated with the government to avoid project renegotiation. 
Through structural adjustment lending programs, these institutions have gained significant 
influence in many developing countries, which often appear to private investors as a form of 
implicit guarantee against renegotiation by the public sector.  
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Along with political risk management, development partners often assist the government 
in project planning. They play a unique facilitation role between the government, with whom 
they often carry out project planning, and private investors, to whom they provide financial 
assistance. For instance, ABD has set up a project preparation facility fund to improve the 
quality of infrastructure projects. The fund assists governments in conducting PPP project due 
diligence (Asian Development Bank, 2014). African Development Bank and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development have similar infrastructure project development facilities.  
Chowdhury, Orr, and Settel (2009) examine the growing role of development partners as 
investors in private infrastructure funds in emerging markets. They argue that development 
partners have embraced a private equity fund investment style as a new strategy for infrastructure 
investment. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
were among the first development partners to invest in private equity funds. The Islamic 
Development Bank played a pioneering role in creating the first Islamic infrastructure fund in 
the Middle East.  
Development partners also play a important role in managing the environmental and social 
risk of PPP projects. PPP projects frequently draw resistance from community and 
environmental groups over issues of potential pollution and congestion. Similarly, project land 
acquisition can be a prolonged process with the potential for legal delays, especially in developing 
countries (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). Through identifying and mitigating environmental 
risk, development partners assist in structuring a viable PPP project.  
Bond and Carter (1995)  discuss the environmental appraisal process of the IFC. To 
receive support from IFC, the project must have conducted an environmental appraisal. If the 
project has environmental concerns, stakeholders are required to make the necessary 
improvements to obtain clearance from IFC. For example, during the project evaluation of the 
Pangue hydroelectric project in Chile, concerns were raised about the environmental impact of 
the project on the indigenous communities. To address these concerns, IFC proposed to 
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establish the Pehuen Foundation, which funds socially beneficial activities for affected 
indigenous people. IFC also recommended running the Pehuen Foundation through some fee 
from the project‘s revenues. At IFC‘s initiative, an ecological station was set up to rehabilitate the 
construction site. 
 
2.8.  Project Finance 
Building infrastructure through the PPP framework is a capital intensive process, involving 
substantial initial investment. Most PPP projects are socially and politically important, which can 
impose a further challenge for the private investor. For instance, PPP projects can face large-
scale protests against tariff increases and arbitrary renegotiations of project contracts. Therefore, 
complex risk mitigation arrangements are used in PPP projects to protect investors. One of the 
key mechanisms for protecting PPP investors is the use of the project financing approach. 
Project financing has been extensively used in the mineral resource industry for hundreds 
of years. However, the project financing approach has been widely used in infrastructure from 
the 1990s (Esty, 2004). As Yescombe (2007) points out, the worldwide spread and growth of 
PPPs are linked to the expansion of project finance.7 With a significant long-term capital 
requirement, PPP projects have been largely dependent on bank loans.  
However, the GFC has affected the international project financing market in a number of 
ways. First, most banks, particularly those with limited retail deposits, are finding it harder to 
provide long-term financing, and monoline insurers are finding they have less capacity to 
participate in the project finance market.8 In the U.K., the government has responded to the 
challenge created by the GFC by introducing concrete measures to support PPP projects. The 
                                                          
7 Project finance is a financing technique through creating of a legally independent project company. The project 
company is financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms for investing in a capital asset (Esty, 2004). In 
project finance, cash flow generated after the PPP project goes operational is used to service the debt. 
8 Monolines are insurance companies that assure the timely payment of principal and interest in exchange for a fee 
through a process called ―wrapping‖. By wrapping a project bond issued by a PPP project company, monolines can 
improve the credit rating of a PPP project debt to its triple-A rating. 
8 Monolines are insurance companies that assure the timely payment of principal and interest in exchange for a fee 
through a process called ―wrapping‖. By wrapping a project bond issued by a PPP project company, monolines can 
improve the credit rating of a PPP project debt to its triple-A rating. 
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government established an Infrastructure Finance Unit, which lends to PPP projects on the same 
terms as commercial lenders (Farquharson and Encinas 2010). Second, the introduction of Basel 
III, which emphasises bank capital adequacy, market liquidity, and stress testing, means that 
banks now have to keep more capital on their risk-weighted assets. As a result, the cost of long-
term borrowing for PPP projects has increased, and the availability of long-term bank debt has 
reduced.  
Most PPP projects are implemented through the project finance approach where an SPV 
company is created by the investors to implement the project. The SPV does not have recourse 
to the parent company after the initial project capitalisation (Gatti, Rigamonti, Saita, & Senati, 
2007).9 The lender‘s recourse is thus limited to the project assets in case of default by the SPV 
company. Banks rely on the revenue generated by the PPP project to repay their loan, and review 
the financial feasibility of the project during the loan approval process. The project finance 
approach of PPP projects is thus different from corporate lending where creditors rely on the 
strength of the borrower‘s balance sheet for their loans. 
For an investor, financing a PPP project through the project financing structure is 
compelling in two ways. First, the project‘s risk and responsibility are borne not by the investor 
alone but are shared with different stakeholders including debt providers, contractors, and quasi-
equity investors. The sharing of risk and responsibility is suitable for capital-intensive 
investments like PPP projects, where diverse stakeholders can utilise their expertise and share 
project risk.  
Second, under project financing, PPP projects are implemented under a legally and 
economically separated SPV company, implying that the risks of the PPP project remain distinct 
from the investor‘s existing business. Project finance approach promotes private investment by 
structuring the financing around the project‘s revenue and assets. Therefore, repayment of the 
loan only relies on the project's cash flow and the assets. The assets, contracts, and cash flows of 
                                                          
9 The debt of the project company is non-recourse because lenders have no claim over the equity investor‘s balance 
sheet in the event of default. 
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the PPP project are separated from those of the investor so that if the PPP project were to fail, it 
would not jeopardize the financial integrity of the investor‘s existing businesses. The investors of 
the SPV Company usually do not finance the PPP project themselves. Instead, the investors 
provide a proportion of equity and borrow the remainder from financial institutions. Long 
project duration and significant upfront investment costs of PPP project mean that these 
projects are best financed with long-term financing, especially debt finance.  
However, project finance also has some disadvantages. Project financing deals can be more 
complex than traditional corporate financing. Project financing deals involve many stakeholders 
with different incentive structure, which can result in significantly higher transaction costs. The 
project viability assessment process conducted by lenders, legal experts, and other technical 
consultant's results in higher planning and project development costs. After the due diligence 
stage, stakeholders sign the project contract through a negotiation process. Such negotiations can 
be very prolonged and contentious. Getting stakeholders with varied incentives to agree on the 
magnitude of project risks can be very difficult (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). 
To obtain debt from the lenders, the investors must demonstrate how the estimated 
project revenues will repay the loan, and cover the maintenance and operation costs. The largest 
share of project finance would typically consist of debt provided by banks with limited control 
over the management of the project. Since creditors do not have any claim on the existing 
business of the private investor, creditors can expect significant losses if the PPP project fails 
(Ahmed and Fang, 1999). Tiong (1990) provides an example of Bandar Khomeni petrochemical 
complex in Iran, which was abandoned after air raids during the Iran-Iraq war. After the 
project‘s cancellation, the Mitsui Bank of Japan had to write off USD 1 billion in the project. 
Therefore, PPP projects implemented under project financing structure have to satisfy rigorous 
lender requirements. 
Mobilising debt from lenders is particularly sensitive to having adequate project risk 
management mechanisms. Achieving financial closure of the PPP project can be stalled if the 
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lenders are not happy with the project structure. Critical project areas for lenders include market 
risk, contractual agreements, and force majeure provisions. Creditors require that project‘s 
operating cash flows are high enough for debt repayment plus an acceptable margin, and use 
collateral and contracts to ensure that their loans will be repaid. As project financing depends on 
the project‘s revenue flow and the project arrangements that ensure the cash flows, it is 
important to structure the security package to alleviate the project risks (Ahmed and Fang, 1999). 
If the investors fail to fulfill with the requirements of lenders, then the PPP project could be 
delayed or even abandoned.. Therefore, highly-leveraged PPP projects can be very vulnerable to 
default risk and bankruptcy. Despite the risk associated with debt financing, private investors 
have an incentive to finance a PPP project with high leverage. Such high leverage can enable 
equity investors to achieve higher returns (Yescombe, 2007). To ensure a sustainable level of 
leverage government needs to play an active role in project design and the financial process.  
Governments need to ensure that the proposed PPP project structure is ―bankable‖, 
referring to the ability of a PPP project to raise financing. For a PPP project to be bankable, 
creditors need to be convinced that the PPP project is technically, financially and socially sound. 
Therefore, from the government‘s perspective, it is important to plan the project considering the 
technical, social, environmental, and financial viability. To achieve this, the government needs to 
assess the project and then design the project carefully. Then the government needs to properly 
communicate about the project and, if necessary, provide technical, social, environmental, and 
financial data to the project‘s stakeholders.  
The government can also assure the market about the bankability of a particular project 
through committing its resource. Governments can contribute in the finance structure through 
debt, equity, guarantees and other instruments. Girardone and Snaith (2011) report that project 
finance loan spreads are significantly lower with a government loan guarantee. Through these 
support measures, the government can build the project stakeholder's confidence. In many 
developing countries, the government has established special financing institutions which 
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provide concessional loans, guarantees, and other project supports to PPP project companies. 
These institutions also play the essential role of refinancing the PPP projects. Especially when 
capital markets are underdeveloped, the availability of long-term project financing may be limited 
for the private investor. In India, the government set up the Tamil Nadu Urban Development 
Fund (TNUDF) for this purpose, with contributions received from the State Government of 
Tamil Nadu and several Indian financial institutions. TNUDF also has access to a line of credit 
of about Rs 3.7 billion from the World Bank. The fund provides long-term debt for 
infrastructure financing on a non-guarantee mode (Krishnan, 2007).  
In developing countries, investors often prefer to obtain financing from local financial 
market including government supported financial institutions and domestic banks. Accessing 
local capital markets for PPP projects can have several benefits. First, with local financing 
investors can avoid exchange rate fluctuation risk. Second, local financial institutions may have a 
better understanding of project structure and government policies, and be more willing than 
foreign banks to assume local economic and political risk. 
However, underdeveloped debt markets in developing countries can be a constraint for 
infrastructure financing as infrastructure projects can take a long time to generate profits. With 
such return structure, investors require longer term debt for PPP project financing. In the 
absence of long-term local debt markets, private investors has been faced with two suboptimal 
choices. First, investors can use shorter-term financing from the local market, which can create a 
maturity mismatch with refinancing risk (Blanc‐Brude and Strange, 2007). Second, investors can 
obtain financing from developed countries using long-term foreign currency debt.  
If infrastructure projects require foreign currency borrowings, then these loans need to be 
properly hedged against currency risks. Very few infrastructure projects have foreign earnings to 
serve as a natural hedge. Therefore, a loan from an international credit market can create 
currency risk for the private investors. When a foreign-denominated loan funds a PPP project 
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but project revenues are paid in local currency, the investors need to manage a potential long-
term currency exchange risk (Zou, Wang, & Fang, 2008). 
Additionally, there are environmental requirements that need to be fulfilled under the 
project financing framework since large infrastructure projects can present potential 
environmental and social risks. Having favourable social support helps the project development 
and financing process go smoothly (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005). For fulfilling 
the environmental issues related to project financing, private lending institutions and 
development partners have developed the Equator Principles, which has been adopted by other 
international commercial banks. The Equator Principles extensively focus on the environmental 
issues that arise as a result of project financing in developing countries (Andrew, 2008). 
Development partners, international banks and many reputed local lenders will support a PPP 
project only if strict environmental conditions are fulfilled. Careful project planning avoids 
having to modify the project scope to fulfill the social and environmental requirements of 
development partners, community groups and other banks (Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe, 
2011). 
Development partners‘ experience with working with environmental issues can help 
investors structure a more socially sustainable PPP project. Faith-Ell and Arts (2009) argue that 
an efficient transfer of environmental information is essential for PPP projects. The 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study would require governments to collect 
environmental information during the project planning stage, but it is not easy to identify all the 
environmental risk from feasibility documents prepared by governments. In addressing 
ecological and social risks in infrastructure projects, Momtaz (2002) argues that independent 
bodies should review the environmental impact assessment study. Through this process, 
governments can ensure the quality of information in the EIA report. This is exemplified by the 
Western Australia government which has established an independent body to review its EIA 
study (Conacher & Conacher, 2000). When a development partner is involved in the PPP project 
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planning and environmental assessment process, it can indicate to the market about the 
environmentally sustainable project planning process.  
2.9.  Chapter Summary  
This chapter explains the key issues of the PPP financing process, which are crucial to my 
research. Investments in infrastructure have far-reaching consequences for economic 
development and poverty reduction. Calderón and Servén (2004) find that income inequality 
declines with a higher level of infrastructure. Inadequate infrastructure can constrain economic 
growth, particularly in developing countries. The chapter provides a number of examples of PPP 
projects and highlights the importance of a careful project development process for 
infrastructure projects. Since the project development process can significantly affect the 
financial performance of PPP projects, it is important to conduct a project feasibility study and 
to plan the project carefully before inviting private investors. The important roles played by 
governments and developments partners in ensuring the success of PPP projects are also 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of relevant empirical and theoretical literature on PPPs. I start 
with an examination of the information asymmetry problem in infrastructure projects in Section 
3.2. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on certification in the presence of information asymmetry. 
This is followed by a review of extant studies on project modality in Section 3.4, and private 
sector ownership in Section 3.5. I discuss studies that examine the role of governments and 
development partners in PPP projects in Section 3.6, which can help pinpoint the motivations of 
these stakeholders for providing certification. Finally, Section 3.7 discusses how institutional 
quality can influence PPP project investment decision. A summary of the major conclusions 
drawn from the extant literature is given in Section 3.8. 
 
3.2 Information Asymmetry and Infrastructure Projects 
In the infrastructure literature, several authors have highlighted the problem of intentional 
misrepresentation by project initiators. Wachs (1989) argues that planners often make certain 
infrastructure projects viable because of their political importance. Although planners should 
analyse project data to assess the viability of the infrastructure project, they adjust the data and 
assumptions so that the preferred project is made to look viable. In fact, Wachs (1989) points 
out that often computerised databases, revenue forecasting models, and statistical calculation 
procedures are not transparent. Every simulation model needs a certain value to be assumed for 
a particular parameter, but these assumed values are not often disclosed in project reports. 
Further, a number estimated by a simulation model is likely to be subject to error. Despite these 
shortcomings, it is common for planners to present the forecasted value as a single number 
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without disclosing the confidence intervals. In the absence of reliable project data, planners often 
―fudge‖ the data by applying findings from one region to another. 
Eichengreen (1995) argues that due to difficulties in assessing infrastructure projects, 
private investors are often hesitant to invest in them. It can be especially difficult for foreigns 
investor to obtain project information and assess the project. In some cases, foreign investors 
reduce this uncertainty by drawing on the expertise and knowledge of local investors. However, 
even local investors may face difficulty in assessing project quality. To encourage private 
investment and assure investors, governments offer subsidies and guarantees.  
Eichengreen (1995) argues that government guarantee is essential in addressing the 
information asymmetry problem in railway projects. He provides the example of the North 
Bengal Railway Company in India, which failed to get government guarantee for the railway 
project. Potential investors became concerned about the feasibility of the project, and the project 
failed to begin construction. Other railway projects which managed to obtain government 
guarantee were able to raise funds from private investors.  
Eichengreen (1995) emphasises that in developing countries the domestic financial market 
has limited expertise in supporting infrastructure projects which are characterised by high 
information asymmetries. To address this problem, leaders often turn to foreign financial 
institutions that specialise in assessing infrastructure projects. Their past experience with PPP 
projects gives these foreign institutions a competitive advantage in terms of assessing project 
risk. These financial institutions also have big foreign clienteles which provide a potentially large 
source of funding.  
Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) argue that an independent third party certification is 
important for PPP projects. In Hong Kong, the government enlisted a third party to certify that 
the designs for an infrastructure project have followed the predetermined criteria and codes of 
practice. They provide case studies of several infrastructure projects, including the elevated 
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transport project of Thailand and the Tha Ngone bridge project of Lao PDR, where the 
governments failed to follow the required project development process.   
Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) examine the cost escalation of 258 infrastructure projects 
worth USD 90 billion. Their results show the cost estimates for the transportation projects are 
systematically misleading. To be precise, the projected costs for the infrastructure projects are 
underestimated by the project initiators, or governments, driven in part by political incentives. 
Since it is hard to verify the PPP project documents, the intentional misrepresentation is likely to 
produce losers amongst the project investors. For this reason, Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) 
aurge that it is important to increase transparency in the project infrastructure development 
process.  
Bruijn and Leijten (2007) argue that information is crucial for effective project assessment 
and subsequent decision-making in infrastructure projects. However, project initiators often 
engage in deliberate misinterpretations with other project stakeholders to implement an unviable 
infrastructure project. Therefore, it is crucial for other interested parties to gather appropriate 
project information. Infrastructure projects are highly information sensitive, and decisions based 
on manipulated data can be catastrophic for project stakeholders. Bruijn and Leijten (2007) 
propose that more attention should be given in collecting infrastructure project information. 
Such a careful information collection process can improve the quality of decision making in 
infrastructure projects. 
 Flyvbjerg (2009) argues that the decision-making and planning processes of infrastructure 
projects involve multiple actors with conflicting interests. In studying a sample of 258 transport 
projects, he finds that 90% of them have a cost overrun problem. In most cases, the projects 
have an inaccurate revenue forecast. For instance, on average the actual passenger traffic in 
railway projects is 51.4% lower than estimated. He argues that when forecasting the outcomes of 
transport projects, project planners and promoters often intentionally overestimate the project 
benefits and underestimate the costs in an attempt to present a non-viable project as a viable 
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one. That is, project promoters and planners intentionally spin scenarios of success and gloss 
over the potential for project failure. Strategic misrepresentations of infrastructure projects can 
be attributed to organisational and political pressures.  
To address this problem, Flyvbjerg (2009) emphasises the importance of a project quality 
check by independent authorities, and that project forecasts and documents should be 
independently peer reviewed. He lists potential independent reviewers including the National 
Audit Office and General Accounting Office. Reports from the reviews should be accessible for 
public scrutiny. Project initiators and their organisations should share the responsibility for 
covering cost overruns and project failures resulting from a biased project assessment.  
Odeck, Welde, and Volden (2015) examine the strategies that governments can use to 
reduce overruns in road infrastructure projects in Norway. In 2000, the Norwegian government 
implemented a quality assurance process where all projects with an estimated cost above USD 6 
million must undergo an assessment by external consultants. The study compares the magnitudes 
of cost overruns for transportation projects. They find that the independent evaluation of cost 
estimates has led to a decline in project cost overruns. Also, the external consultant's cost 
estimates are more precise than initial estimates prepared by project authorities. Based on the 
results, the study emphasises the importance of having an independent review of the 
infrastructure project development process.  
 In summary, the above studies highlight the information asymmetry problem in 
infrastructure projects. In addressing the information asymmetry problem, several solutions have 
been recommended. Flyvbjerg (2009) advocates project quality review by government agencies 
to minimise strategic misrepresentation in infrastructure projects. Although he lists government 
agencies such as the National Audit Office as a project reviewer, it is important to consider 
project certification by other potential stakeholders as well. 
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3.3 Certification and Information Asymmetry 
The finance literature proposes several solutions to the information asymmetry problem, 
which are premised largely on financial certification and signaling models. Research on the 
certification of financial intermediaries draws on the work of Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977), 
where an intermediary gathers information about a firm through its existing borrowing 
relationship. They provide an example of financing projects, where the quality of different 
projects can be highly variable. For good quality projects to be financed, an information transfer, 
which is facilitated through financial intermediaries, must occur. 
Signaling, theory, which was originally developed to study the problem of information 
asymmetry in the labor market, has been applied to different areas in the finance literature 
including voluntary disclosure, capital structure, corporate dividend policy, and selection of 
auditors. Spence‘s (1973) seminal work on labor markets examines how information asymmetry 
can be reduced in the employee selection process. Spence shows that how high-quality 
prospective candidates can distinguish themselves from low-quality potential candidates through 
providing a costly quality signal in the form of rigorous higher education. 
The signaling theory addresses how information asymmetry can be minimized if the party 
with more information provides a quality signal to the other parties. Although the signaling 
theory was developed for the labor market, its application extends to any market with an 
information asymmetry (Morris, 1987), including the PPP market. In the PPP market, the seller 
(the government) has more information about the PPP project than the buyers (private 
investors). If private investors have limited information about a specific PPP project but hold a 
general perception about all PPP projects, then investors will value all PPP projects at an average 
price, based on the weighted average of investors‘ general perceptions.  Government and other 
project stakeholders have an incentive to properly communicate about their PPP project quality, 
particularly for high-quality projects. This communication can be done through quality signaling.  
 
48 
  
Another closely related theory is agency theory. Morris (1987) argues that a considerable 
amount of overlap exists between the signaling and agency theories, although they are not 
equivalent. Agency theory deals with the principal-agent problem in the separation of firm 
ownership and control. If individuals act in only their self-interest, then such behavior can lead 
to a conflict between the principal and agents. Devapriya (2006) emphasizes that the PPP project 
financing process needs to address the agency conflict between the shareholders and managers. 
Managers have an incentive to expropriate shareholders‘ wealth by using PPP projects‘ free cash 
flow. Without careful monitoring during the project operation stage, managers may abuse the 
project‘s free cash flows (Sorge, 2011). A solution to the limited expertise that domestic private 
investors have in managing PPP projects in developing countries is to have development 
partners involved in the infrastructure project management process. In this regard, private 
investors rely on the expertise of development partners in monitoring PPP project operation. 
Several authors highlight the certification role of banks as the financial intermediary. Fama 
(1985) argues that the signals provided by banks are credible as the banks back their opinions 
with financial resources. Therefore, a positive loan decision from a bank is useful to avoid 
possible duplication of information costs. Gomes-Casseres (1990) proposes that banks are 
trusted certifying agents with their inside knowledge about the issuing company gained from a 
pre-existing lending relationship. Banks are thus credible transmitters of firm-specific 
information to the financial market. Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) examine how the 
lender‘s identity can affect the stock market‘s response to a loan announcement. Through 
defining each lender‘s identity and its credit rating, the study finds that the firm‘s abnormal 
return is associated with the lender‘s credit quality.  
However, the argument proposed by the above finance papers is based on a pre-existing 
credit relationship between banks and investors, which is not the case for PPP projects. Under 
the project financing structure, new project companies are established for each new PPP project. 
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Since the PPP projects are structured as a new company without any previous track record,  
banks may not have inside knowledge about the PPP project companies. 
A number of researchers highlight how the project financing structure can address 
infrastructure project risk. Based on a signaling model, Shah and Thakor (1987) argue that for 
reducing signaling costs risky projects should be project-financed. If it is hard to access 
information about a project deal, creditors will charge a higher rate for the loan to reflect the 
high information production cost. In equilibrium, the cost of gathering and assessing project 
information will be compensated by the investor. The investor/firm has a choice of engaging in 
a revelation game or having the creditors to collect the project information. To prevent market 
failure, different market participants and other stakeholders have an incentive to create 
information transmission channels. Therefore, if investors take loans from multiple creditors, the 
creditors will share the information among themselves.  
Although it is difficult for investors to participate in the revelation game for the entire 
firm, it is relatively easy to reveal information about a particular project. Project financing 
provides that opportunity as the firm creates the project as a legally separate entity. Therefore, 
creditors are not concerned with the characteristics of the entire company‘s operation and assets, 
but only have to evaluate the individual projects. Project financing thus separates a project from 
existing assets of the business. The investor or firm can share information about the project, and 
signal to the market about the project‘s risk and return. Without a project financing structure, 
creditors would find it difficult to access project information and consequently charge more for 
the higher information production cost. An implication of Shah and Thakor‘s (1987) theory is 
that quality signaling costs are reduced when new projects are financed under a project financing 
arrangement.  
Berkovitch and Kim (1990) focus on the role of project financing approach in minimising 
the agency cost of debt. Risky project debt can lead to conflicts of interest between bondholders 
and shareholders, which may lead to overinvestment or underinvestment incentives in new 
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projects (Myers, 1977). To address this issue, they develop a model for simultaneously analysing 
the overinvestment and underinvestment incentives. They show that under symmetric 
information, project financing is the most efficient process for minimising the agency cost 
associated with risky debt. This occurs since project financing separates a new project from 
existing assets of a company, making it relatively easy to monitor fund utilisation. The 
establishment of a separate project company creates an opportunity to set up an asset-specific 
governance procedure.  
John and John (1991) present a theoretical study of project financing. They argue that the 
project financing structure results from the firm‘s efforts to minimise agency problems. In any 
project, the outstanding debt can increase the agency cost of underinvestment. Without proper 
monitoring by banks, investors can use the bank loans for other purposes. However, in project 
financing, the banks exert considerable control during the construction and subsequent 
operation stage. In the presence of bank monitoring, investors have to use the project debt only 
for the specified purpose. The resultant governance structure can thus lead to a reduction in 
agency cost. 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find project financing loans differ significantly from non-
project financing loans on a number of attributes. In analysing a sample of 4,956 project 
financing loans, they conclude that project financing has a longer average maturity and likely to 
have third-party guarantees. Also, project financing loans engage more participating banks, and 
apply fixed-rate loan pricing rather than floating-rate loan pricing. The financing is also likely to 
be extended to lenders in asset-rich industries, such as energy utilities. Project financing loans 
have a standard loan to value ratio of 67%. Despite such high leverage, project financing loans 
have relatively lower credit spreads than other comparable loans. They attribute the lower agency 
cost in project financing deals to the lower credit spread. In project financing transactions, banks 
exert considerable control on project contract agreements. For instance, step-in-clauses give 
banks the right to intervene in the project and ensure that revenues are generated from the 
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project, thus allowing lenders to recover their funds. Step-in-clauses are increasingly used to 
protect banks in project financing deals. The inclusion of these clauses allows the lenders to take 
over the project company or to obtain control rights in making decisions on behalf of the 
company. With these contract agreements, banks can monitor project implementation and 
performance. 
Sanders and Boivie (2004) argue that the lack of reliable data can result in an information 
asymmetry for a new business, especially in emerging industries.  For an established industry, 
investors can get industry data and reduce information asymmetry through detailed analysis. 
However, such detailed analysis is often not possible for investors in emerging industry. When 
investors cannot differentiate firm quality based on traditional indicators, they may turn towards 
secondary information sources. Through the secondary information investors try to filter and 
find appropriate investment opportunity. While their study is not directly related to PPP projects, 
it implies that PPP investors in developing countries may need to rely on secondary information 
sources for assessing project quality. In most of the developing countries, PPP is a relatively new 
concept and investors often lack access to project data in these markets.  
Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) emphasise  that certification by 
prestigious lead arranging banks can reduce project finance loan spreads. They argue that 
information asymmetry is high in project finance loans as these projects do not have any prior 
operational history. Consequently, banks need to gather expertise in assessing an entirely new 
project company. They emphasize that prestigious arranging banks have better access to legal, 
engineering, financial risk assessment, and market evaluation skills in evaluating project quality. 
Further, having a reputable arranging bank to provide quality certification for the project can 
minimise the search cost of other participating banks. Using a sample of 4,122 projects, they find 
that credit spreads are considerably lower for project financing loans arranged by prestigious 
banks.  
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In summary, in the finance literature, proposed solutions to the information asymmetry 
problem have been largely limited to financial certification. Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and 
Steffanoni (2013) argue that project certification by prestigious banks can lower the project 
financing loan spread. Although the empirical literature on private lending focuses primarily on 
commercial bank loans, the theoretical arguments apply equally to any private lenders including 
development partners. 
 
3.4    Project Modality 
Governments and investors have to make several important decisions during the PPP 
project cycle, one of them being the project modality. In fact, the private investor‘s capital 
contribution requirement is mainly determined by the chosen financing modality. Since 
modalities vary in terms of project risk (Hine, Queiroz, & Chelliah, 2009), governments have 
incentives to implement the project under a modality where most of the project risk is 
transferred to the private investors. 
Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) argue that the PPP project risk sharing 
process can vary depending according to the chosen project modality, which they coin as 
investors‘ ―participation type‖. They differentiate among BOO, BOT, and Management Contract 
modalities in terms of resource commitments, with a higher risk index indicating a higher 
commitment of private sector resources. Using a cross-sectional study of 2,712 PPP projects 
from various developing countries, their empirical study shows that PPP projects are more 
common in countries with better control over corruptions. Less corrupt countries can protect 
investors from potential opportunistic behaviour by corrupt government officials. Further, they 
argue that the common law system tends to secure investors‘ rights and can thus facilitate PPP 
projects. Countries with a common law system and better control over corruption tend to 
implement projects with modalities where private investors absorb the maximum project risk.  
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 Through analysing sector specific data, Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) 
find some interesting sector-specific characteristics of infrastructure investment. They find that 
investors in the water sector prefer modalities with less private sector participation and 
subsequent project risk. Water sector projects can be politically sensitive, and the private sector 
may prefer to take less risk in these projects. Whereas, private investors in the 
telecommunication sector prefer to have modalities with marginally higher private sector 
participation. 
Vives, Benavides, and Paris (2009) provide one of the earliest studies on project modality. 
Their theoretical paper assesses the feasibility of different types of modality under existing local 
conditions in developing countries. They propose eight project variables/conditions that can 
significantly impact the viability of a PPP project: the country‘s fiscal space; legal framework; 
macroeconomic conditions; institutional capacity; political risk environment; sustainability of 
tariffs; size and location of the infrastructure facility; and the willingness of project users to pay 
for the services provided. While investors or governments may have a particular project modality 
in mind, a risky modality will not work without favorable project conditions. With favorable local 
project conditions, greater private participation through risky modalities like BOT may be 
feasible. However, with weak local project conditions, governments should consider lower risk 
modalities such as Management Contracts. If a project is not feasible, the government can 
improve project feasibility by providing selected risk mitigation mechanisms, including political 
risk insurance and credit enhancement. These risk mitigation mechanisms can make a significant 
difference in the project risk profile to private investors.  
Rajan , Siddharth, and Mukund (2010) argue that countries with limited PPP experience 
should initiate PPP programs with less risky modalities as they have a better probability of 
success compared to PPP projects with risky modalities. They provide an example of a relatively 
less risky modality like Rehabilitate, Improve, Maintain, Operate and Transfer (RIMOT) . Under 
54 
  
this modality, the investors have low capital cost and project risk. However, many developing 
countries started their PPP program with relatively risky modalities like BOT. Rajan , Siddharth, 
and Mukund (2010) discuss the case of East Coast Road project, the first PPP project in India 
on road renovation and maintenance. The East Coast Road project was successfully 
implemented under the RIMOT modality, and has been generating a steady increase in revenue 
since the project began operations. In fact, the project was constructed within the budgeted costs 
and time, which is not often seen in infrastructure projects. Demonstration of the initial success 
can be crucial in attracting subsequent investments to other PPP projects, including those with 
more risky modalities. Rajan, Siddharth, and Mukund (2010) encourage further research on PPP 
modalities, as the findings will have significant implications for policymakers in evaluating the 
relevance of different modalities particularly in emerging countries. 
Auriol and Picard (2013) argue that governments tend to choose the BOT modality if the 
project risk is high. They compare public sector projects with BOT modality projects, and 
discuss the circumstances when such modality is favoured. For instance, toll projects tend to 
have a significant risk for a high forecasting error and associated business risk. If governments 
can implement a toll project under the BOT modality, then the private sector has to manage 
most of the project risk. Also, infrastructure characteristics can also influence the choice of 
modality. Under the BOT modality, governments have to manage the PPP project after the 
contract period. Auriol and Picard (2013) argue that the incentive to choose the BOT modality is 
higher if the project operation capability can be easily transferred to the government after the 
contract period. One such sector is the transport sector since road traffic is likely to remain 
constant after the project is transferred to the government. In others, the project‘s characteristics 
such as management expertise cannot be easily transferred as they are tied to the concession 
holder‘s strategy, technology, management procedure or synergies with other projects. For 
example, it is difficult for a government to manage a hospital project treating critical cancer 
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patients. Failure to learn the management aspects of a PPP hospital project can lead to political 
crisis and revenue shortfall.  
 Auriol and Picard (2013) argue that the BOT modality is particularly appropriate in times 
of budgetary crisis when the opportunity cost of state funds rises sharply. However, BOT 
modality involves infrastructure pricing that can reduce consumer surplus, which in turn have 
political consequences for governments. To reduce consumer surplus, governments could use 
the BOT modality with a price cap, thus allowing them to regulate infrastructure prices while 
minimising the loss of consumer surplus. 
 Albalate, Bel, and Geddes (2015) analyse the factors that influence private investors‘ 
project risk sharing behaviour by examining four types of PPP modality: Design, Build, Finance 
Operate; Concession; Management Contracts; and Asset Sales. In terms of risk sharing, they 
grade management contract as the least risky project structure for private investors, followed by 
Design, Build, Finance, Operate; Concession; and Asset Sales. Based on a sample of 472 PPP 
projects between 1985 and 2008, they find that infrastructure project characteristics affect the 
selection of PPP modality. Their ordered logistic and binary logistic regression analyses show 
that private investors share more project risk in single facilities infrastructure projects, such as 
power plant projects, but less project risk in network infrastructure projects, such as road 
projects. One of the key characteristics of network infrastructure projects is that the projected 
revenue depends on other infrastructure projects. For example, revenue from a toll project often 
depends on the toll charge and traffic in surrounding roads. Fiscal variables, such as lower 
government debt levels, encourage PPP project types that involve greater private participation 
and risk sharing.  
 
3.5     Project Ownership 
Marjit (1990) analyses the risk of expropriation in less developed countries and shows that 
investment by the country‘s political authority leads to greater investment by multinationals. He 
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focuses on multinational companies and models the dilemma of nationalisation as a dynamic 
game between multinational investors and the state. With no transfer of technology, the 
formation of a joint venture between the government and the private investor can serve as a 
credible pre-commitment from the government. Therefore, government investment can act as a 
positive signal to the investors. Marjit's (1990) research thus explains the private sector‘s 
willingness to invest jointly with the government in PPP projects.  
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) examine foreign direct ownership in developing countries. 
Developing countries often lack the required technical knowledge and capital for implementing 
large infrastructure projects, and have to rely on foreign direct investment. Foreign investors play 
an important role in these countries by providing capital and sharing the technical experience. 
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) collect ownership data for 4430 non-bank subsidiaries. Using a 
probit regression analysis, they find that governments value the unique capability and assets that 
private investors can offer. In equilibrium, foreign investors‘ equity share increases with the 
scarcity of foreign assets such as technical expertise but declines with the relative importance of 
local assets and expertise to the project. The state policies and the institutional framework for 
investment can also affect the ownership structure. 
Hart (2003) investigates the boundaries between public and private firms and develops an 
incomplete contracting model for PPP projects. He argues that in a theoretically complete 
contracting world, the public sector does not need to own a firm in order to control firm 
behaviour. Any public sector objectives can be accomplished via a comprehensive project 
contract. However, a common characteristic of PPP projects is that contracts are incomplete, 
and, therefore, it is hard to specify the exact responsibilities of different stakeholders in the 
project. Under this circumstance, there is a case for the government to own the PPP project as 
ownership gives the public sector special powers through control rights. 
One of the earliest studies of private ownership in PPP projects is Doh, Teegen, and 
Mudambi (2004). Using a sample of 500 telecommunication PPP projects in more than 100 
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developing countries, they find private sector ownership is positively associated with private 
investment liberalisation policy and economic development of the country. The level of private 
participation is higher for PPP projects with multiple private investors, suggesting that 
collectively, private investors are willing to take relatively more project risk and ownership. 
However, private sector ownership is negatively related to the technological complexity of the 
projects. If we consider technical complexity as a proxy for project risk, then this finding 
suggests that private investors prefer to take less ownership in risky projects. 
Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi (2004) provide the scope for conducting further research into 
PPP project ownership. First, their study only considers the role of private investors and state 
for determining project ownership. In PPP projects, other stakeholders such as commercial 
banks and development partners can also play a vital part in determining the project ownership. 
Further, by focusing on the ownership structure of telecommunications projects only, their 
findings may not apply to other sectors such as transport and water. Compared to the 
telecommunication sector, transport and water projects require significant land acquisitions and 
can be politically more sensitive to infrastructure pricing issue. 
There are also different opinions regarding how public sector ownership affects PPP 
project performance. Oum, Adler, and Yu (2006) study the profitability of various ownership 
structures in 116 airports. They find that airports with majority ownership by the state are 
considerably less efficient than airports with majority ownership by private investors. Airports 
with majority private ownership achieve notably higher operating profit margins. However, full 
privatisation is often not a viable option since airports are strategically important to the public 
sector.  
In a follow-up study, Oum, Yan, and Yu (2008) use the stochastic frontier analysis to 
examine the effects of ownership structure on airport cost efficiency. They use a Bayesian 
estimation approach with panel data of 109 airports, representing different investment value, 
ownership structures, and institutional environment. They conclude that governments should 
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transfer majority shares to the private parties, and estimate an 80% probability that airports with 
a majority private sector ownership will attain higher efficiency than those with a majority 
government ownership. 
Klijn and Teisman (2003) conduct a case study of three Dutch PPP projects and find that 
in a mixed ownership structure, project partners experience major project management difficulty. 
They find that institutional fragmentation in the country can create barriers for PPP project 
stakeholders. For instance, in developing countries, private sector needs to obtain project 
approvals from different line ministries. Such fragmentation increases the difficulty of decision 
making and requires considerable organisational effort to implement and operate the project.  
Moszoro (2010) develops an efficient capital structure model, which predicts that the 
optimal capital structure for PPP projects is achieved through the joint equity participation of 
both the private investor and the government. The government‘s involvement in the equity share 
provides certainty to the project‘s commercial viability. With its investment, the government is 
expected to take measures favouring a particular project. His model is based on two 
assumptions: (i) the public sector can borrow project capital at a lower rate than can the private 
sector; and (ii) the private sector can construct the PPP project at a lower cost compared to the 
public sector. A mixed capital structure ensures the internalisation of the private sector‘s 
managerial advantage and the state‘s financial advantage. However, Moszoro's (2010) model has 
certain drawbacks as it assumes that the state can always borrow at a cheaper rate than the 
private sector, which is true only if the public sector has recourse to taxpayers. Moszoro (2010) 
also points out that the public sector‘s equity participation can solve the principal-agent problem 
in PPP projects. However, joint ownership can also trigger conflicts between the project‘s 
stakeholders as the public and private sectors can have different project priorities leading to 
disputes. 
In sum, different researchers explain PPP ownership structure from different perspectives. 
Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi (2004) highlight the bargaining process between the government 
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and private investors. Moszoro (2010) highlights how capital structure influences ownership 
structure but ignores project risk management issue.  
 
3.6     The Role of the Government and Development Partners 
Infrastructure project certification provides an interesting research opportunity as various 
stakeholders, including governments, development partners, commercial banks, regulators, and 
private investors, interact during the planning and implementation process of the PPP project. 
While Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) provide initial insights into the 
certification role of commercial banks in project financing deals, there is currently limited 
research on the certification role of governments and development partners in PPP projects. 
Most of the existing research focus on the broad roles of governments and development 
partners in PPP projects, concentrating on why support from governments and development 
partners is necessary.  
Dailami and Klein (1998) discuss the potential risks of investing in PPP projects, including 
currency convertibility and transferability risks. Most of the PPP project revenues are generated 
in local currencies, but investors need to service the international debt in foreign currencies. 
Exchange rate fluctuations can create a significant risk to foreign private investors and financiers. 
They conduct a case study of the Argentinean private natural gas transport company 
COGASCO, which started operation with a guarantee from the government about currency 
convertibility. In 1982, with low foreign exchange reserves, the government breached the 
contract with COGASCO, which initiated a dispute. After the dispute, COGASCO and its 
parent company went bankrupt. This case study highlights the fact that governments can and do 
provide various long-term project commitments to attract private investors, but do not always 
deliver them. 
Ramamurti (2001) emphasises that in providing the guarantee, the state assumes full 
responsibility for all future liabilities that the guarantee may create. He gives an example where 
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the Spanish government provided a foreign exchange guarantee in 1970 based on wrong project 
assessments, and eventually had to pay USD 2.5 billion. Considering the enormous financial 
implications of providing a guarantee, governments have an incentive to carry out a careful 
project quality assessment before issuing a guarantee.  
Several studies highlight the risk of PPP projects, and the importance of support from 
project stakeholders. Harris, Schur, and Hodges (2003) examine cancelled PPP projects with 
total investment commitments of USD 24.2 billion in developing countries between 1990 and 
2001. Their sectoral analysis for cancelled toll projects shows that the government and the 
private sector had very optimistic traffic forecasts for these projects. They provide a case study 
of the Mexican toll road project where the government offered indirect guarantees to private 
investors. After implementing the project, the government, however, failed to honour the 
guarantee, leading to project cancellation.  
Ramamurti (2003) assesses the credibility of states‘ promises for PPP projects, and what 
strategies private investors can adopt to ensure that the promises are fulfilled. His research 
provides three explanations for government renegotiation in PPP projects: (i) political change, 
where new leaders renege on a previous project deal; (ii) economic uncertainty and downturn; 
and (iii) ‗‗obsolescing bargain‘‘, which makes the infrastructure deal less attractive for the 
government after the project has been implemented. The importance of infrastructure 
investment to economic development suggests that governments are incentivised to ―sell hard‖ 
PPP projects to the private sector, including promising favourable contract terms. Once the 
investment from private investors is made, Ramamurti (2003) argues that governments may 
break their promises. To minimise the risk of this happening, private investors can ask for 
specific guarantees from the government. From the government‘s perspective, project guarantees 
can impose considerable risk and potential costs for the host country, and may be difficult to 
manage, particularly during periods of economic downturns. For instance, if the government 
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were to provide an exchange rate guarantee for PPP projects, then all the projects will 
simultaneously require exchange rate support from the government during a crisis period. 
 Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005a) argue that government guarantees are 
essential if private investors are not confident with government policy. Based on a questionnaire 
survey, they assess different success factors for PPP projects in the U.K. They find that 
government guarantees are the key success factor for PPP projects, even in the U.K., which is 
one of the pioneers of PPP. Viewing the state as a risk reduction agent, Li, Akintoye, Edwards, 
and Hardcastle (2005a) emphasise that government guarantee is essential in attracting private 
investors to PPP projects.  
Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster (2005) estimate the rate of return to private 
investors in PPP projects and assess the adequacy of the return relative to the project‘s risk. 
Their sample consists of 34 PPP projects from Latin America in various sectors, including 
electricity, telecommunication, transport, and water. They find that in most cases, the rate of 
return on PPP projects is below the cost of capital, with PPP projects in the telecom and energy 
sectors rewarding a better than average return than those in the transport and water sectors. The 
authors also develop an index of the quality of regulation, and find that better quality regulation 
is positively related to a closer alignment between the financial return and the cost of capital. 
Thus, the paper confirms that the quality of regulation is important for PPP projects. 
Blanc and Strange (2007) examine the government‘s role in infrastructure projects. In line 
with Ramamurti (2001) and Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005a), they hypothesise that 
since PPP projects are politically important and are supported by governments, they should have 
lower loan spreads. Commercial banks may also view the state as the underwriter of the PPP 
project. This is exemplified by London Underground PPP where the U.K. government 
underwrote a significant portion of the £4.5 billion project. However, the authors find no 
evidence supporting their hypothesis. The empirical results show that lenders do not differentiate 
between PPP projects that receive and do not receive a guarantee from the government.  
62 
  
 Carpintero and Gomez-Ibañez (2011) provide an example in Mexico, where the 
government renegotiated many road sector PPP projects immediately after the Mexican Peso 
crisis. From 1989 to 1994, the Mexican government initiated an ambitious PPP program granting 
52 projects. State-owned banks provided roughly 50% of the total financing for these projects. 
In most of the projects, the actual traffic was much lower than that forecasted due to the 
Mexican financial crisis in 1995. As traffic was cut down and interest rates were increased, the 
financial viability of the PPP projects was undermined. Financial difficulties of transport projects 
soon led the government to renegotiate most of the projects. Intervention by the government 
was deemed necessary because the financial difficulties of the PPP road projects made the 
Mexican banking system vulnerable. By 1997, the government took control of 23 road PPP 
projects, ignoring the interest of private investors.  
Several authors use the obsolescing bargain theory to explain such exploitation by 
governments. The theory, originally developed by Vernon (1971) to analyse foreign investment 
in natural resource projects, argues that the bargaining ability of the government and the investor 
changes with the project cycle.10 PPP projects have some similarities with those in the natural 
resources industry. For example, both have similar significant initial investment requirement and 
sunk cost characteristics. According to the obsolescing bargain theory, at the start of the project, 
the investor has a stronger bargaining power over the government. To persuade the private 
investor to invest, the government offers favourable project terms. The combination of 
technological, marketing, and financial dependence often causes developing countries to accept 
contract terms that are weighted more heavily in favour of foreign investors. However after the 
project investment, the power relationship between the host government and the investor 
reverses.  
As the investor can no longer withdraw their investment, the government has the 
bargaining power to renegotiate the contract in its favour. However, to address such risk the 
                                                          
10 In obsolescing bargain theory, the initial bargain favours the foreign investors. However, with sunk investment 
characteristics, the relative bargaining power shifts to the state after the investors invest in the country. (Eden, 2004). 
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investor looks for project risk mitigation options such as including influential stakeholders in the 
project who can negotiate on her behalf. Although Vernon (1971) does not propose any risk 
mitigation process, possible options include the participation of a development partner in the 
project. With such an inclusion, the investor can make it more costly for the government to 
break the contractual terms of the PPP project.  
 Several authors offer different justifications for the involvement of development partners 
in PPP projects. Harris, Hodges, and Schur (2003) argue that the participation of reputable 
development partners can provide legitimacy to a project. They give the example of the Hub 
power project in Pakistan, where the World Bank is both a subordinated debt holder and a 
guarantor of senior debt. During 1998, Pakistan issued notices of intent to terminate the Hub 
power project on the grounds of alleged corruption. The World Bank later negotiated with the 
government on behalf of private investors, and successfully persuaded the government to change 
its position. Doh and Ramamurti (2003) provide a case study of the Linha Amarela expressway 
project of Brazil where the new authorities tried to change the project‘s tariff structure. 
Specifically, the new mayor issued instructions ignoring the policies of his predecessor, and 
instructed the private investor to reduce the toll from USD 0.67 to USD 0.56. The Inter-
American Development Bank intervened in the project, and successfully convinced the Rio 
government to cancel the toll reduction plan. 
Eden (2004) explores how participation by development partners facilitates project 
financing. He argues that it is difficult to create a complete contract with the host government in 
PPP projects. Without it, the private sector faces political risk and should, therefore, structure 
the project financing deal in a way that makes it difficult for the state to take actions that are 
detrimental to private investors. One such strategy is by including development partners in the 
project. The cost of any adverse state action would then fall on the development partner who 
has considerable political influence, and if necessary, can provide pressure on the government to 
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act in the interest of the private investors. Participation of development partners can thus create 
an environment in which government intervention in PPP project can be constrained.  
 Thomsen (2005) identifies the key obstacles for PPP projects, including obtaining project 
financing and managing project financing risk. He analyses some case studies on PPP projects, 
including Grameen Phone from Bangladesh, and water sector PPP projects in Senegal. Based on 
the analysis, he argues that Official Development Assistance (ODA) from different development 
partners can reduce project risk and raises profitability. Participation of development partners 
has multiple advantages, including ensuring adequate transparency and reducing political risk. 
Development partners‘ involvement also adds indirect assurance that investors will receive 
support if the government were to change its infrastructure policies. 
 Developing countries often depend on influential development partners for foreign aid, 
and this enables development partners to exert a significant influence on governments‘ decision. 
Kimura and Todo (2007) argue that foreign aid can reduce the political risk to foreign direct 
investment. They find that external aid from a particular donor country encourages foreign direct 
investment from the donor country but not from other countries. Based on the analysis of a 
sample of 1,384 foreign direct investment projects from 98 recipient countries, they find that 
infrastructure aid from Japan promotes foreign direct investment from Japan to the beneficiary 
developing country. If a country is dependent on foreign aid, the recipient government is less 
likely to take actions against the foreign investor from the donor country. The same applies to 
development partners as developing countries are less likely to take action against PPP projects 
where development partners have provided loans, guarantees, or invested equity. Therefore, 
investors may see the involvement of a development partner in the PPP project as a form of 
implicit guarantee against political risk in developing countries.  
 Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) argue that development partners have unique advantages in 
infrastructure projects as they have considerable influence derived from participation in public 
infrastructure financing, and their provision of foreign aid. Also, development partners have 
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frequent interactions with governments and have expertise in stakeholder management. 
Therefore, the involvement of development partners in a loan syndicate for PPP projects can 
mitigate political risk in developing countries. Based on a sample of 4,978 loans in 64 countries, 
they find that if the political risk is high, investors can mitigate project risk by inviting 
development partners in the loan syndicate. The involvement of development partners is 
particularly effective in a politically risky country. 
In summary, the above studies show that development partners and governments play a 
crucial role in PPP projects. However, the evidence is based mostly on case studies specific to 
certain industry and certain countries. Most studies advocate for PPP project risk management 
assistance from governments and development partners, but none has empirically addressed 
whether these stakeholders can attest to PPP project quality and risk.  
 
3.7   Institutional Quality and PPP Projects 
Institutions have a crucial role in an economy to assist the efficient operation of the 
market. Institutions ensure that individuals and firms can participate in transactions without 
paying unjustified costs or risks (North, 1990). Banerjee, Oetzel, and Ranganathan (2006) argue 
that effective institutions are crucial for promoting PPP investment. The existence of efficient 
capital markets, regulation, and protection of property rights can reduce investment uncertainty 
and encourage investment. By minimising risk, institutions can reduce transaction and 
information searching costs. The legal environment can have a considerable effect on 
infrastructure projects as these projects are often subject to interference by the host government. 
Infrastructure projects are politically sensitive, and the state may be worried about the monopoly 
position that many PPP investors hold. Besides, the government can be concerned about the 
impact of infrastructure projects on public health and intervene to reduce any potential 
environmental impact.  
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Banerjee, Oetzel, and Ranganathan (2006) argue that private investors‘ response to 
corruption can vary depending on the market condition. Avoiding a developing country for fear 
of may not be a viable option for private investors as they often feel compelled to increase 
revenue or follow competitors. This is predominantly the context in the infrastructure market 
where the first entrant can pre-empt other competitors and gain a crucial monopoly advantage. 
Based on a panel of 40 developing countries over the period 1990-2000, they find that countries 
with effective economic and legal institutions attract significantly more PPP investment. Greater 
macroeconomic stability, higher GDP growth, and higher effective exchange rates attract a 
greater volume of PPP investment. They also find more corrupt countries have higher levels of 
PPP, and argue that although investors prefer to avoid corrupt countries, they have very few 
alternative markets. Often in highly corrupted developing countries, investors may utilise their 
location-specific advantages. 
Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden (2006) argue that investors respond to pervasive 
corruption by modifying their mode of entry. The mode-of-entry decision is an important 
element for PPP investors as it substantially influences their degree of control, investment risk, 
resource commitment, and profits. For foreign investors, it is particularly important to assess 
institutional quality before finalising their entry mode since foreign investors can be 
disadvantaged by the environmental uncertainty of the host country. Challenges of entry can 
include obtaining project-related environmental licenses and managing different regulatory 
matters relating to project management. Using a data set of over 400 telecommunications PPP 
projects in 96 developing countries from the PPI database, they find that investors adjust to the 
pressures of corruption using the joint venture entry strategy. Investors also use short-term 
contracting to address the threat of corruption. Also, instead of the equity-entry mode, investors 
engage in non-equity modes for highly corrupt countries.  
Estache, Juan, and Trujillo (2007) argue that the credibility of the state in fulfilling its 
contractual responsibilities and its ability to ensure compensation for political risks are critical for 
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project financing deals. If the government has a history of violating project commitments, that 
can make prospective investors wary about the viability of a new PPP project. This applies in 
particular to foreign investors who are vulnerable to political risks. Estache, Juan, and Trujillo 
(2007) propose that development partners‘ support would be necessary to mitigate this risk in 
developing countries.  
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng (2009) argue that the institutional environment can 
affect investors‘ entry strategies. Institutions can provide information about potential business 
stakeholders and their likely behaviour. In developing economies, the typically weak institutional 
environment can magnify information asymmetries, and investors are uncertain about their 
partners‘ behaviour. The strengthening of the institutional environment can address these risks 
and lower the costs of doing business, which in turn influence investors‘ entry modes. The 
authors combine survey and archival data from four developing economies: South Africa, 
Vietnam, Egypt, and India. They find that institutions can indeed directly influence investors‘ 
entry strategies. In a weak institutional environment, joint ventures are the more common entry 
mode to access the required project resources than in a stronger institutional environment. 
 
3.8    Summary and Conclusion 
Highlighting the enormous errors in forecasting the benefits and costs of PPP projects, 
many studies agree that it is difficult for private investors to assess PPP project risk and quality 
correctly. Recent studies have started to examine the role of certification in PPP projects. 
Certification is an important line of research as it draws attention to the quality assessment 
problem in PPP projects. There is also a lack of theories to explain the involvement of 
development partners and governments in PPP projects. While previous studies have highlighted 
evidence of the influence of government policy on PPP projects, there is a paucity of empirical 
evidence about the certification function that governments and development partners play in 
PPP projects. From the literature it appears that along with the state other stakeholders can 
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support PPP projects. While both governments and development partners have access to project 
information, there is limited evidence whether these stakeholders act as trusted certifiers and 
influence the project decisions.Besides, it is not clear how different types of signals from various 
stakeholders can interact with one another and how investors interpret these signal patterns. For 
instance, in some PPP projects, both governments and development partners provide 
certification.  
Since PPP is a part of the project financing literature, most existing papers rely on the 
theoretical aspects of project financing to explain the investment aspects of PPP projects. Most 
of the extant studies follow a case study based approach due to data constraints, providing 
evidence which is often too partial to allow firm generalisations to be drawn. As Inderst (2010) 
points out, infrastructure data are still very limited, making empirical research work on the 
infrastructure sector difficult.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 This chapter develops the hypotheses on the choice of modality and private sector 
ownership of PPP projects in emerging countries. The hypotheses aim to examine 
how government certification, development partners‘ certification and reputation, and 
institutional quality are related to project modality and private ownership. Understanding 
modality selection is important because it affects PPP project risk management and the 
incentives for investors to participate in the project. Understanding private sector ownership is 
important as it affects the cost of capital, project risk allocation, the degree of technology 
transfer, and the distribution of project gains in the PPP market.  
The first hypothesis, outlined in Section 4.2, relate to government certification effects on 
project modality and ownership. These hypotheses draw on the theoretical argument of signaling 
theory proposed by Spence (1977). The second hypothesis aims to examine the effects of 
development partner certification on project modality and ownership, and is developed in 
Section 4.3. Drawing on the theoretical model of certification by financial intermediaries in 
Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977), I argue that development partners as independent third parties 
provide credible certification of project quality. In Section 4.4, I develop the third hypothesis 
relating to the reputation effects of development partners on project modality and ownership. 
These hypotheses derive from the literature on reputational signaling, most notably the work of 
Klein and Leffler (1981). Finally, hypotheses on the interaction between institutional quality and 
certification effects in relation to project modality and ownership are provided in Section 4.5. A 
chapter summary is provided in Section 4.6.  
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4.2     Government Certification Effects 
My hypotheses first explore the certification role of governments in the choice of project 
ownership and modality. Just like selling securities in the financial market, governments create 
PPP projects and sell the right to implement them to private investors. As the project originator 
or seller, the government has more information about the project than private investors. Before 
bidding for a particular PPP project, private investors complete individual due diligence by 
gathering information about the project. Access to PPP project information is thus vital to 
private investors; otherwise, they may prepare an erroneous project feasibility study.  
The role of information in the coordination process of economic activities was first 
emphasised by Hayek (1937). He argues that the market system motivates investors to search for 
information. Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe (2011) argue that a critical factor in an investor‘s 
decision to proceed with a project is the quality of project information provided by the 
government. The government can provide project information, which includes, amongst other 
things, details about the financial feasibility of a PPP project as well as early stage environmental 
and social impact assessment results. Along with information about the current PPP project, 
investors often also need information about potential future infrastructure projects. For instance, 
if the government wants to establish a new PPP port project, private investors would need to 
know about associated projects since a PPP port project may create little commercial sense 
unless there is a plan for road and rail infrastructure projects.  
When PPP projects are not homogenous and information about the project development 
process, financial feasibility, and value is not in the public domain, investors would find it 
difficult to choose from a set of PPP projects. Asymmetric information about the quality and 
value of a PPP project may result in an ―adverse selection‖ or a ―lemon‖ problem in the PPP 
market. Potential private investors, recognising this potential problem, will protect themselves by 
reducing their investment stake in the project accordingly. At the extreme, the project does not 
take off – this is a likely outcome if the government fails to persuade investors about the true 
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value of the PPP project. For mitigating this potential deadlock in the project implementation 
process, the government may choose to increase information disclosure, alter the project plan, 
and/or offer a modality with lower project risk to private investors. Alternatively, the 
government may provide assurance to private investors through project guarantees, which 
indicate the government‘s willingness to share the PPP project risk.  
Spence (1977) argues for the signaling role of warranty in promoting product purchase by 
uninformed buyers. Signaling theory deals with the interaction between two parties in the 
presence of information asymmetries and addresses ways of reducing the problem. Spence (1977) 
proposes that a high-quality producer might provide a long-term product warranty to signal its 
quality commitment to uninformed buyers. A low-quality producer is not likely to follow a 
similar strategy because of the associated high cost, thus confirming longer warranties as a 
positive signal of product quality. Grossman (1981) argues that for new products, the available 
information can be very limited for the buyer, and that the seller can use warranties or ―money-
back‖ guarantees to distinguish  their  high-quality product from lower quality ones.  
In line with the signaling arguments of Spence (1977) and Grossman (1981), I argue that in 
the PPP market, government guarantees can act in the similar way as long-term warranties to 
private investors. PPP is a new but emerging concept in developing countries, and for PPP 
projects to be financed, information transfer must occur. Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977) argue 
that the information transfer is best managed through the actions of project insiders who, in the 
case of PPP projects, are the governments. The importance of infrastructure investment for 
economic growth (Aschauer, 1989) suggests that governments have strong incentives to 
encourage private investment by signalling about project quality and risk. Eichengreen (1995) 
explains how governments can address the information asymmetry problem in railway projects. 
Since the amount of traffic in a railway project is contingent on the economic development of 
adjoining regions, he argues that private investors are often reluctant to invest in the project 
unless they receive a guarantee from the government.  
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However, the credibility of the signal is likely to be compromised by the fact that the 
government, as the seller of the PPP project, is not an independent party to the transaction. 
Nevertheless, as in Akerlof‘s (1970) study of the automobile industry where dealers assure buyers 
by providing warranties and quality certificates about second-hand cars, I argue that in the PPP 
sector, government agencies can also assure project quality by providing a range of guarantees, 
which may apply to various aspects of the project, including the payment, the debt amount, the 
revenue and the exchange rate.11 
 A government‘s decision to issue guarantees can thus increase investors‘ confidence in the 
PPP project since the government can be expected to have carried out due diligence checks on 
the financial feasibility of the PPP project before granting the guarantee support. This is because 
of the binding financial liabilities that the government takes on when it issues the guarantee. That 
is, by providing guarantees, the state becomes accountable for all potential liabilities that the 
guarantees may create (Ramamurti, 2001). PPP projects guaranteed by governments are thus 
viewed to be less risky to private investors, encouraging them to participate in the projects. This 
has support in Zhang, Wang, Tiong, Ting, and Ashley (1998), who argue that guarantees can 
increase the level of confidence of private investors, and lower their risk exposure. Li, Akintoye, 
Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005b) argue that government guarantees are necessary if private 
investors are not confident about government policy.    
Government certification through guarantees can thus influence the choice of project 
modality selection. Since modalities vary in terms of project risk, investment requirements from 
private investors, and control over infrastructure assets (Hine, Queiroz, & Chelliah, 2009), 
governments have incentive to implement the project under a modality where most of the 
project risk is transferred to the private investors. To minimise their exposure to project risk, 
                                                          
11 In payment guarantee, the state agrees to fulfil the purchase obligations of a state-owned enterprise in case of 
non-performance by the purchaser. Through revenue guarantee, the public sector fix a minimum variable income 
for the private investors. Debt guarantee occurs when the government secures the borrowings of a private investor, 
and guarantees loan repayment to creditors in the case of default by the private investor. In exchange rate guarantee, 
the state protects the private investor from fluctuations in the value of the local currency. 
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governments are likely to conceal adverse information about PPP project risk from the private 
sector. The difficulty for private investors in assessing the financial risk of a selected modality is 
further compounded by the fact that most PPP projects do not have any prior operating history.  
For private investors, certification about the financial viability of a selected modality is 
important. Vives, Benavides, and Paris (2009) claim a significant number of project failures in the 
infrastructure sector can be attributed to the poor choice of modality. Since infrastructure 
projects are capital intensive, inappropriate project modality selection can be highly costly to 
private investors. With such uncertainty and in the absence of effective certification, risk-averse 
private investors are likely to stay away from projects with high-risk modalities and invest only in 
less risky ones. Private investors may not even bid for a PPP project if the government cannot 
convince them about the suitability of the project modality. High levels of uncertainty 
surrounding an investment can, therefore, create a barrier to entry for private investors in the 
PPP market.  
With such uncertainty about project quality, government can assure investors about the 
viability of a modality through certification. For example, a project under the BOO modality may 
be financially risky to private investors. By providing a guarantee under the BOO modality 
project, the government signals the project‘s quality to the private investors. Consequently, a 
project with a risky modality can become financially viable if there are risk mitigation instruments 
like government guarantees or insurance in place (Vives, Benavides, & Paris, 2009). Based on the 
above arguments, I predict the following: 
H1a: Government guarantees enable the PPP project to be implemented under a 
relatively risky modality 
The chronological order of the decisions made in PPP projects is that modality selection is 
one of the initial project decisions, followed by the private sector‘s decision to invest in the PPP 
project. Project guarantees from governments, who are the sellers of the project, transfer the 
project risk from the buyer to the seller. State guarantees are valuable to private investors as they 
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enhance the investors‘ borrowing capability, decrease the cost of financing and can encourage 
investors to increase ownership. For instance, in the case of loan guarantees, the government 
assures the lender that the debt will be fully or partially repaid by the state if the project fails 
(Zhang, 2005). Government loan guarantees are thus valuable by reducing the lender‘s risk 
premium on the loan (Regan, Love, & Smith, 2012).  
If information about PPP projects becomes obsolete between the project modality 
selection stage and the stage when ownership structuring decision is made, private investors will 
find it difficult to assess project quality and may not invest in the PPP project. In the absence of 
government guarantees, there is likely to be a duplication of information production as investors, 
banks, and other stakeholders have to assess project quality individually. Thus, project guarantees 
can provide an effective certification tool to avoid duplication of information production and to 
encourage greater private sector ownership. It is also essential that the state provide certification 
to promote private sector ownership. Therefore, I predict the following: 
H1b: PPP projects with government guarantees have higher private sector 
ownership.  
 
4.3    Certification Effects of Development Partners  
My second hypothesis explores the certification role of development partners in the choice 
of project modality and private sector ownership. If a project were to receive funding from the 
private sector, it is essential that information about project quality is credibly transferred or 
signaled to the market (Brealey, Leland, & Pyle, 1977). Perhaps a more credible way of certifying 
and signaling project risk (quality) is to involve an independent third party.  
It is well recognised in the finance literature that third-party certification is valuable when 
insiders and outside investors have different information sets about product quality (Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004). The third party is often an intermediary with superior inside information about the 
project. In the financial markets, financial intermediaries are viewed as highly skilled in collecting 
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and processing information about firms and can credibly signal their quality to the market due to 
reputation concerns (Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977); Fama, 1985). For instance, prestigious 
underwriters are often engaged to provide some credibility to new ventures (Bruton, Chahine, & 
Filatotchev, 2009). Rating agencies play a similar role by signaling firm quality (creditworthiness) 
to the financial market (Ederington, Yawitz, & Roberts, 1987). In this context, underwriters and 
rating agencies act as informed third parties who bear the signalling cost by putting their 
reputational capital on the line.  
The prevalent information asymmetry problem in the PPP market suggests that without an 
intermediating information broker, there would be enormous duplication in information 
production as each party attempts to screen the project (Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). 
Drawing on the theoretical model of certification by financial intermediaries in Brealey, Leland, 
and Pyle (1977), I argue that development partners provide a valuable certification role about 
PPP project quality. Development partners can facilitate information transfers by certifying PPP 
project quality as they have both the technical ability and independence to assess project quality. 
Reputation concerns (Klein & Leffler, 1981) ensure that development partners would not 
participate in low-quality projects.  
The institutional stamp of approval provided by development partners thus closely 
matches the certification role of financial intermediaries. Development partners have been 
known to value transparency and  careful project planning process (Stiglitz, 1999). PPP project 
planning stage primarily involves financial, social and environmental risks, where development 
partner's can utilize their expertise by carefully identifying, assessing and mitigating potential 
project risks. During the modality structuring stage, which is the initial phase of a PPP project, 
investors are more likely to participate in PPP projects with a sound planning process. I predict 
that certification by development partners can encourage the private sector to invest under a 
modality with greater risk for the following reasons.  
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First, development partners are highly skilled in gathering information about PPP projects, 
just as financial intermediaries are about firms. Domestic commercial banks may not have the 
necessary expertise and experience in gathering information about large infrastructure projects. 
International commercial banks are likely to have greater financial resources and experience, but 
face the added difficulties of collecting information in different business environments. 
Development partners may present solutions to some of these difficulties as they have existing 
operations in developing countries. Ratha (2001) argues that because development partners have 
access to a wealth of information about developing countries, their loans promote private 
investment by signalling a quality investment environment.  
Second, development partners have an incentive to independently assess PPP project 
information before finalising their support decision. These institutions carry out due diligence 
checks on project structure and modality; otherwise, they will have to bear the financial 
consequences. For instance, a seaport may turn out to be not financially viable due to planning 
errors like shortage of berths, inadequate channel depth, and limited transit areas. These errors, 
which often escape existing government agencies, are likely to be detected by independent third 
parties such as the development partners in their due diligence process. Allen (1990) argues that 
an intermediary could signal its informed position by investing resource, especially in assets 
where it has special knowledge. By providing loans, syndication, and guarantee support in a PPP 
project, development partners commit their financial resources to the project. Since development 
partners can access project-related information, including information about the viability of the 
proposed modality, a positive support decision from them provides an institutional stamp of 
approval about the feasibility of the selected modality (Eden, 2004).  
Third, development partners have an extensive background in structuring PPP projects in 
developing countries. Estache, Juan, and Trujillo (2007) argue that PPP project financing is much 
more complex than traditional corporate financing as it typically involves a diverse group of 
stakeholders. PPP project financing requires unique project management skill as well, since 
77 
  
forecasting the benefits and costs of PPP projects is often problematic for government and 
investors (Ramamurti, 1992). In this regard, development partners can use their experience in 
developing a feasible PPP project deal. For instance, during the period 1989-2013, the IFC has 
provided PPP project assistance in 102 countries. Involvement of development partners such as 
the IFC can enhance the credibility of a PPP project, and provide greater assurance to investors, 
banks, and other stakeholders (Chowdhury, Orr, & Settel, 2009). By holding a portfolio of PPP 
projects, development partners can diversify unique PPP project risk away, thus enabling them to 
support PPP projects through a number of channels, including the provision of loans, equity, 
and syndication.  
In sum, development partners‘ certification can have significant implications for the 
project modality structuring process by giving credibility to the PPP project (Settel, Chowdhury, 
& Orr, 2009). Development partners‘ involvement in the PPP project certifies to the market that 
the project has been carefully planned, and follows a transparent project development process. 
Thus, with the participation of a development partner, PPP projects are more likely to be 
implemented with a more risky modality.  
H2a:  PPP projects with development partners’ certification are implemented under 
a more risky modality. 
Along with influencing project modality, development partners‘ certification can also 
determine the level of private sector ownership of PPP projects. PPP projects involve an 
extended operation period, and it is necessary to assure investors about the long-run project 
profitability. Investors may consider a PPP project operation process as less risky if a 
development partner is participating than when only the government and the investors are 
managing the PPP project. Therefore, governments often turn to development partners in the 
belief that their endorsement of PPP project operation has a positive market value. Participation 
of development partners is thus essential as these institutions can minimise PPP project 
operation risk through different channels.  
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First, compared to commercial banks, development partners are likely to have more 
efficient project monitoring abilities, which can enhance a project‘s value. Devapriya (2006) 
argues that the financing process in PPP projects needs to address the agency conflict between 
the shareholders and managers. This conflict arises because of managers‘ motivation to 
expropriate shareholders‘ wealth by using free cash flow. Without careful monitoring during the 
project operation stage, managers may abuse the project‘s free cash flows, leading to 
opportunistic behaviour and inefficient investments (Sorge, 2011). As development partners are 
often involved in the planning and investment stages of infrastructure projects, they have some 
advantage in monitoring PPP project operation. Additionally, most development partners have a 
separate unit for monitoring PPP projects. For instance, during the 2002-2012 periods, 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) assisted 81 PPP projects by providing 
political risk insurance with a total gross exposure of USD 5.1 billion. For private investors and 
commercial banks, it can be difficult to monitor project operation. 
Second, PPP project operation requires long-term commitments from both the public and 
private sectors. For instance, during war or an environmental crisis, the private sector and the 
government need to collaborate in managing existing infrastructure projects. If a PPP project is 
in financial distress, it may be optimal for all parties to provide additional support to the project. 
Estache, Juan, and Trujillo (2007) argue that during force majeure events, the government may 
need to extend the project period or to provide additional financial support to investors. 
However, often PPP project documents do not specify the support requirement during force 
majeure events. To manage this kind of situation, investors require an intermediary who 
coordinates with the government. Utilising their relationship with the government, development 
partners can address unique operational risk of PPP projects. Consequently, PPP projects that 
involve a development partner are expected to attract greater private sector ownership.  
Third, most PPP projects have a long contract period. It is thus important to minimise 
political risk during the operation period. Operation stage involves commercial and political risk, 
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where the private investors may face fluctuations in the project output and political interference. 
Development partners can share PPP project risk by providing political risk and exchange rate 
guarantees (Ramamurti, 2001). In the case of project disputes, development partners can 
coordinate with the government and offer political risk diversification options for private 
investors. Such supports can minimise PPP project risk, especially during the operational stage of 
the PPP project. Since many developing countries rely on development partners for aid, 
development assistance, and loans, development partners have a bargaining power over 
governments (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012), making it easier for them to negotiate with the 
government in the case of project disputes. Buiter and Fries (2002) similarly argue that 
development partners‘ support for private sector projects is essential as it can mitigate the risks 
associated with government policies. In fact, some of the development partners, including 
MIGA, are set up with the mission of managing political risk in foreign direct investment 
projects (Baker, 1999). 
Along with investors, lenders in an emerging market often seek political risk guarantees 
from development partners. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) argue that the availability of political 
risk mitigation instruments from development partners can reduce project finance loan spreads. 
They emphasise that development partners can intervene if there is any indication of project 
dispute, and resolve potential complications with the government on behalf of private sector 
investors.  
Since development partners are expected to carry out due diligence checks on the 
feasibility of PPP projects before deciding on whether to provide any form of support, I argue 
that a positive support decision from development partners also provide assurance about project 
quality. Development partner involvement may be seen as a proxy for the careful project 
planning and operation process, thereby encouraging greater private sector investment. Thus, I 
hypothesise the following:  
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H2b: PPP projects with development partners’ certification have higher private 
sector ownership.  
 
4.4     Development Partners’ Reputation Effects 
My third hypothesis explores the role of development partners‘ reputation in certifying 
PPP project quality. These hypotheses draw from the literature on reputational signaling by 
Klein and Leffler (1981). I argue that if development partners differ in their technical ability and 
independence in assessing the project quality, and investors are aware of this difference, then the 
certification effect of prestigious development partners is expected to be stronger. This argument 
is in line with the role of auditors‘ reputation in certifying the truth and fairness of financial 
statements (Deangelo, 1981). Certification by a higher quality auditor, in this respect, allows users 
of the financial statement to make more informed investment decisions. Similarly, Logue (1973) 
argues that the participation of a prestigious investment banker can positively influence the stock 
price at which initial public offerings of equity can be sold.  
A theoretical paper by Diamond (1989) argues that reputation is essential for firms to 
access debt and raise equity. Firms with a relatively short history will try to acquire reputation by 
borrowing it from a prestigious intermediary. In most developing countries, investors and 
governments have limited experience in implementing PPP project. Therefore, reputation can be 
a very valued asset in developing countries, and often governments try to include reputed 
development partners in the project. 
Prestigious development partners can thus provide a valuable project signal to the 
investors. However, these development partners often also require the fulfillment of costly 
environmental and social compliance. Their careful project implementation can imply an 
increased project planning cost for the government. This viewpoint is similar to hiring high-
quality auditors, who can offer precise information about the firm, but are also more costly to 
hire (Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991). Therefore, I argue that when a government invites a 
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prestigious development partner to participate in the PPP project, it indicates the government‘s 
willingness to plan the project carefully. From the perspective of the prestigious development 
partner, the focus will be more on strategies aimed at influencing project demand, and on 
incorporating policies designed to eliminate environmental risks and encourage social 
development.  
At the initial phase of the PPP project development, certification by a prestigious 
development partner can help modality structuring process in three ways. First, before bidding 
for a PPP project, private investors have to assess the project‘s structure, including its 
development process and modality. Ezulike, Perry, and Hawwash (1997) report that investors are 
often reluctant to employ (costly) external advisors at the initial phase of the PPP project, and 
would rather wait until they have a reasonably high probability of winning the project. This 
suggests that at the initial stage of the PPP project, the participation of a reputable development 
partner like the World Bank is highly valuable to private investors as it provides assurance of the 
project‘s quality and selected modality. Renowned development partners have the experience and 
technical expertise in managing PPP projects, suggesting that more prestigious development 
partners are more credible in certifying project risk. The credibility of their certification is also 
ensured since reputable development partners have the more reputational capital to lose from 
false or inaccurate certification. This argument is similar to the certification effects in the project 
financing market. Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) argue that certification by a 
prestigious arranging bank can reduce credit spreads more than loans arranged by less reputed 
banks. 
Second, reputed development partners have greater access to (inside) information. 
Prestigious institutions like IFC and ADB offer project planning assistance to PPP projects, 
whereas other development partners concentrate only on financial support. As prestigious 
development partners are involved in the planning phase, they enjoy greater access to 
confidential project information, enabling them to coordinate more effectively with the 
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government and the private investor. The asymmetric information between prestigious and other 
development partners grants the former an information monopoly about the PPP project. 
Third, in recent years, there has been an increasingly negative sentiment about the PPP 
concept in both developing and advanced economies. PPP projects often face large-scale 
protests because of potential environmental concerns and social sustainability issues, which in 
turn can result in real risks to investors and their financiers. In developing countries, 
governments and other project stakeholders have been known to conceal information on the 
potential environmental impacts of the project during the planning stage. This often results in 
wide-scale public opposition during the project‘s completion stage. Reputed development 
partners can address these issues by carefully reviewing environmental risk during the project 
planning process. Therefore, in light of the potential social and environmental risks that may 
arise from the PPP project, private investors are likely to participate in a less risky modality when 
only the government manages the environmental and social risks.  
I propose that certification by prestigious development partners is effective in alleviating 
some of the financial, environmental, and social concerns about PPP projects. Prestigious 
development partners have a track record of maintaining transparency in project development 
process. Over the last decade, institutions like World Bank and IFC have pioneered the concept 
of environmental sustainability for infrastructure projects. These development partners have 
strong incentives to maintain their market reputation as leaders of environmental and social 
sustainability through a careful project supervision and review process before project selection 
(Baker, 1999). Any public protest over environmental and social issues relating to projects which 
development partners have an association with can damage their market reputation. Therefore, 
all else being equal, having a prestigious development partner involved in the PPP project signals 
to the market that there is a robust planning process which can reduce project risk. Since 
development partners are not a homogeneous group, I argue that private investors are more 
likely to participate in projects associated with more prestigious development partners. 
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Prestigious development partners perform a more credible certification role, and their 
involvement can thus reduce project risk and encourage investment in relatively more risky 
modality. 
Development partners‘ reputation can also affect subsequent project operation stage, in 
particular decisions related to PPP project ownership. In developing countries, investors have 
greater incentives to form a long-term relationship with influential project stakeholders. Peng 
and Heath (1996) argue that when institutions, such as property rights and contract law, are 
weak, investors focus more on relationship-based and network-based strategies for managing 
business risk. The motivations for entering this kind of relationship include risk sharing and 
gaining access to new markets. Through developing a relationship with prestigious development 
partners, investors develop the ability to enforce project contracts and reduce PPP project 
operation risk.  With a relatively lower operational risk, private investors may be willing to share 
more project ownership. During the 1990s, prestigious development partners including World 
Bank, ADB, and IFC played a central role in introducing the concept of PPP, and their presence 
may motivate governments to enforce PPP contracts properly.  
Along with the project planning stage, development partners are expected to be 
heterogeneous in their ability to support PPP projects for two reasons based on differences 
between the role of prestigious and less prestigious development partners. First, prestigious 
development partners have extensive experience in the infrastructure sector in developing 
countries. This is exemplified by prestigious institutions like World Bank and IFC, which have a 
long track record of successfully assisting developing countries in infrastructure projects. 
Therefore, these prestigious institutions are more familiar with project management and project 
quality assessment for developing countries than their less prestigious counterparts. Reputed 
development partners also have the expertise in managing social and environmental risk 
management issues – an attribute that is particularly valuable for attracting international lenders 
and institutional investors. If the private investor wants to form a consortium with a diverse 
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group of investors and lenders, prestigious development partners‘ certification can also reduce 
the project financing cost.  
Second, reputable development partners have greater ability to manage political disputes 
with the government during the project operation stage. Once a PPP project deal has been 
sealed, and a project contract has been finalised, there remains a question of whether the 
government will properly fulfill the terms of the contract. Miller (2003) argues that participation 
of prominent development partners can provide legitimacy to the project. As developing 
countries often depend on big development partners for foreign aid, these agencies have 
stronger bargaining power in influencing a government decision. Kimura and Todo (2007) argue 
that foreign aid can reduce the political risk of foreign direct investment. If a country is 
dependent on foreign aid, the recipient government is less likely to take actions against foreign 
investors from the donor country. The same argument applies to prestigious development 
partners. Prestigious development partners are more likely to offer aid to developing countries 
and are thus more able to influence the decision-making process of the government.  
Hence, an affirmative support decision from prestigious development partners can provide 
a positive signal about project quality. Based on the above, I hypothesise the following: 
H3a:  PPP projects with participation from more prestigious development partners 
are implemented under higher risk modality. 
H3b: PPP projects with participation from more prestigious development partners 
have higher private sector ownership. 
 
4.5    Country Institutional Quality and Certification 
My fourth hypothesis examines how country-level institutional quality affects the 
effectiveness of certification by governments and development partners in modality selection 
and private sector ownership of PPP projects.  
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The law and finance literature, pioneered by La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), 
establishes the link between a country‘s legal infrastructure and financial market development. 
They focus on two important aspects of the legal infrastructure − the legal protection of investor 
rights and the quality of legal enforcement of these rights. Results from cross-sectional 
regressions on a sample of 49 countries show that differences in institutional quality explain why 
the size of the capital market varies around the world, and why different corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e., stakeholder/bank-centred versus shareholder/market-centred) have been 
chosen in different economies.  
Transactions in markets can thus be facilitated by an institutional environment which 
ensures contract enforcement and which promotes transparency (Peng and Heath, 1996). In 
countries with strong institutions, information asymmetries are more efficiently resolved through 
public disclosures, implying that there is more information about potential business stakeholders 
and their likely behaviour (Casson, 2001). Conversely, in countries with weak institutional quality, 
information asymmetries are magnified, and investors face higher partner-related uncertainties 
and costs (Meyer, 2001). In sum, entrepreneurs are more likely to raise external capital when 
terms offered by financiers (creditors or shareholders) are better, and financiers are more willing 
to offer capital to entrepreneur at better terms when they know their rights are secured by law. 
PPP projects are based on contractual agreements between the state and the private 
investors. The credibility of the government to uphold project contractual obligations and to 
provide compensation for political risks are thus critical aspects of PPP project financing 
(Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). This argument suggests that PPP projects‘ financial viability 
depends on the legal framework, which is shaped by institutional quality. In countries with poor 
institutional quality, investors also need to deal with additional project risks arising from 
corruption, political unrest, and contract renegotiation. These additional risks permeating from 
poor institutional quality reduce the inherent value of the investor‘s investment stake in the PPP 
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project, and may cause the investor to minimise their risk exposure by engaging in low-risk 
project modalities and limited equity investments (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Private investors of PPP projects therefore cannot rely on legal protection in countries 
with weak institutions due to the high uncertainty about the quality of regulations, which in turn 
increases project risk (Doh, Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004). It follows that in countries with poor 
institutions and where information asymmetry is ubiquitous, the private sector is likely to shift 
the emphasis from PPP project information, which is lacking, to indirect secondary indicators of 
project quality such as the ―stamp of approval‖ by governments and development partners. In 
this environment, a government‘s decision to issue a guarantee can increase investors‘ confidence 
in the PPP project by lowering their risk exposure (Zhang, Wang, Tiong, Ting, & Ashley, 1998). 
This happens mainly because of the binding financial liabilities ensuing from the guarantee 
(Ramamurti, 2001). The above suggests that government certification effect is stronger in 
countries with poorer institutional quality, in line with Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle's 
(2005a) contention that government guarantees are necessary if private investors are not 
confident about government stability. I therefore predict that the positive relation between 
government certification and project modality risk/private sector ownership is stronger in 
countries with poorer institutional quality. 
H4a:  The positive effect of government certification on project modality and 
private sector ownership will be strengthened in countries with poorer 
institutional quality  
 
Likewise, the ability of development partners to create an environment in which 
government intervention can be constrained (Eden, 2004), for example by putting pressure on 
the host government to act in the interest of the private investors, is more valuable in countries 
with poor institutional quality. This is consistent with Estache, Juan, and Trujillo (2007), who 
argue that in a relatively risky country, investors require support from development partners to 
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reduce project risk exposure. Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) claim that in politically risky countries, 
participation of development partners is especially effective at reducing project risk. In fact, 
where there are high levels of political risk, project stakeholders take deliberate initiatives of 
including development partners in loan syndicates. Similarly, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) 
contend that large infrastructure projects are exposed to political inference by host governments, 
and that political risk guarantees from development partners can reduce the credit spread of 
project finance loans. Since development partners‘ certification indicates their willingness to 
minimise political and economic risks, I argue that certification of development partners is more 
valuable in countries with poorer institutional quality. Therefore, I predict that the positive 
relation between development partners‘ certification and project modality risk/private sector 
ownership is stronger in countries with poorer institutional quality. 
H4b: The positive effect of development partners’ certification on project modality 
and private sector ownership will be strengthened in countries with poorer 
institutional quality  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter develops four testable hypotheses in my thesis. The first hypotheses predict 
that PPP projects with government certification are implemented under higher risk modality and 
attract greater private sector ownership. With government certification through the provision of 
project guarantees, some of the project risk that private investors do not want to bear shifts back 
to the government, thus making the investment more attractive to the former.  
The second hypotheses examine how development partners‘ certification is related to 
project modality selection and private sector ownership. These hypotheses are based on the 
theoretical argument that development partners can certify project quality as an independent 
third-party. Project certification from development partners thus signals project quality, allowing 
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PPP projects to be implemented under higher risk modality and to attract greater private sector 
ownership.  
The third hypotheses test the reputation effects of development partners in PPP project 
modality selection and private sector ownership. The hypotheses are premised on development 
partners being heterogeneous in their ability to certify and support PPP projects. Since more 
reputable developments partners have greater technical ability and independence to certify PPP 
projects credibly, I hypothesise that PPP projects with participation from more prestigious 
development partners are implemented under higher risk modality, and are associated with 
higher private sector ownership. 
The final hypotheses examine the interaction between the quality of country-level 
institutions and the certification effects of governments and development partners in PPP 
projects. Since private investors are expected to put greater value on certification by 
governments and development partners, I hypothesise that institutional quality moderates the 
certification effects of both governments and development partners in relation to project 
modality risk and private sector ownership. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
5.1     Introduction 
        This chapter discusses the sample used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter Four. It 
begins with a discussion of my data sources in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the research 
methods used to test the hypotheses, and the sample profile is described in Section 5.4. A 
summary of this chapter is provided in Section 5.5. 
5.2     Data 
The initial sample is drawn from the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, 
which covers 5,781 PPP projects implemented in 139 developing countries from 1990 to 2012.12 
The PPI database is a joint product of the Infrastructure Policy Unit of the World Bank‘s 
Sustainable Development Network, and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF). It provides PPP project-specific data, including project modality, the percentage of 
private sector ownership, and details of development partners‘ support. An important caveat of 
the PPI database is that it considered project investment value from the private sector 
perspective, not the public sector perspective. In many projects, the PPP project value from the 
public sector‘s perspective is higher because it includes the feasibility study cost and transaction 
expense, along with the cost of other forms of government support including guarantees 
(Izaguirre & Kulkarni, 2011).  
The database covers PPP projects in the telecommunication, energy, transport, and water 
sector projects, and 16 development partners who provide different types of support, including 
loans, risk management, insurance, syndication, equity, and guarantees. From the initial sample, I 
exclude (i) countries with less than 20 PPP projects; (ii) merged and cross-border PPP projects to 
ensure that the same PPP project is not double-counted; (iii) projects that are in the construction 
                                                          
12 The PPI database is restricted to publicly available PPP project data and relates only to projects that have reached 
a financial close. 
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stage; and (iv) projects with missing data. These filters result in a final sample of 4,384 PPP 
projects in 36 developing countries. Country-specific data such as corruption, inflation, GDP 
growth are all sourced from the Political Risk Services (PRS) database. 
Figure 5.1 provides a graphical overview of annual PPP investment in developing 
countries for my sample13. In 1990, PPP investment in my sample of developing countries was 
only around USD 12.50 billion. The investment flows in PPP projects increased over time, from 
USD 12.68 billion to a record USD 105.91 billion in 1997. Particularly in South America, the 
privatisation of the power and telecommunications sector in Argentina in the early 1990s, and 
later in Brazil drove such investment increase.  
The investment flows decreased significantly during the 1997-2000 period. Investment fell 
to USD 89.54 billion in 1998 and USD 65.77 billion in 1999. Although investment recovered 
slightly to USD 78.50 billion in 2000, it dropped again in 2001, to USD 63.53 billion. By 2002 
private investment was only 46% of the levels seen in 1997. This decline coincides with the East 
Asian financial crisis, which made an investment in developing countries riskier. The crisis 
reduced the aggregate infrastructure demand and increased the exchange rate risk for the 
investors. The PPP market in developing countries was rather slow to pick up from the shock of 
the Asian Financial Crisis, taking around nine years to reclaim pre-crisis levels. 
                                                          
13 For the study, I select countries which have extensive background in PPP project. Based on criteria of 
having at least 20 PPP projects, I select 36 countries from my initial sample of 139 developing countries. 
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Figure 5.1 
Investment commitment on PPP projects in developing countries by  
year, 1990-2012 
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Figure 5.2 provides a graphical overview of annual PPP investment by sector for my 
sample. Especially for energy and telecommunication sector, PPP project investment increased 
rapidly during the early 1990s. For instance, Investments in energy projects grew from USD 592 
million in 1990 to USD 43.49 billion in 1997. The expansion of private investment in the energy 
sector has been influenced by technological innovation and market reform by governments. 
Telecommunication sector grew from USD 4.47 billion in 1990 to USD 34.47 billion in 1997. 
Investment in Telecommunication sector was driven by new technology, including the rapid 
growth of the mobile telephone and internet. 
From 2003, three is a steady rise in the investment in energy, transport and 
telecommunication sector. By 2007 private investment was 214% of the levels seen at 2002. The 
growth was driven mainly by the telecommunications sector. Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster 
(2005) find that among different infrastructure sectors, telecommunication has the highest 
operating profitability followed by energy and transport. Among the four sectors, water and 
sewerage have the lowest profitability. Such profitability of water sector projects can explain the 
lower investor preference towards this sector. The growth of telecommunications suggests that 
investors are giving preference in sectors with greater return potential, as expected. Private 
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investors seem to favour sectors with faster payback and limited regulatory intervention such as 
telecommunications. Most telecommunication projects rely on technological innovation and 
therefore, the government has to continuously rely on the management capacity and innovation 
of private investors. 
Figure 5.2 
Investment commitment on PPP projects in developing countries by  
sector and year, 1990-2012 
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Table 5.1 provides the frequency distribution of sample PPP projects and investment 
commitment by sector and region. Panel A shows that PPP projects are most abundant in the 
energy sector, accounting for 50% of all projects and 54% of total investment value. The next 
largest sector is transportation, which received an investment value of USD 307.52 billion, or 
30.75% of the total PPP investment. The water and sewerage sector makes up 16% of the 
number of PPP projects, representing just 6% of total investment value.  
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of sample PPP projects by sector, 1990-2012 
N (%)
Total 
Investment               
(USD Million)
(%)
Panel A: By Sector
Energy 2,114       (49.68%) 538,480.40          (53.85%)
Telecommunication 327          (7.69%) 93,582.95            (9.36%)
Transportation 1,262       (29.66%) 307,528.03          (30.75%)
Water and Sewerage 681          (16.00%) 60,344.25            (6.03%)
Panel B: By Region
Asia 2,444       (55.75%) 511,192.75          (51.12%)
South America 1,151       (26.25%) 304,138.76          (30.42%)
North America 298          (6.80%) 59,705.10            (5.97%)
Europe 284          (6.48%) 78,248.97            (7.83%)
Africa 207          (4.72%) 46,650.05            (4.67%)
Total 4,384        (100.00%) 999,935.63            (100.00%)  
Panel B of Table 5.1 provides a overview of PPP projects by region. The use of PPP 
financing approach has been growing significantly since the 1990s, but the geographical 
distribution of PPP projects is not homogeneous. The period 1990–2012 was dominated by the 
Asian region, which attracted 56% of the total PPP investment, followed by South America and 
North America, which attracted 26% and 7% of investments respectively. Europe, along with 
Africa, lagged behind significantly, with only 6.5% and 5% of total investment value respectively. 
The low investment value of PPP investment in Africa is due to the fact that PPP was 
introduced at a later stage in Africa. For example, Nigeria implemented its first PPP project as 
late as 1997, compared to 1991 for Bangladesh. 
Table 5.2 shows the PPP project implementation status of sample countries. While the use 
of PPP has spread into most developing countries, the wealthier and larger countries dominate 
the investment table. In my sample of 36 countries, China, India, and Brazil account for around 
50% of the total project value. In these emerging economies, the rapid economic growth and 
urbanisation have necessitated the supplementing of infrastructure investment.  
This suggests that the PPP investment occurred in high growth and densely populated 
countries, where high market demand can be assured. In India and Brazil, governments have 
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strongly supported ambitious PPP program with necessary market reforms. To increase 
infrastructure investment, Brazil initiated the Growth Acceleration Program (GAP) and 
successfully implemented the federal road concession program. India established the India 
Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL) to provide long-term debt financing to PPP 
projects, as well as the Viability Gap Fund (VGF) to encourage PPP projects (Izaguirre & 
Kulkarni, 2011).  
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Table 5.2 
Distribution of sample PPP projects by country, 1990-2012  
N (%)
Total Investment               
(USD Million)
(%)
China 957 (21.83%) 107,386.09              (10.78%)
India 702 (16.01%) 204,095.36              (20.49%)
Brazil 591 (13.48%) 199,339.80              (20.01%)
Mexico 192 (4.38%) 45,416.35                (4.56%)
Argentina 182 (4.15%) 38,655.25                (3.88%)
Turkey 126 (2.87%) 53,519.83                (5.37%)
Chile 131 (2.99%) 25,230.70                (2.53%)
Russian Federation 130 (2.97%) 38,130.58                (3.83%)
Philippines 116 (2.65%) 34,886.11                (3.50%)
Colombia 114 (2.60%) 17,365.89                (1.74%)
Thailand 99 (2.26%) 24,841.49                (2.49%)
Malaysia 86 (1.96%) 42,943.56                (4.31%)
Peru 87 (1.98%) 16,175.72                (1.62%)
Indonesia 79 (1.80%) 25,816.70                (2.59%)
Pakistan 76 (1.73%) 16,131.40                (1.62%)
Vietnam 80 (1.82%) 10,159.80                (1.02%)
Sri Lanka 70 (1.60%) 2,470.88                  (0.25%)
Bulgaria 50 (1.14%) 7,054.49                  (0.71%)
Nigeria 47 (1.07%) 7,719.03                  (0.77%)
Bangladesh 49 (1.12%) 3,330.77                  (0.33%)
South Africa 40 (0.91%) 11,725.30                (1.18%)
Romania 49 (1.12%) 10,876.29                (1.09%)
Ukraine 39 (0.89%) 3,397.60                  (0.34%)
Costa Rica 31 (0.71%) 1,629.70                  (0.16%)
Guatemala 28 (0.64%) 3,562.70                  (0.36%)
Bolivia 25 (0.57%) 4,212.00                  (0.42%)
Panama 26 (0.59%) 5,225.20                  (0.52%)
Dominican Republic 21 (0.48%) 3,666.20                  (0.37%)
Ecuador 21 (0.48%) 3,159.40                  (0.32%)
Uganda 20 (0.46%) 2,145.03                  (0.22%)
Algeria 20 (0.46%) 9,693.50                  (0.97%)
Egypt, Arab Rep. 20 (0.46%) 9,077.30                  (0.91%)
Tanzania 20 (0.46%) 1,046.19                  (0.11%)
Kenya 20 (0.46%) 1,942.60                  (0.20%)
Ghana 20 (0.46%) 2,801.10                  (0.28%)
Albania 20 (0.46%) 1,360.76                  (0.14%)
Total 4,384           100% 999,935.63              100%
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5.3     Research Method 
To test the effect of certification on project modality selection and ownership, the 
following two regression models are run. I use Huber White robust standard levels for my 
regressions, which assume independence in residuals14. 
Financing_Modalityi,t = β0  + β1Govt_Certification_Dummy,t +β2 DP_Certification,t+ β3 
Govt._Certification_Dummy x Corruptioni,t+ β4 DP_Certification x Corruptioni,t+ β5 
DP_Reputation+ βj Controli,t+ ei,t,     (1) 
 
Private_Ownershipi,t =  β0+β1Govt_Certification_Dummy,t+β2DP_Certification,t+β3 
Govt._Certification_Dummy x Corruptioni,t+ β4 DP_Certification x Corruptioni,t + 
β5 DP_Reputation+ βj Controli,t + ei,t ,      (2) 
 Where Financing_Modality in equation (1) is an ordinal variable, on a scale from 1 to 10, 
with 1 indicating the least risky modality to private investors, and 10 indicating the most risky 
modality. This ordering of project modalities is consistent with Hine, Queiroz, and Chelliah 
(2009), who argue that PPP modalities differ in the level of risk transferred to private investors. 
Therefore, each PPP financing modality has a different financing risk and incentive structure for 
the private investors. I categorise PPP modalities following the methodology of Hammami, 
Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) and adopted by Albalate, Bel, and Geddes (2015). Hammami, 
Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) assign low risk to modalities where the private sector shares 
minimum project risk and contributes minimum capital during the project implementation 
stage.15  In a relatively risky modality, the private sector has to manage most of the project risk 
and make a significant capital contribution. The underlying assumption is that with low private 
sector involvement, the private sector assumes low project risk. Such assumption is also 
                                                          
14 I also test for correlation in residuals by cluster, for instance by sector and modality. However, I found 
no evidence of strong correlation in residuals. 
15 While the private sector accepts project modality during the project planning stage, it contributes 
capital during the project implementation stage. 
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consistent with PPP categorisations adopted by reputed institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank (Felsinger, 2008). Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue (2006) argue that 
Management Contracts is the least risky modality as the private sector assumes the minimum 
market risk and has the least possible capital commitment under this modality. They classify 
Leasing as the next least risky modality, followed by Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer; 
Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent and Transfer; Merchant; Build, Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer; 
Build, Own, Operate and Transfer; Build, Lease and Own; Build, Own and Operate; Partial; and 
Full . 
In equation (2), Private_Ownership is the percentage of the PPP project owned by private 
investors. For assessing the effect of certification on ownership, I exclude PPP projects with 
Management Contract modality following Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi (2004). They exclude 
Management Contract modality, as the private project company only handles the management 
aspect of the infrastructure project, and the ownership and investment decisions remain with the 
public sector. Following Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi (2004), I also exclude Lease contract PPP 
projects since the private sector manages the entire project over the contract period, but 
ownership, financial responsibilities, and investment decisions remain with the public sector. 
Therefore, I have a reduced sample of 4,255 PPP project for testing the effect of certification in 
PPP project ownership. 
Govt._Certification_Dummy is a dummy variable which equals one if the project receives 
supports from the government, and zero otherwise. Eichengreen (1995) argues that investors are 
often unwilling to invest in private infrastructure projects because of difficulties in evaluating the 
projects. In PPP projects, the government can ensure project quality by providing fixed 
payments, and a range of guarantees including guarantees on project payments, debt, revenues, 
exchange rates, and construction costs. I examine the following seven different types of 
government guarantee support: Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, 
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Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee. A dummy 
variable is used to indicate the presence of each of these support types from the government.  
DP_Certification aims to capture certification effects of development partners. 
DP_Certification is the sum of the value of all project supports from development partners scaled 
by the PPP project value. I also proxy the certification effect of development partners through 
using a dummy variable DP_Certification_Dummy, which equals one if the project receives project 
support from development partners, and zero otherwise. To test whether the type of support 
granted by development partners matters to modality selection and private sector ownership, I 
use scaled value and dummies to indicate each of the following support instruments: Loans, 
referring to direct debt financing from development partners; Guarantees, referring to partial 
credit guarantees, civil disturbance, political risk coverage against currency inconvertibility, and 
breach of contract; Equity, referring to direct capital investment by development partners; 
Quasi_Equity, which includes subordinated loan investments, income note investments, preferred 
stock and convertible debt;16 Risk_Management, which includes derivatives instruments provided 
by development partners; and Syndication, which includes loan arranging support from 
development partners who also act as the lender-of-record. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy is 
a dummy variable which equals one if the project receives certifications from both government 
and development partners, and zero otherwise. 
It is important to note that the instruments for development partner's certification can 
vary between the PPP project modality and ownership decision stage. During the modality 
decision, development partners provide an early endorsement of project quality through loan and 
syndication. Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) emphasise that the availability of potential 
lenders is often determined before the private investors submit the tender. Investors need to 
                                                          
16 Many development partners, including Inter-American Development Bank, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and International Development Association are not allowed to invest 
in PPP projects. In our sample of 4,255 PPP projects, investment by development partners (equity and 
quasi-equity) occurs in only 58 projects. 
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submit a formal financing intention letter from the lenders during the project bidding stage. 
Farquharson, Mastle, & Yescombe (2011) discuss the Queen Alia Airport expansion project, 
where IFC provided an early endorsement of project quality by issuing indicative terms of 
finance. During the ownership stage, development partners can provide seven different types of 
support instruments: loan, syndication, guarantee, insurance, risk management, equity and quasi-
equity. Often, PPP projects receive multiple types of support development partners. To account 
for this, I construct DP_Support_Number, which denotes the number of support types provided 
to the PPP project by development partners. 
DP_Reputation is the development partner‘s reputation. Following others (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Sufi, 2007), I use the development partner‘s market share in the PPP market as an 
indicator of reputation. How, Lam, and Yeo (2007) use market share to proxy the underwriter‘s 
reputation in the new issues market. Based on the reputational capital paradigm, they argue that 
market share indicates the revenue stream at stake for an investment bank, and that bigger (more 
reputable) banks have more to lose from a tarnished reputation. Fang (2005) argues that market 
share includes the ―brand name‖ and ―goodwill‖ of an investment bank.   
 I measure the quality of a country‘s institutions, denoted by InstQuality in the above 
equations, using Corruption. Corruption can raise the cost of investment and increase 
investment uncertainty (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002).Corruption can also reduce firm performance 
and thus significantly reduce a country‘s investment inflows (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & 
Eden, 2006).In PRS database corruption is measured through an index, which is concerned with 
corruption through nepotism, secret party funding, excessive patronage, and skeptically close 
affiliation between politics and business.  
 Control is a vector of control variables that may have an effect on project modality and 
private sector ownership. Following Marjit (1990), I control for GDP_Growth, measured by the 
annual percentage change of a country's gross domestic product. Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and 
Yehoue (2006) report that PPP projects are more frequent in countries with higher aggregate 
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demand, suggesting that private investors may prefer to invest in countries whose market is large 
enough to allow for cost recovery. From the private investors‘ point of view, markets with high 
economic growth are more attractive as demand is more likely to be there and sustainable in the 
longer term. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield is dummies representing the types of PPP 
projects. 
 I control for Inflation since it can influence PPP project risk structure (Hammami, 
Ruhashyankiko, and Yehoue, 2006). High inflations have a negative impact on private sector 
investment (Cardoso, 1993), and can also affect the value of a PPP project as well as the ability 
of infrastructure users to pay for the infrastructure services. I also control for projects where 
private investors have a 49% ownership since these are often politically important projects where 
the government wants to maintain ownership control. Own49pct is a dummy variable which takes 
a value of 1 if the private sector has 49% ownership in a project, and zero otherwise.  
 I control for the natural logarithm of the size of the PPP project (Ln_(Size)) since larger 
projects have greater risk, which may affect modality selection and private sector ownership.17 
Finally, I include year and sector fixed effects to capture unobserved year and sector factors. In 
tests of private sector ownership, I also include dummy variables to indicate the different types 
of project modality, which vary mainly in (i) the level of risk transferred to private investors; and 
(ii) the control of infrastructure project.  
 
5.4     Sample Profile 
 Table 5.3 provides the distribution of sample PPP projects across the different modalities 
for testing the effect of certification in project modality selection. PPP projects under the Build, 
Operate, and Transfer modalities are the most common, accounting for 31% of all projects and 
27% of total investment value. Build, Own and Operate is the next leading modality, representing 
                                                          
17 The PPI database provides project value, which reflects only investment in physical assets. Often, PPP 
projects receive land and/or equipment from the government, but these data are not available from the 
database. Therefore, the reported project investment may underestimate the actual project cost. 
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24% of total investment value. While the Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer modality makes up 
9.92% of the total number of projects, it represents just 4.60% of the total investment value. 
Table 5.3 
Distribution of sample PPP projects by project modality, 1990-2012 
N (%)
Total Investment               
(USD Million)
(%)
Management contracts 97 2.21 244 0.02
Lease contracts 89 2.03 3,543 0.35
Rehabilitate, operate and transfer 435 9.92 46,374 4.60
Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer 46 1.05 6,279 0.62
Merchant 331 7.55 73,242 7.27
Build, rehabilitate,operate and transfer 696 15.88 212,218 21.07
Build, operate and transfer 1,369 31.23 272,641 21.07
Build, own and operate 960 21.9 242,333 24.06
Partial 248 5.66 110,933 11.01
Full 113 2.58 39,371 2.91  
 Table 5.4 provides the distribution of private sector ownership for testing the effect of 
certification on private sector ownership. Panel A shows the mean private sector ownership is 
87.99%. The variation in private sector ownership is relatively high, with a standard deviation of 
22.03%. Panel B shows there is no considerable difference in the mean (median) values of 
private sector ownership across the different sectors. The transportation sector has the highest 
mean value of private sector ownership at 89.66%. The variation in private sector ownership 
across the PPP projects in the telecommunication sector is comparatively high, with a standard 
deviation of 24.81%.  
Stratifying by project type, Panel C shows that divestiture projects have the lowest average 
ownership at 62.21%, with a standard deviation of 30.70%. Divestiture projects often have 
strategic importance to governments as these projects were previously controlled by them. Such 
importance can explain governments‘ reluctance to surrender ownership in these projects. 
Concession projects, however, see private investors holding a high average ownership at 90.70%. 
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Table 5.4 
Private sector ownership distribution of sample PPP projects, 1990-2012 
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Full Sample
Private_Ownership 4,255 87.99 100.00 22.03 5.00 100.00
Panel B: By Sector
Energy 2,141 87.90 100.00 21.91 5.00 100.00
Telecommunication 325 83.71 100.00 24.81 5.00 100.00
Transportation 1,202 89.66 100.00 21.48 5.00 100.00
Water and Sewerage 587 87.28 100.00 21.71 10.00 100.00
Panel C: By Type
Concession 1,182 90.70 100.00 19.27 5.00 100.00
Divesture 359 62.21 56.00 30.70 5.00 100.00
Greenfield 2,714 90.18 100.00 19.51 5.00 100.00
 
 
 Table 5.5 provides the descriptive statistics of sample PPP projects. The average 
investment value of a PPP project is USD 236.69 million, indicating that the average PPP project 
is capital intensive involving a significant capital contribution from private investors. The 
maximum project investment value is USD 148 billion.  
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the types of support provided by development 
partners and governments to PPP projects. Around 9.8% and 11.1% of PPP projects receive 
some form of support from governments and development partners respectively. Just 1.1% of 
sample PPP projects receive support from both governments and development partners. Among 
the types of support provided by development partners, loans are the most common followed by 
syndication and guarantees. In terms of the dollar value of total support from development 
partner (scaled by total project value), insurance, loans, guarantees and syndication have a 
relatively higher values while risk management support has the lowest. The latter is due to the 
low nominal value of derivatives contracts.  
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Table 5.5 
Descriptive statistics for sample of PPP projects 
Size is the total investment amount under the project. I use dummy for different modalities for different PPP 
modalities. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield is dummies representing the types of PPP projects. 
Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero 
otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the development 
partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from 
both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the sum of the dollar value of all 
forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is the market share of a 
development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types provided by development 
partners in a project. Loans_dummy takes a value of one if the project receives loan support from the development 
partner, and zero otherwise.. I also use a similar dummy variable for other development partner support which 
includes Syndication_Dummy, Insurance_Dummy, Risk_Management_Dummy, Equity_Dummy, Quasi_Equity_Dummy and 
Guarantee_Dummy. Loans is the dollar value of loan support from development partners scaled by the PPP project 
value. I also use a similar variable for other development partner support which includes Syndication, Insurance, 
Risk_Management, Equity, Quasi_Equity and Guarantee. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a country‘s 
gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the consumer price index. Corruption is 
an index on the extent of corruption within a political system.  
N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Project Characteristics
Size 4,255      236.692 72.400 547.470 0.030 14800.010
Concession 4,255      0.278 0.000 0.448 0.000 1.000
Greenfield 4,255      0.637 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000
Divestiture 4,255      0.084 0.000 0.278 0.000 1.000
Modality:
Build_Lease_Transfer 4,255 0.003 0.000 0.055 0.000 1.000
Build_Operate_Transfer 4,255 0.321 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000
Build_Own_Operate 4,255 0.225 0.000 0.418 0.000 1.000
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer 4,255 0.163 0.000 0.369 0.000 1.000
Merchant 4,255 0.077 0.000 0.267 0.000 1.000
Partial 4,255 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 1.000
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer 4,255 0.010 0.000 0.103 0.000 1.000
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer 4,255 0.102 0.000 0.302 0.000 1.000
Rental 4,255 0.009 0.000 0.098 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Certification Types
Govt_Certification_Dummy 4,255 0.098 0.000 0.298 0.000 1.000
DP_Certification_Dummy 4,255 0.111 0.000 0.314 0.000 1.000
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 4,255 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 1.000
DP_Certification 4,255 0.518 0.401 0.470 0.008 2.868
DP_Support_Number 4,255 0.168 0.000 0.551 1.000 6.000
DP_Reputation 444 0.229 0.179 0.175 0.006 1.000
DP Certification type:
Loan_Dummy 4,255 0.085 0.000 0.279 0.000 1.000
Syndication_Dummy 4,255 0.035 0.000 0.183 0.000 1.000
Insurance_Dummy 4,255 0.001 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.000
Risk_Management_Dummy 4,255 0.001 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.000
Equity_Dummy 4,255 0.013 0.000 0.115 0.000 1.000
Quasi_Equity_Dummy 4,255 0.007 0.000 0.083 0.000 1.000
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Guarantee_Dummy 4,255 0.023 0.000 0.150 0.000 1.000
Loan 358 0.387 0.242 0.405 0.012 2.760
Syndication 149 0.322 0.269 0.266 0.027 1.860
Insurance 8 0.520 0.347 0.409 0.100 1.003
Risk_Management 10 0.030 0.022 0.023 0.008 0.077
Equity 56 0.072 0.062 0.061 0.005 0.310
Quasi_Equity 30 0.074 0.054 0.066 0.011 0.307
Guarantee 97 0.336 0.230 0.374 0.008 2.600
Govt. Certification type:
Debt_Guarantee 4,255 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.000 1.000
Revenue_Guarantee 4,255 0.011 0.000 0.104 0.000 1.000
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 4,255 0.002 0.000 0.053 0.000 1.000
Fixed_ Payments 4,255 0.054 0.000 0.226 0.000 1.000
Variable_Payments 4,255 0.012 0.000 0.110 0.000 1.000
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 4,255 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 1.000
Payment_Guarantee 4,255 0.016 0.000 0.128 0.000 1.000
Panel C: Country Characteristics
GDP_Growth (%) 4,255 5.423 5.500 3.598 -19.000 14.200
Inflation (%) 4,255 25.133 5.900 207.259 -1.900 7481.500
Corruption 4,255 2.476 2.500 0.704 0.500 5.000
 
Noticeably, the mean private loan support from development partners is 0.387, which is 
much higher than the mean syndication support. The maximum scaled value of various 
development partners‘ support is more than one, e.g., the scaled value of loans is 2.76. This is 
because the PPI database reports only the initially committed investment value of PPP projects 
and does not reflect the actual investment value or the future project (expansion) cost.18 
Among the types of support provided by governments, fixed government payments are 
the most common. In total, around 5.4% of PPP projects receive a fixed government payment 
guarantee. Under this guarantee, the government agrees to fulfil the payment obligations of a 
state-owned purchaser in the case of agreement violation by the state-owned company. For 
instance, if a state-owned company has a power purchase agreement with a PPP project, the state 
guarantees the payment of the off-take purchase agreement. After fixed government payment 
                                                          
18 Oum, Yan, and Yu (2008) report that the actual average cost is 65% higher for 258 infrastructure 
projects outside Europe and North America. The difference in costing maybe due to (i) PPP projects can 
undergo multiple expansions during their life; and (ii) development partners can adjust the loan or 
guarantee amount subsequent to contracting. 
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guarantee, payment guarantee is the most widely used government support mechanism followed 
by revenue guarantee.  
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of country-level variables. The mean GDP_Growth 
is quite high at 5.41%, which is not unexpected for developing countries. The mean Inflation rate 
in sample countries is high at 25.25%; this can lead to project cost increases for the private 
investors, particularly those in countries with unusually high inflation rates such as Brazil and 
Argentina.  
Table 5.6 presents the Pearson correlations between the primary variables of interest. The 
correlations between the independent variables are quite small except for Syndication, which is 
highly correlated with DP_Certification_Dummy, Loan, and DP_Reputation. To minimise potential 
multicollinearity problem, I run regressions with and without Syndication.   
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Table 5.6 
Pearson correlation matrix for the primary variables of interest 
Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project 
receives support from the development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from both government and 
development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the sum of the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is 
the market share of a development partner in a given year. Loan_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives loan support from the development partner, and zero otherwise. 
I also use a similar dummy variable for other development partner support which includes Syndication_Dummy, Insurance_Dummy, Risk_Management_Dummy, Equity_Dummy, 
Quasi_Equity_Dummy and Guarantee_Dummy. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change in a country's gross domestic 
product. Inflation is the annual average percent change in the consumer price index. Corruption is an index assessing the extent of corruption within a political system. Own49pct is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one if the project has 49% private ownership, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1 Govt_Certification_Dummy 1.000
2 DP_Certification_Dummy 0.002 1.000
3 DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.322 0.301 1.000
4 DP_Certification -0.016 0.700 0.160 1.000
5 DP_Reputation -0.009 0.753 0.196 0.547 1.000
6 Loan_Dummy -0.001 0.584 0.168 0.860 0.410 1.000
7 Syndication_Dummy -0.030 0.412 0.035 0.585 0.408 0.291 1.000
8 Insurance_Dummy 0.000 0.098 0.030 0.118 0.122 -0.007 -0.005 1.000
9 Risk_Management_Dummy -0.013 0.111 -0.004 0.112 0.141 0.042 0.133 -0.001 1.000
10 Equity_Dummy -0.019 0.249 0.019 0.189 0.234 0.127 0.114 -0.003 0.050 1.000
11 Quasi_Equity_Dummy -0.013 0.178 0.014 0.214 0.230 0.119 0.232 -0.002 0.123 0.175 1.000
12 Guarantee_Dummy -0.008 0.287 0.060 0.392 0.196 0.059 0.018 -0.003 0.054 0.001 -0.005 1.000
13 Ln(Size) 0.079 0.186 0.053 0.052 0.160 0.028 0.059 0.014 0.009 0.012 -0.010 0.024 1.000
14 GDP_Growth 0.016 -0.118 -0.006 -0.079 -0.086 -0.072 -0.066 -0.003 -0.007 -0.026 -0.026 -0.001 -0.029 1.000
15 Inflation -0.028 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 0.008 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.015 -0.008 -0.026 -0.157 1.000
16 Corruption -0.044 0.061 -0.022 0.047 0.052 0.021 0.071 0.001 0.029 0.017 0.031 0.014 0.117 -0.148 0.139 1.000
17 own49pct -0.030 -0.028 0.003 -0.017 -0.022 -0.019 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.012 -0.008 -0.013 0.017 0.051 -0.009 -0.05
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5.5    Chapter Summary  
This chapter details the sample selection process and research methods for testing my 
hypotheses. Data on PPP projects in developing countries from 1990 to 2012 are sourced from 
the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database. My final sample consists of 4,344 PPP 
projects, which I use to test the effect of certification on project modality. For testing the effect 
of certification on ownership, I use a sample of 4,255 PPP project. Most of the PPP projects do 
not receive any certification (in the form of support)  from governments and development 
partners. In fact, only 11% of sample PPP projects receive support from the development 
partners. The percentage is even lower for government certification, with just 9.8% of all the 
projects receiving support from governments.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical results. Results for the certification 
effects on project modality are provided in Section 6.2, with robustness tests discussed in Section 
6.3. Section 6.4 presents the results for the certification effects on project ownership, and 
additional robustness tests are provided in Section 6.5. A chapter summary and conclusion are 
presented in Section 6.6. 
6.2     Certification Effects and Project Modality Choice 
Table 6.1 provides univariate tests of difference between PPP projects with ―low‖ and 
―high‖ modality risk. Low-risk project modalities are Management Contracts; Lease Contracts; 
Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer; Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent, and Transfer; and Merchant. 
High-risk modalities are Build, Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer; Build, Operate and Transfer; 
Build, Own and Operate; Partial and Full. The univariate results are grouped by project 
characteristics (Panel A), support types (Panel B), and country characteristics (Panel C). 
 Results indicate that there are significant differences between the two groups of projects. 
In Panels A and B, projects with high modality risk are substantially larger and more likely to 
receive support from the government and development partners than low-risk modality projects. 
High-risk modality projects are also associated with a higher number of support types from 
development partners (0.18 vs. 0.11) than low-risk modality projects, and are more likely to 
receive development partners‘ support in the form of Syndication, and government‘s support in 
the form of Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, and Payment_Guarantee. Panel C shows projects 
with high modality risk are more common in countries lower Inflation.  
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 Table 6.1 
Univariate tests for PPP projects with low and high-risk modality 
 The five low-risk modalities are Management Contracts; Lease Contracts; Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer; 
Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent, and Transfer and Merchant. High-risk modalities are Build, Rehabilitate, Operate and 
Transfer; Build, Operate and Transfer; Build, Own and Operate; Partial and Full. Size is the total investment amount 
under the project. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, 
and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the 
development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives 
certifications from both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the sum of 
the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is the 
market share of a development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types provided 
by development partners in a project. Loans is the scaled value of loan support from development partners. 
Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support from development partners. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, 
Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are 
dummies representing the type of government guarantee. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a 
country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the consumer price index. 
Corruption is an index on the extent of corruption within a political system. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%, level respectively. 
 
Low Risk 
Modality
High Risk 
Modality
t-test
Mean Mean p-value p-value
Panel A: Project Characteristics
Ln_(Size) 3.129 4.315 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
Panel B: Certification Types
Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.049 0.112 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.066 0.093 0.008
***
0.007
***
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.001 0.009  0.002 *** 0.003 ***
DP_Certification 0.047 0.046 0.877 0.011
**
DP_Reputation 0.024 0.025  0.784 0.001
***
DP_Support_Number 0.106 0.180 0.000
***
0.000
***
DP Certification Types:
Loans 0.0410 0.0330 0.231 0.011
**
Syndication 0.0050 0.0120  0.021
**
0.007
***
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee 0.0000 0.0010 0.187 0.187
Revenue_Guarantee 0.0070 0.0120 0.190 0.189
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 0.0010 0.0030 0.201 0.202
Fixed_Payments 0.0470 0.0620 0.081
*
0.082
*
Variable_Payments 0.0060 0.0140 0.034
**
0.036
**
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 0.0000 0.0010  0.281 0.282
Payment_Guarantee 0.0010 0.0180  0.000
***
0.000
***
Panel  C: Country Characteristics
GDP_Growth 0.136 0.057 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
Inflation 59.134 15.441 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Corruption 2.496 2.461 0.174 0.116
p-values of diffrence tests
Mann Whitney
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Table 6.2 reports the ordered logit regression results for the determinants of project 
modality selection. These regressions aim to test the hypotheses on whether government 
certification (H1a), development partners‘ certification (H2a), and development partners‘ 
reputation (H3a) can explain the choice of project modality. 
Results show the estimated coefficient on Govt._Certification_Dummy is positive and 
statistically significant in all specifications, supporting the prediction of hypothesis H1a. 
Therefore, PPP projects that receive government guarantees encourage private sector 
participation under a relatively risky modality. By providing the guarantee, the government 
becomes accountable for all potential liabilities that the guarantee may create (Ramamurti, 2001). 
Therefore, PPP projects guaranteed by governments are viewed to be less risky to private 
investors. In this sense, government guarantees can serve as an effective certification mechanism 
about the quality of PPP projects. My finding is also in line with Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and 
Hardcastle (2005a), as they emphasize that government guarantees are the key success factor for 
PPP projects in UK. Finally, Brandao and Saraiva (2008) provide the example of Costanera 
Norte toll road in Chile, where government guarantees provided assurance to private investors 
about the viability of the PPP project.  
Hypothesis H2a predicts that certification by development partners can encourage private 
sector investment under a relatively risky modality. Specifications (1) and (6) show support for 
this prediction, with a significant positive coefficient on DP_Certification_Dummy. This finding is 
consistent with Ratha (2001), who emphasises that because development partners have access 
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Table 6.2 
Ordered logit regressions for project modality selection 
The dependent variable, Financing_Modality is a 10 category ordinal variable, with 1 being the lowest modality risk 
and 10 the highest modality risk. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from 
the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support 
from the development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project 
receives certifications from both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the 
sum of the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is 
the market share of a development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types 
provided by development partners in a project. Corruption is an index on the extent of corruption within a political 
system. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, 
Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are dummies representing the type of government guarantee. Loans is 
the scaled value of loan support from development partners. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support 
from development partners. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual 
percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the 
consumer price index. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield is dummies representing the types of PPP projects. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 1.292
***
0.478
***
0.492
***
0.495
***
0.612
*
0.499
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000)
DP_Certification_Dummy 1.393
***
0.585
***
(0.001) (0.001)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy -0.278 0.248
(0.654) (0.686)
DP_Certification 0.282
*
0.127
(0.075) (0.463)
DP_Reputation  0.724
*
(0.065)
DP_Support_Number 0.167
***
(0.007)
Corruption 0.154
***
0.076 0.075 0.074 0.086 0.080
(0.008) (0.146) (0.151) (0.160) (0.103) (0.127)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -0.325 **
(0.014)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.359 **
(0.015)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -0.721
(0.152)
Revenue_Guarantee -0.175
(0.660)
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 2.03
***
(0.000)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values 
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed_ Government_Payments -0.132
(0.717)
Variable_Government_Payments -0.467
(0.240)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 0.018
(0.968)
Payment_Guarantee 0.135
(0.750)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 0.443
***
-0.215
(0.003) (0.355)
Syndication -0.0006 -0.391
(0.998) (0.358)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) 0.107
***
0.120
***
0.114
***
0.113
***
0.11
***
0.108
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth -0.054
***
-0.061
***
-0.060
***
-0.060
***
-0.058
***
-0.058
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.170) (0.169) (0.177) (0.169) (0.169) (0.166)
Concession 40.227
***
40.199
***
40.231
***
40.181
***
40.215
***
40.201
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divesture 56.880
***
56.848
***
56.882
***
56.843
***
56.954
***
56.851
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Greenfield 44.422
***
44.392
***
 44.427
***
44.375
***
44.410
***
44.403
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,384   4,384   4,384  4,384  4,384      4,384      
Pseudo R2 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.443 0.442
Dummy 
values
Scaled values 
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to a wealth of information about developing countries, their support decision can promote 
private investment. Eichengreen (1995) also argues that the vast experience of   development 
partners with PPP projects has given them a competitive advantage in assessing project risk, 
which the domestic financial market can tap into in deciding on whether to support 
infrastructure projects. DP_Support_Number has a significantly positive coefficient in 
specification (4), suggesting that having more types of development partners‘ support enables 
PPP investment under a relatively risky modality. In sum, participation of development partners 
can reduce project risk, and signal to the market about the financial viability of the proposed 
project modality. 
Next, I investigate whether the different forms of guarantee support provided by 
government matters to project modality choice. I use dummy variables (specifications (5)) to 
indicate the various forms of government support. Results show that none of the government 
support types are significant, except for Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, which has a positive and 
significant coefficient in specification (5). The former is consistent with Blanc‐Brude and Strange 
(2007), who find that lenders do not differentiate between PPP projects that receive and do not 
receive a loan guarantee support from the government.  
My finding for Exchange_Rate_Guarantee implies that government certification in the form 
of exchange rate guarantee can encourage private sector investment under a relatively risky 
modality. The underdeveloped financial markets in developing countries can be a constraint on 
infrastructure financing, suggesting that private investors often have to turn to developed 
countries for project financing using long-term foreign currency debt. As PPP project revenues 
are generated in local currencies and investors need foreign currency to service their debt, 
fluctuations in the exchange rate can create risk for the investors and financiers (Dailami & 
Leipziger, 1998). The scope of exchange rate risk management and hedging through the use of 
derivatives may be also limited in developing countries. My result shows that government 
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support through exchange rate guarantee is highly valuable and effective in assuring the market 
about the financial viability of the proposed project modality. 
I also use dummy variables (specifications (5)) and scaled values (specifications (6)) of the 
different forms of support provided by development partners in explaining project modality 
choice. Results show that only Loans has a positive and marginally significantly coefficient in 
specification (5). Thus, there is some support showing that PPP projects that receive loan 
support from development partners can attract private investment to PPP projects under a 
relatively risky modality.  
For hypothesis H3a, I find evidence that development partners‘ reputation promotes 
private investment in a relatively risky modality, as shown by the significant coefficient on 
DP_Reputation. Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) find that that certification by 
reputed lead arranging banks can add economic value in project financing loans by reducing 
overall loan spreads. In infrastructure projects reputed development partners can access 
additional sources of project information to ensure that all potential adverse inside information is 
revealed during the project planning process. 
Insofar as the corruption influences governments‘ and development partners‘ certification 
effects (hypotheses H4a and H4b), I include interaction terms of corruption and certification 
measures in the ordered logit regression. The results are presented in Table 6.2. I predict that the 
certification effects on project modality are stronger in countries with poorer institutional quality 
and corruption. I find that if a project has received certification from the government and 
development partners then corruption matters less to modality selection. Results show that a 
number of control variables are significant in explaining project modality selection including 
Ln(Size) and GDP_Growth. Consistent with Hammami, Ruhashyankiko and Yehoue (2006), I find 
GDP_Growth is significant for PPP projects. 
Table 6.3 reports the economic implications of the ordered regression model. The exercise 
is carried out in the following manner. For each of the continuous (non-dummy) variables, the 
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consequent change in the probability of each modality due to one standard deviation increase 
from the mean of the explanatory variable is calculated, holding the other explanatory variables 
at their means. For the dummy variables, the consequent change in the probability is calculated 
when the dummy variable goes from 0 to 1.  
The table shows that in economic terms, having support from governments or 
development partners increases the probability of participating under the Build, Rehabilitate, 
Operate and Transfer modality by 27.5% and 28.3% respectively. However, for other less risky 
forms of project modality, the percentage change is much lower. For instance, governments‘ and 
development partners‘ certification increases the probability of participating under the Rehabilitate, 
Operate and Transfer modality by just 2.7% and 2.8% respectively. The result also shows that 
DP_Reputation has significant economic implications for project modality selection. An increase 
in development partners‘ reputation by 0.100, centered on its mean, increases the likelihood of 
adopting relatively risky modalities like Build, Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer by as much as 34.4%. 
However, development partners‘ reputation has very little economic effect on less risky forms of 
modality.   
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Table 6.3 
Economic interpretation of the regression result 
The change in the probability of a given project modality in response to a one unit change in the explanatory 
variables (using specification (3) of Table 6.2) 
Govt._Certification_
Dummy
DP_Reputation DP_Certification_
Dummy
Mean of Variable 0.0980 0.025 0.087
Change in Variable 1 0.100 1
      (Management Contract) 0.000 0.000 0.000
      (Lease Contract) 0.000 0.000 0.000
     (Rehabilitate, operate and transfer) 0.027 0.028 0.041
     (Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer) 0.004 0.005 0.007
     (Merchant) 0.044 0.046 0.065
    (Build, rehabilitate,operate and transfer) 0.275 0.283 0.344
    (Build, operate and transfer) 0.573 0.565 0.491
    (Build, own and operate) 0.074 0.070 0.048
     (Partial) 0.000 0.000 0.000
     (Full) 0.000 0.000 0.000
ologit modality d_govt__support d_dp_support_new dp_reputation ln_size_ gdp_growth inflation  
corruption   i.sectorid  i.typeid i.year , vce(robust)
margins, predict(outcome(1)) at ( d_govt__support =1 ) atmeans
margins, predict(outcome(1)) at ( d_dp_support_new=1 ) atmeans
margins, predict(outcome(1)) at (dp_reputation=0.125 ) atmeans
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6.3    Robustness Tests for Project Modality 
 It is possible that project modality will vary significantly across sectors due in part to 
differences in the quality of regulation (Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, & Foster, 2005). As a 
robustness check, I rerun the regressions using a multi-level mixed-effect model, which can 
handle grouped data and accounts for clustering within groups by employing a mix of fixed 
effects and random effects. 
Table 6.4 shows the estimation table with fixed effects and estimated variance components. 
The random-effects equation is labelled  sector, meaning that these are random effects at the 
sector level. Because I have only one random effect at this level, the table shows only one 
variance component. In specification (1), the estimate of the intercept variance is 0.801, ranging 
from 0.770 to 0.801 across all the specifications. I note that exchange rate guarantee remains as 
one of the most statistically significant certification variables. Also noteworthy is the significantly 
positive coefficient on development partner certifcation, DP_Certification. Therefore, PPP 
projects that receive certification from development partners have relatively more risky modality. 
However, I find that for both government and development partners, the certification effects on 
project modality are insignificant in countries with higher corruption. 
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Table 6.4 
Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logit regressions for project modality selection 
The dependent variable, Financing_Modality is a 10 category ordinal variable, with 1 being the lowest modality risk 
and 10 the highest modality risk. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from 
the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support 
from the development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project 
receives certifications from both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the 
sum of the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is 
the market share of a development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types 
provided by development partners in a project. Corruption is an index on the extent of corruption within a political 
system. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, 
Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are dummies representing the type of government guarantee. Loans is 
the scaled value of loan support from the development partners. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support 
from the development partners. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual 
percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the 
consumer price index. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield are dummies representing the types of PPP projects.***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.586 0.011 0.047 0.048 0.054 0.049
(0.207) (0.908) (0.449) (0.424) (0.319) (0.395)
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.438 0.049
(0.362) (0.398)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.398 0.058
(0.667) (0.755)
DP_Certification 0.515 0.165
(0.564) (0.414)
DP_Reputation -0.507
(0.533)
DP_Support_Number 0.081
(0.208)
Corruption -0.141 * -0.183 ** -0.189 ** -0.187 ** -0.178 ** -0.186 **
(0.072) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -0.236
(0.282)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.145
(0.286)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -0.799 *
(0.079)
Revenue_Guarantee 1.143
(0.245)
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 0.817 *
(0.054)
Fixed_ Government_Payments 1.845
(0.150)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable_Government_Payments 1.684
(0.118)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 0.134
(0.935)
Payment_Guarantee 1.220
(0.136)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 0.051 -0.288
(0.796) (0.654)
Syndication 0.131 0.231
(0.671) (0.586)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) 0.214 * 0.216 ** 0.222 ** 0.214 ** 0.211 ** 0.213 **
(0.050) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043)
GDP_Growth 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.030
(0.514) (0.543) (0.556) (0.547) (0.527) (0.542)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.608) (0.611) (0.596) (0.615) (0.608) (0.612)
Concession 15.567
***
15.549
***
15.858
***
15.548
***
17.515
***
17.451
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divesture 21.234
***
21.667
***
21.875
***
21.325
***
23.534
***
23.651
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Greenfield 15.684
***
15.672
***
15.710
***
15.410
***
17.410
***
17.803
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Variance of random components
Intercept variance 0.801 0.770 0.777 0.771 0.787 0.774
N 4,384   4,384   4,384   4,384   4,384      4,384      
Log Likelihood -7251.3 -7445.5 -7446.1 -7445.9 -7235.1 -7445.7
Dummy 
values
Scaled values
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I also rerun the ordered logit regression for each of the following sectors separately in 
Table 6.5: transport; telecommunication; energy; and water & sewerage. While this has the 
disadvantage of losing the statistical power of the tests, it allows the coefficients (the slope 
effects) to vary across sectors. Results show that Govt._Certification_Dummy is significant for the 
telecommunication, water & sewerage sectors, implying that government certification through 
project guarantees provide greater confidence to private investors in the telecommunication, 
water & sewerage sector. Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch and Foster (2005) find that water & sewerage 
sector projects are more risky than other infrastructure sectors. Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and 
Yehoue (2006) find that investors in the water sector prefer modalities with less private sector 
participation as water sector projects tend to be politically sensitive. With increased risk of 
political risk in this sector, government certification can assure investors about the long run 
viability of water & sewerage projects. 
DP_Certification_Dummy is significant in explaining PPP project modality choice in the 
transport sector, and has some explanatory power in the telecommunication and water & 
sewerage sectors. The former shows that an independent third party certification of project 
quality can be highly valuable in encouraging relatively risky modality in the transport sector. 
This finding is perhaps not surprising as it can be difficult for private investors to assess project 
quality in the transport sector. For instance, Flyvbjerg (2009) studies 258 transport projects and 
finds most of them have inaccurate revenue forecasts, with 90% of the projects have a cost 
overrun 
I also investigate whether the form of support provided by the development partner 
matters to project modality selection. The results show that both loans and syndication from 
development partners is statistically significant in the water & sewerage sectors. Sirtaine, Pinglo, 
Guasch and Foster (2005) find water & sewerage projects have the lowest profitability of all the 
infrastructure sectors. It follows that water sector projects would require more extensive support 
from development partners through, as my results indicate, with both syndication and loan. 
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Allen (1990) emphasisesthat an intermediary could signal product quality by directly investing 
resources in the product where it has special knowledge. Therefore, by providing loan and 
syndication support to a PPP project, development partners commit their financial resources to 
the project and thus signal the quality of the project. In addition, syndication is statistically 
significant in the telecommunication sector.  
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Table 6.5 
Sector-wise ordered logit regressions for project modality selection 
The dependent variable, Financing_Modality is a 10 category ordinal variable, with 1 being the lowest modality risk and 10 the highest modality risk. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a 
value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the 
development partners, and zero otherwise. Corruption is an index on the extent of corruption within a political system. Loans is the scaled value of loan support from the 
development partners. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support from the development partners. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is 
the annual percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the consumer price index. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield 
are dummies representing the types of PPP projects. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Govt._Certification_Dummy -0.002 -0.012 -0.051 -0.048 1.783 * 2.555 ** 0.055 ** 0.055 **
(0.985) (0.906) (0.678) (0.694) (0.083) (0.033) (0.022) (0.021)
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.018 -0.190 1.607 ** 0.328 * 0.494 1.020 * -1.041 *** -0.235
(0.892) (0.491) (0.028) (0.078) (0.187) (0.052) (0.008) (0.641)
Corruption -0.286 *** -0.289 *** -0.354 *** -0.356 *** 0.319 0.321 0.233 0.253
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.163) (0.161) (0.208) (0.169)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -0.068 -0.068 0.207 0.206 0.246 0.249 -1.522 *** -1.560 ***
(0.768) (0.769) (0.342) (0.346) (0.378) (0.382) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.091 -0.090 0.016 0.010 -0.348 ** -0.338 ** 0.405 * 0.414 *
(0.196) (0.203) (0.904) (0.937) (0.042) (0.043) (0.050) (0.052)
DP Certification Types (scaled value)
Loans 0.496 0.524 -0.588 -1.835 ***
(0.339) (0.617) (0.318) (0.000)
Syndication 0.053 0.748 -2.942 ** 5.513 **
(0.922) (0.509) (0.033) (0.031)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) 0.034 0.039 0.495 *** 0.499
***
0.411 *** 0.407 *** 0.420 *** 0.407 ***
(0.226) (0.172) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Energy Transport Telecommunications Water and Sewerage
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP_Growth -0.084 *** -0.085 *** 0.163 *** 0.164 *** -0.013 -0.015 0.119 *** 0.407 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.635) (0.582) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.873) (0.881) (0.000) (0.000) (0.547) (0.587) (0.217) (0.198)
Concession 15.567 *** 15.236 *** 40.125 *** 40.776 *** 40.661 *** 40.121 *** 56.134
**
56.400 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divesture 21.544 *** 21.899 *** 19.577
***
19.799 *** 57.334 ** 57.874 ** 14.907 *** 14.145 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)
Greenfield 15.454 *** 15.874 *** 12.262
***
12.692 *** 44.986 *** 44.172 *** 41.285
***
41.533 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.008)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2114 2114 1262 1262 327 327 681 681
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.021 0.092 0.093 0.120 0.124 0.073 0.080
Energy Transport Telecommunications Water and Sewerage
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Next, I investigate whether the results are robust to using the ordered probit regression 
model which assumes fatter tails. Table 6.6 shows that the results are robust to this alternative 
model specification. As predicted by hypothesis H1a, Govt._Certification_Dummy remains positive 
and statistically significant, supporting the prediction that government certification through 
project guarantee can encourage private sector participation in projects under a relatively risky 
modality. Specification (1) also supports hypothesis H2a, as shown by the significant and positive 
coefficient for DP_Certification_Dummy. In Specification (3) I find significant and positive 
coefficient for DP_Reputation, which is consistent with my earlier regression result. The 
interaction term Corruptionx Govt._Certification_Dummy is statistically significant and 
negative.These results are largely consistent with the ordered logit regression results. Consistent 
with my ordered logit regression result, I find that for government, corruption matters less to 
modality selection when the project has government certification.  
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Table 6.6 
Ordered probit regressions for project modality selection  
The dependent variable, Financing_Modality is a 10 category ordinal variable, with 1 being the lowest modality risk 
and 10 the highest modality risk. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from 
the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support 
from the development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project 
receives certifications from both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the 
sum of the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is 
the market share of a development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types 
provided by development partners in a project. Corruption is an index on the extent of corruption within a political 
system. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, 
Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are dummies representing the type of government guarantee. Loans is 
the scaled value of loan support from development partners. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support 
from the development partners. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual 
percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percentage change in the 
consumer price index. Concession, Divesture and Greenfield are dummies representing the types of  PPP projects.***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.277
***
0.252
**
0.307
***
0.325
***
0.393
***
0.049
***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.193
***
0.585
***
(0.000) (0.001)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.348
*
0.748
*
(0.060) (0.053)
DP_Certification 0.106 0.051
(0.276) (0.634)
DP_Reputation 0.472
**
(0.047)
DP_Support_Number 0.045
(0.114)
Corruption 0.078 ** 0.028 0.024 0.020 0.086 0.080
(0.012) (0.369) (0.438) (0.160) (0.103) (0.127)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -0.134 *
(0.058)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.060
(0.431)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -0.280
(0.607)
Revenue_Guarantee -0.040
(0.884)
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 1.044 **
(0.029)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values
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Table 6.6 (continued)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed_Payments -0.267
(0.300)
Variable_Payments -0.166
(0.565)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee -0.332
(0.611)
Payment_Guarantee 0.039
(0.895)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 0.321
***
-0.215
(0.000) (0.355)
Syndication 0.026 -0.391
(0.823) (0.358)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) 0.129 *** 0.061 *** 0.057 ** 0.055 *** 0.036 *** 0.108 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth 0.019 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.011 *** -0.058 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.346) (0.260) (0.266) (0.325) (0.529) (0.166)
Concession 12.467
***
11.849
***
12.486
***
12.348
***
40.215
***
40.201
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divesture 19.154
***
19.167
***
19.775
***
19.435
***
56.954
***
56.851
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Greenfield 13.984
***
13.972
***
14.610
***
14.210
***
44.410
***
44.403
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,384  4,384  4,384  4,384  4,384      4,384     
Pseudo R2 0.424 0.421 0.421 0.423 0.445 0.443
Dummy 
values
Scaled values
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6.4     Certification Effects and Private Sector Ownership of PPP Projects  
This section discusses the results for the relation between private sector ownership and 
certification. Table 6.7 shows univariate results for differences in project characteristics (Panel A), 
certification types (Panel B), and country characteristics (Panel C) between PPP projects with 
high (> sample 25th percentile) and low (< sample 25th percentile) private sector ownership.  
The results show that projects with high private sector ownership are smaller and more 
likely to have government support (certification), particularly in the form of Fixed_Payments, 
Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee, and Payment_Guarantee. However, projects with high 
private sector ownership are as likely to have development partner support as projects with low 
private sector ownership; although DP_Reputation is slightly higher for projects with high private 
sector ownership, the difference is not statistically significant. PPP projects with high private 
sector ownership are more common in countries with higher GDP_Growth and Inflation. 
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Table 6.7 
Univariate test for PPP projects with High and Low private ownership 
―High‖ private sector ownership is > sample 25th percentile, and ―Low‖ private sector ownership <=sample 25th 
percentile. Size is the total investment amount under the project. Build_Lease_Transfer, Build_Operate_Transfer, 
Build_Own_Operate, Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, Rehabilate_Operate_ 
Transfer and Rental are dummies representing the type of project modality. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of 
one if the project receives support from the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value 
of one if the project receives support from the development partners, and zero otherwise.  
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from both government and 
development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the dollar value of all forms of support from 
development partners scaled by project value. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types provided by 
development partners. DP_Reputation is the market share of a development partner in a given year. Loan is the scaled 
value of loan support from the development partner. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support from the 
development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of insurance support from the development partner. 
Risk_Management is the scaled value of risk management support from the development partner. Equity is the scaled 
value of equity support from the development partner. Quasi_Equity is the scaled value of quasi equity support from 
the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value of guarantee support from the development partner. 
Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee 
and Payment_Guarantee are dummies taking the value of one for the specified type of government guarantee, and zero 
otherwise. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual 
average percent change in the consumer price index. Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a 
political system. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively. 
Low Private 
Ownership
High Private 
Ownership
t-test Mann Whitney
Mean Mean p-value p-value
Panel A: Project Characteristics
Size 4.316 4.124 0.001
***
0.006
***
Modality:
Build_Lease_Transfer 0.001 0.003  0.142 0.143
Build_Operate_Transfer 0.379 0.302 0.000
***
0.000
***
Build_Own_Operate 0.110 0.264 0.000
***
0.000
***
Build_Rehabitate_Operat_Transfer 0.095 0.186 0.000
***
0.000
***
Merchant 0.065 0.081 0.088 * 0.089 *
Partial 0.209 0.006 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer 0.001 0.013 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer 0.010 0.005 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Rental 0.001 0.013 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Panel B: Certification Types
Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.049 0.115 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.101 0.114 0.253 0.253
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.010 0.011 0.695 0.696
DP_Certification 0.050 0.055  0.499 0.232
DP_Support_Number 0.140 0.178 0.052
*
0.231
DP_Reputation 0.022 0.024 0.395 0.314
p-values of diffrence tests
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
Low Private 
Ownership
High Private 
Ownership
t-test Mann Whitney
Mean Mean p-value p-value
DP Certification Types:
Loan 0.027 0.034 0.218 0.084 *
Syndication 0.009 0.012 0.306 0.061 *
Insurance 0.002 0.001 0.111 0.108
Risk_Management 0.000 0.000 0.184 0.214
Equity 0.001 0.001 0.915 0.419
Quasi_Equity 0.000 0.001  0.056 * 0.127
Guarantee 0.010 0.006  0.174 0.689
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee 0.003 0.001  0.165 0.165
Revenue_Guarantee 0.012 0.010 0.715 0.715
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee 0.001 0.003  0.488 0.488
Fixed_ Payments 0.022 0.065 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Variable_Payments 0.015 0.015 0.001 *** 0.000 ***
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 0.001 0.000 0.015 ** 0.015 **
Payment_Guarantee 0.011 0.018  0.087 * 0.087 *
Panel  C: Country Characteristics
GDP_Growth 6.241 5.142 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
Inflation 21.451 26.383 0.499 *** 0.000 ***
Corruption 2.380 2.509 0.000
*** 0.000 ***
p-values of diffrence tests
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The OLS regression results for the determinants of private sector percentage ownership in 
PPP projects are presented in Table 6.8. These regressions test whether government certification 
(H1b), development partners‘ support (H2b), and development partners‘ reputation (H3b) can 
explain private sector ownership of PPP projects.  
 In H1b, I argue that governments can certify the quality of PPP projects by providing 
project guarantee. Specifically, PPP projects that receive government guarantee provide greater 
confidence to the private investors and would thus encourage greater private sector ownership. 
This prediction is supported by the regression results, as shown by the significant coefficient for 
Govt._Certification_Dummy in most specifications. My finding is also in line with Farquharson, 
Mastle, & Yescombe (2011), who emphasise that by providing project certification, the 
government assures the market about project quality, and can thus create confidence among the 
private investors.  
 I offer two plausible explanations for why government certification promotes private 
sector ownership in my sample. First, the process of identifying viable PPP projects is inherently 
challenging due to the difficulty in forecasting the costs and benefits of PPP projects, which 
often results in overstated benefits and understated costs (Ramamurti, 1992). Forecasting the 
PPP project revenue can be very challenging as most of the developing countries lack a 
benchmark PPP project. Under such circumstances, investors may have limited option but to 
rely on stakeholders involved in the project planning process. In most PPP projects, government 
plays the key role in PPP project planning.  
Second, considering the importance of infrastructure for economic growth (Aschauer, 
1989), governments have incentives to prepare a good quality PPP project and support the 
project during the operation period. A well-functioning PPP project can ensure market access for 
agriculture and promote sustainable development. However, for attracting investment in a PPP 
project, government needs to assure investors that it will support the PPP project, for instance 
through constructing the necessary supporting infrastructure. Constructuring the supporting 
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infrastructure is important as the revenues from PPP projects may depend on the functionality 
of other public infrastructure projects. A PPP port project may earn little revenue if the 
government do not build a connecting road and rail network. Hence, to be functional, PPP 
projects must interconnect with other supporting infrastructure. Often government have to 
make significant investment to build the supporting infrastructure for a PPP project. Therefore, 
government have an incentive to support only quality PPP projects.  
By providing guarantee to a PPP project, government also commit it‘s financial resources 
to the project and thus signal the quality of the project. Allen (1990) argue that an intermediary 
could signal product quality by directly investing resources in the product where it has special 
knowledge. The same argument can be applicable for government when government commits 
it‘s resource in PPP project. This in turn makes the project more attractive to private investors. 
Since government agencies are involved in the PPP project planning process from the initial 
stage, their certification can assure investors about the project planning. Through providing 
guarantee the government can signal to the market about its intend of supporting the PPP 
project. 
However, there can be concern regarding the reliability of government certification in PPP 
projects. Such concern can arise because government agencies often change PPP project 
contract and initiate PPP project renegotiation. Brixi and Schick (2002) provide a case in Mexico 
where immediately after the Mexican Peso crisis, the government renegotiated 23 road sector 
PPP projects. However, it is also important to note that often private investors initiate PPP 
project renegotiations (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2007). Considering the social and economic 
benefit, government have an incentive to carefully structure PPP project, certify project quality 
and support the project during the project operational stage. Governments are frequent players 
in the PPP market, and therefore, the success of their future PPP projects hinges on their 
reputation in clinching past PPP deals.  
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It is essential to note that governments‘ certification is important for both modality and 
private sector ownership decisions. The PPP project implementation process can be time-
consuming process. Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005b) provide a case study of New 
South Wales, Australia, where the planning and decision making for a PPP motorway project 
took around one and a half decade. With investors, banks and other stakeholders have limited 
access to project information, potential investors will incur information collection cost to analyse 
the project‘s quality both during the modality and ownership decision. Commercial banks and 
other creditors will also need to assess the project‘s quality before providing a loan to private 
investors, thus raising the cost of their loan. Since excessive loan pricing reduces project 
profitability, investors may want to share only limited ownership in a relatively risky PPP project. 
Government can address this scenario by providing certification during the modality and 
ownership structuring stage. 
In H2b, I argue that participation by development partners can encourage greater private 
sector ownership in PPP projects by reducing project risk and signalling to the market about the 
financial viability of the project. Specifications (1) and (2) show both DP_Certification_Dummy and 
DP_Certification have a positive and significant coefficient, supporting this prediction. In 
economic terms, development partners‘ support increases private sector ownership by 5.011 
percentage points on average (specification (1)), highlighting the economic value of certification 
by development partners in encouraging private investment in PPP projects. This has support in 
Ratha (2001) who emphasises that development partners‘ loans promote private investment by 
signalling a quality investment environment, and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) who find that the 
availability of political risk mitigation instruments from development partners can reduce project 
finance loan spreads. Specification 4 shows DP_Support_Number is also significant, indicating 
projects that receive more types of support from development partners have higher private 
sector ownership.  
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Table 6.8 
OLS regressions for private sector ownership 
The dependent variable, Private_Ownership is the percentage of the PPP project company owned by private investors. 
Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero 
otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the development 
partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from 
both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the dollar value of all forms of 
support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types 
provided by development partners. DP_Reputation is the market share of a development partner in a given year. 
Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee 
and Payment_Guarantee are dummies taking the value of one for the specified type of government guarantee, and zero 
otherwise. Loan is the scaled value of loan support from the development partner. Syndication is the scaled value of 
syndication support from the development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of insurance support from the 
development partner. Risk_Management is the scaled value of risk management support from the development 
partner. Equity is the scaled value of equity support from the development partner. Quasi_Equity is the scaled value 
of quasi equity support from the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value of guarantee support from the 
development partner. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage 
change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percent change in the consumer price 
index. Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a political system. Own49pct is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of one if the project has 49% private ownership, and zero otherwise. Build_Lease_Transfer, 
Build_Operate_Transfer, Build_Own_Operate, Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, 
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer and Rental are dummies representing the type of project modality. Divesture and Greenfield 
are dummies representing the types of PPP projects.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 10.091
**
1.773 ** 1.728 ** 1.781 ** 2.038 1.716 ** 1.706 **
(0.037) (0.047) (0.040) (0.034) (0.589) (0.042) (0.043)
DP_Certification_Dummy 5.011
*
3.271
***
3.445
***
(0.094) (0.006) (0.003)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy -2.895 -0.213
(0.248) (0.929)
DP_Certification 3.198
***
1.718
(0.005) (0.198)
DP_Reputation 6.743
*
(0.056)
DP_Support_Number 2.045
***
(0.000)
Corruption 2.624
***
2.234
**
2.257
**
2.240
**
2.141 ** 2.224 *** 2.230 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -3.372 *
(0.091)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.493
(0.642)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -4.998
(0.475)
Revenue_Guarantee -3.797
(0.398)
Exchange_Rate_Guarantee -1.975
(0.677)
Fixed_ Payments 1.576
(0.671)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values 
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Table 6.8 (continued)   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable_Payments 0.401
(0.915)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee -12.253
(0.269)
Payment_Guarantee -3.017
(0.488)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 1.087 -1.734 -1.680
(0.388) (0.433) (0.444)
Syndication 1.768 1.905
(0.317) (0.525)
Insurance 1.201 -6.267 -6.477
(0.826) (0.382) (0.364)
Risk_Management -1.170 188.535 *** 194.533 ***
(0.837) (0.000) (0.008)
Equity 3.524 8.556 8.309
(0.122) (0.732) (0.741)
Quasi_Equity 2.196 22.227 24.868
(0.441) (0.147) (0.108)
Guarantee 7.274 *** 3.590 3.392
(0.000) (0.176) (0.199)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) -0.993
***
-0.867
***
-0.919
***
-0.961
***
-0.970
***
-0.973
***
-0.974
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth -0.658
***
-0.700
***
-0.691
***
-0.682
***
-0.698
***
-0.685 *** -0.686
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.192) (0.200) (0.209) (0.196) (0.195) (0.204) (0.204)
own49pct  -34.774
***
 -34.991
***
 -34.938
***
 -34.882 ***   -34.841 ***  -34.870 ***   -34.852 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Build_Operate_Transfer -10.408 *** -12.686
***
-10.238 *** -10.482 *** -10.633 *** -10.465 *** -10.518 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Build_Own_Operate -3.477 -3.353  -3.212 -3.453 -3.430 -3.388 -3.441
(0.208) (0.216) (0.247) (0.213) (0.212) (0.223) (0.212)
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer -10.964
***
-10.400 ***  -10.274 ** -10.681 *** -10.718 *** -10.721 *** -10.786 ***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer -2.386 -2.368   -2.194 -2.386 -2.579 -2.348 -2.397
(0.410) (0.406) (0.451) (0.412) (0.371) (0.421) (0.408)
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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Table 6.8 (continued)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer -50.543
***
-50.272
***
 -50.157 *** -50.506 *** -50.860 *** -50.730 *** -50.808 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rental -2.654 -2.141 -2.109 -2.576 -2.751 -2.587 -2.661
(0.510) (0.594) (0.602) (0.524) (0.497) (0.522) (0.509)
Merchant -15.854
***
-15.333
***
-15.219
***
-15.603
***
-15.341
***
-15.624
***
-15.701
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partial -4.156 -3.656  -3.511 -3.782 -3.439 -3.698 -3.747
(0.184) (0.235) (0.262) (0.227) (0.274) (0.239) (0.229)
Divesture -0.011 0.108 0.137 0.264 0.737 0.379 0.388
(0.994) (0.949) (0.935) (0.877) (0.679) (0.826) (0.822)
Greenfield -4.020 -3.459  -3.496 -3.664 -3.293 -3.739 -3.749
(0.167) (0.235) (0.229) (0.206) (0.262) (0.198) (0.196)
Constant 104.077 *** 104.458 *** 104.125 *** 104.839 *** 105.182 *** 104.868 *** 104.920 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,255    4,255    4,255   4,255    4,255      4,255      4,255     
R Squared 0.351 0.348 0.349 0.350 0.353 0.351 0.350
Dummy  
values
Scaled values 
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 In the corporate finance literature, Heil and Robertson (1991) argue that a firm‘s 
previous signals may influence the efficacy of its current signal. The same argument is also 
applicable to the development partner‘s certification role in the PPP market. Development 
partner's have a sound track record of introducing the concept of PPP and assisting PPP projects. 
Therefore, if the development partner's has a previous history of supporting private investors in 
PPP project, then development partner certification may become effective in promoting private 
sector ownership in PPP projects.  
 It is worth noting that development partners‘ certification is important for both modality 
and private sector ownership decisions. Since there is a time lag between modality and ownership 
decisions, due to the extensive transaction and negotiation process (Ezulike, Perry and Hawwash, 
1997)), these results underscores the importance of providing assurance to the market through 
development partners‘ certification. Focusing on the types of support by development partners, 
specification (5) shows that Guarantee is statically significantly related to private sector ownership. 
In economic terms, private sector ownership of PPP projects is on average 7.274 percentage 
points higher if the project has received development partners‘ guarantee. Reside (2009) also 
finds that political risk guarantees have a significant effect on project outcomes. It is worth 
noting that guarantees are a support mechanism that is uniquely provided by development 
partners since very few commercial banks can provide political risk guarantee to private 
investors.19  Thus, while private investors may have alternative lenders for loans, they have to rely 
on development partners for guarantees. Guarantees can cover political risks, including 
expropriations, wars, breaches of contract, and civil disturbances although political risk 
guarantees are rarely offered by development partners.  
                                                          
19
 Often government agencies provide political risk insurance and promote private sector investment. 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation is one such institution which operates as a U.S. government agency and 
provides political risk insurance for the private sector. Many developed countries have their own Export Credit 
Agency (ECA), which offers similar services for investors from their respective country. 
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 Using the scaled value of development partners' support in specifications (6) and (7), I 
find projects that receive greater risk management support from development partners are 
associated with greater private sector ownership. Therefore, Risk management has a significantly 
positive coefficient, with the results showing that private sector ownership of PPP projects 
increase by 188.535 point for every one standard deviation increase in the value of risk 
management. Therefore, PPP projects that receive development partners guarantees and greater 
risk management support from the development partners can attract significantly higher private 
sector ownership. 
A caveat is in order since my study considers only the financial aspects of development 
partner support. As lenders, development partners often include step-in clauses which allow 
them to take over the PPP project company or obtain control rights over decision making on 
behalf of the company. The step-in clauses thus allow development partners to intervene in the 
event of mismanagement, e.g., in relation to environmental issues, by the private investors. 
Although private investors may not welcome such interference, such intervention from 
development partners can be highly valuable from the social perspective. 
The other forms of development partners‘ support are insignificant, perhaps due to 
development partners and private investors having different priorities. While private investors 
are profit-oriented, development partners care about socially sustainable infrastructure projects 
and prioritise the environmental impact of the infrastructure projects they support (Brixi & 
Schick, 2002). Therefore, PPP projects that involve development partners are likely to be 
subjected to different compliance requirements and regulations. For instance, development 
partners may focus on land acquisition, resettlement, biodiversity, land access and usage, noise 
levels, and urban amenity, which, from the private sector‘s viewpoint, equate costs. Although 
development partners provide an alternative risk mitigation channel, the private sector may feel 
that it is too costly to comply with the development partners‘ requirements. Instead, private 
investors may prefer to seek loan and syndication support from other institutions, such as 
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domestic banks. This may explain why development partners‘ loan and syndication support are 
insignificant.  
In H3b, I argue that prestigious development partners perform a more valuable 
certification role. It thus follows that the involvement of prestigious development partners in 
PPP projects can reduce project risk and encourages greater private sector ownership. This 
prediction is supported in specification (3), which shows that DP_ Reputation is significant. As 
with the results for modality selection, I explain that this is because the market seeks prestigious 
development partners that can certify a PPP project‘s value and risk to the investors.  
Most of the domestic investors and banks in developing countries have limited experience 
and expertise in assessing PPP project. For assessing PPP project information, it is important to 
have access to specialist financial, legal, engineering, and risk assessment skills that can allow the 
intermediary to evaluate a PPP project‘s financial viability. Most of the domestic investors and 
banks may lack such expertise. Reputed development partners can assist domestic investors and 
banks using their global experience in developing a feasible PPP project deal. For instance, 
during the period 1989-2013, the IFC has provided PPP project assistance in 102 countries. 
Using their project assessment skills, reputed development partners can ensure that all relevant 
project information is carefully evaluated before the investment decision. 
Certification from reputed development partners can also be valuable for foreign investors. 
Although foreign investors may have necessary expertise in accessing PPP projects, these 
investors may have limited access to information in the home country. Reputed development 
partners often assist government for completing public infrastructure projects. Utilizing their 
relation with government agencies, reputed development partners can provide required access to 
project information to the foreign investors. 
Looking at control variables, private sector ownership is significantly lower for 
Build_Operate_Transfer; Rehabilitate_Operate and_Transfer. Since private investors have to transfer 
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the PPP projects back to the government under these modalities, my results suggest that private 
investors prefer to hold only a low ownership stake in these projects.  
Table 6.8 includes the interaction variables in the OLS regressions to test hypotheses H4a 
and H4b on whether country-level corruption matters to the strength of certification effects on 
project ownership. Results show that Corruption × Govt._Certification has a marginally significant 
coefficient in specification (1), suggesting that corruption matters less to private sector 
ownership when the project has government certification. However, I do not find any statistical 
significance for Corruption × DP_Certification. 
 Notwithstanding the importance of institutional quality to PPP projects, an implication 
of this findings is that perhaps PPP projects require a different set of institutional framework. 
That is, since PPPs are dependent on the contracts between various stakeholders, it may be 
necessary to create specific PPP legislation (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). Highlighting the 
PPP projects in China, Ke, Wang, Chan, and Lam (2010) argue that the lack of a national PPP 
law can result in different PPP project planning and implementation processes within a country. 
If different ministries plan PPP projects differently, this can cause confusion among the 
investors. A uniform set of PPP laws can thus address this problem by facilitating a common 
project implementation process. Many developing countries, including Chile, Egypt, Bangladesh, 
and Brazil have introduced PPP laws with the aim of establishing a clear institutional framework 
for implementing and operating PPP projects. Research examining the role of PPP law can 
provide valuable insignts regarding the institutional quality aspect of PPP project. 
 
6.5 Robustness Tests for Project Ownership 
As with project modality, it is likely that the certification effects of development partners 
and governments on private ownership of PPP projects varies across sectors due to regulatory 
differences. I conduct robustness tests for this by running a multi-level mixed-effect model in 
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Table 6.9. The random-effects equation is labelled sector, meaning that the random effects are at 
the sector level.  
Consistent with the OLS regression results, DP_Certification_Dummy is statistically 
significant in the multi-level mixed-effect model. I also find that DP_Reputation is statistically 
significant in the multi-level mixed-effect model. However, I find that for both government and 
development partners, the certification effects on project modality are insignificant in countries 
with higher corruption. 
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Table 6.9 
Multilevel mixed-effects OLS regressions for private sector ownership 
The Dependent variable, Private_Ownership is the percentage of the PPP project company owned by private investors. 
Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero 
otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the development 
partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from 
both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the dollar value of all forms of 
support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types 
provided by development partners. DP_Reputation is the market share of a development partner in a given year. 
Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee 
and Payment_Guarantee are dummies taking the value of one for the specified type of government guarantee, and zero 
otherwise. Loan is the scaled value of loan support from the development partner. Syndication is the scaled value of 
syndication support from the development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of insurance support from the 
development partner. Risk_Management is the scaled value of risk management support from the development 
partner. Equity is the scaled value of equity support from the development partner. Quasi_Equity is the scaled value 
of quasi equity support from the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value of guarantee support from the 
development partner. Size is the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage 
change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percent change in the consumer price 
index. Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a political system. Own49pct is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of one if the project has 49% private ownership, and zero otherwise. Build_Lease_Transfer, 
Build_Operate_Transfer, Build_Own_Operate, Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, 
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer and Rental are dummies representing the type of project modality. Divesture and Greenfield 
are dummies representing the types of PPP projects.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fixed components
Govt._Certification_Dummy 10.091 1.773 1.728 1.781 2.045 1.716 1.706
(0.152) (0.282) (0.159) (0.150) (0.633) (0.162) (0.163)
DP_Certification_Dummy 5.011
*
3.271
***
3.445
***
(0.085) (0.000) (0.000)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy -2.895 -0.213
(0.568) (0.964)
DP_Certification 3.198
**
1.718
(0.032) (0.283)
DP_Reputation 6.743
***
(0.000)
DP_Support_Number 2.045 ***
(0.000)
Corruption 2.624 2.234 2.257 2.240 2.143 2.224 2.230
(0.112) (0.166) (0.154) (0.160) (0.176) (0.171) (0.169)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -3.372
(0.159)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.493
(0.574)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -4.848
(0.103)
Revenue_Guarantee -3.795
(0.348)
Exchange_Rate_Guarantee -1.998
(0.643)
Fixed_ Payments 1.571
(0.727)
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable_Payments 0.405
(0.892)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee 12.408 *
(0.026)
Payment_Guarantee -3.039
(0.209)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 1.087 -1.734 -1.680
(0.522) (0.633) (0.643)
Syndication 1.768 1.905
(0.390) (0.215)
Insurance 1.201 6.267 *** 6.477 ***
(0.487) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk_Management -1.170 188.535 *** 194.533 ***
(0.208) (0.000) (0.000)
Equity 3.524 ** 8.556 8.309
(0.014) (0.425) (0.456)
Quasi_Equity 2.196 22.227 24.868
(0.418) (0.286) (0.242)
Guarantee 7.274 *** 3.590 3.392
(0.000) (0.163) (0.156)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) -0.993
*
-0.867 -0.919 -0.961
*
-0.970
*
-0.973
*
-0.974
*
(0.061) (0.125) (0.100) (0.084) (0.074) (0.085) (0.085)
GDP_Growth -0.658 -0.700 -0.691 -0.682 -0.698 -0.685 -0.686
(0.333) (0.306) (0.311) (0.313) (0.307) (0.315) (0.314)
Inflation -0.002
***
-0.002
***
-0.002
***
-0.002
***
-0.002
***
-0.002
***
-0.002
***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Own49pct -34.774
***
-34.991
***
-34.938 *** -34.882 *** -34.841 *** -34.870 *** -34.852 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Build_Operate_Transfer -10.408 -10.384
***
-10.238 *** -10.482 *** -10.633 *** -10.465 *** -10.518 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Build_Own_Operate -3.477 ** -3.353
**
 -3.212 * -3.453 ** -3.430 ** -3.388 ** -3.441 **
(0.025) (0.031) (0.059) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026)
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer -10.964
*
-10.400  -10.274 -10.681 -10.718 -10.721 * -10.786 *
(0.092) (0.115) (0.130) (0.100) (0.100) (0.093) (0.086)
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer -2.386 -2.368  -2.194 -2.386 -2.579 -2.348 -2.397
(0.503) (0.520) (0.543) (0.504) (0.474) (0.533) (0.521)
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer -50.543
***
-50.272
***
 -50.157 *** -50.506 *** -50.860 *** -50.730 *** -50.808 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rental -2.654 -2.141 -2.109 -2.576 -2.751 -2.587 -2.661
(0.631) (0.702) (0.712) (0.646) (0.637) (0.641) (0.629)
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Merchant -15.854
**
-15.333
**
-15.219 ** -15.603 ** -15.341 ** -15.624 ** -15.701 **
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Partial -4.156
**
-3.656
**
 -3.511
**
-3.782
**
-3.439
*
-3.698
**
-3.747
**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.058) (0.020) (0.014)
Divesture -0.011 0.108  0.137 0.264 0.737 0.379 0.388
(0.996) (0.964) (0.953) (0.914) (0.782) (0.885) (0.883)
Greenfield -4.020 -3.459  -3.496 -3.664 -3.293 -3.739 -3.749
(0.277) (0.332) (0.321) (0.309) (0.360) (0.288) (0.289)
Constant 104.077 *** 104.458 *** 104.125 *** 104.839 *** 105.182 *** 104.868 *** 104.920 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Variance of random components
Residual 314.436 315.471 315.233 314.770  313.490  314.501 314.518
Intercept variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 4,255 4,255 4,255 4,255 4,255 4,255 4,255
Log Likelihood -18272 -18279 -18278 -18275 -18266 -18273 -18273
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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I also rerun the OLS regression for each of the following sectors separately in Table 6.10: 
transport; telecommunication; energy; and water & sewerage. Results show that 
Govt._Certification_Dummy is significant for the transport and telecommunication sector only, 
implying that government certification through project guarantees provide greater confidence to 
private investors in the transport and telecommunication sector. Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch and 
Foster (2005) find that transport sector projects are more risky than other infrastructure sectors. 
This finding is perhaps not surprising as it can be difficult for private investors to assess project 
quality in the transport sector. DP_Certification_Dummy seems to be more important in 
encouraging private sector ownership in the energy and telecommunication sector.  
I also investigate whether the form of support provided by the development partner 
matters to private sector ownership. Of the various forms of development partners‘ support for 
energy sector projects, only Risk_Management  and Guarantee support is statistically significant, 
presumably due to energy projects being less risky than those of other sectors. Chowdhury and 
Charoenngam (2009) argue that the off-take power purchase agreement is one of the most 
important contracts in energy project financing, and that the level of private sector investment 
depends on the conditions of the agreement. The lower sectoral risk implies that private 
investors do not need extensive support from development partners through widely used 
instruments like loans, and syndication–none of these support measures are statistically 
significant.  
 Results for the transport sector show that Risk_Management and Quasi_Equity support 
from development partners is statistically significant, which can assist investors to minimise 
project risk. Projects in the transport sector, especially road projects, have high revenue 
uncertainty due to the difficulty in predicting traffic volume. The other support measures from 
development partners are not related to private ownership. 
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Table 6.10 
Sector-wise OLS regressions for private sector ownership  
The dependent variable, Private_Ownership is the percentage of the PPP project company owned by private investors. Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project 
receives support from the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the development partners, and zero 
otherwise. Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a political system. Loan is the scaled value of loan support from the development partner. Syndication is the scaled 
value of syndication support from the development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of insurance support from the development partner. Risk_Management is the scaled value of 
risk management support from the development partner. Equity is the scaled value of equity support from the development partner. Quasi_Equity is the scaled value of quasi equity 
support from the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value of guarantee support from the development partner. Size is the total investment amount under the project. 
GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percent change in the consumer price index. Own49pct is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of one if the project has 49% private ownership, and zero otherwise. Build_Lease_Transfer, Build_Operate_Transfer, Build_Own_Operate, 
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer and Rental are dummies representing the type of project modality. Divesture and 
Greenfield are dummies representing the types of PPP projects.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 0.197 0.362 2.204 * 2.184 * 3.194 * 6.812 * -1.701 -1.643
(0.880) (0.783) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.499) (0.513)
DP_Certification_Dummy 3.219 *** 3.696 ** 0.813 1.382 7.107 ** 1.600 2.764 -3.573
(0.002) (0.011) (0.593) (0.556) (0.032) (0.725) (0.487) (0.615)
Corruption -0.149 -0.116 2.418
**
2.437
**
5.282
***
5.397
***
8.280
***
8.231
***
(0.842) (0.877) (0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -2.962 -3.052 -5.775 ** -5.763 ** -0.149 -0.136 1.401 2.004
(0.226) (0.212) (0.023) (0.024) (0.194) (0.198) (0.800) (0.717)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.402 -0.805 2.107 2.042 0.334 0.474 -1.071 -3.104
(0.745) (0.518) (0.354) (0.393) (0.943) (0.918) (0.818) (0.501)
DP Support Types (scaled value)
Loans -4.345 -4.069 9.951 ** 3.803
(0.145) (0.338) (0.030) (0.781)
Syndication 2.503 -0.137 -11.946 70.216 ***
(0.525) (0.977) (0.352) (0.009)
Insurance -5.046 7.096 na na
(0.562) (0.266)
Energy Transport Telecommunications Water and Sewerage
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Table 6.10 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk_Management 179.632 *** 165.802 ** na na
(0.000) (0.036)
Equity -4.514 29.826 62.801 ** 5914.343 ***
(0.891) (0.629) (0.014) (0.002)
Quasi_Equity 0.456 92.529 ** 41.655 170.177
(0.983) (0.011) (0.272) (0.247)
Guarantee 7.893 * -5.587 7.319 ** 9.831
(0.086) (0.613) (0.020) (0.358)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) -1.290 *** -1.334 ** -1.348 ** -1.332 ** 0.646 0.743 -2.714 ** -2.725 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.303) (0.237) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth -0.624 *** -0.635 *** -2.493 ** -2.497 ** 0.721 *** 0.746 *** -1.618 *** -1.724 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.016 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.233) (0.240) (0.353) (0.339) (0.511) (0.400) (0.690) (0.665)
Own49pct -31.493 *** -31.430 *** -34.295 *** -34.261 *** -20.231 ** -20.047 ** -34.096 *** -34.004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Build_Operate_Transfer -10.573 *** -10.847 *** -0.773 -1.055 na na na na
(0.001) (0.001) (0.926) (0.902)
Build_Own_Operate -3.231 -3.388 -7.378 -7.392 15.222 6.485 -12.231 ** -12.799 **
(0.308) (0.292) (0.541) (0.548) (0.197) (0.380) (0.047) (0.046)
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer -25.199 *** -24.983 *** -7.402 -7.433 4.237 15.006 -4.226 * -3.984 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.404) (0.420) (0.490) (0.222) (0.062) (0.082)
Energy Transport Telecommunications Water and Sewerage
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Table 6.10 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer 1.238 1.227 6.972 6.935 -51.060 *** 2.567 -66.884 *** -66.495 ***
(0.702) (0.708) (0.443) (0.457) (0.000) (0.707) (0.000) (0.000)
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer   -53.501 ***   -54.183 ***  -55.850 ***  -55.667 ***  -51.060 -53.179 *** na na
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.403) (0.000)
Rental -9.038 ** -9.358 * -3.706 -3.872 -29.560 *** -10.016 -5.201 -4.753
(0.027) (0.025) (0.685) (0.683) (0.006) (0.333) (0.425) (0.430)
Merchant -28.504 *** -28.467 *** -13.448 -13.544 na na -5.203 -5.194 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.149) (0.011) (0.012)
Partial -2.547 -2.924 -15.918 * -15.988 * na na -18.935 ** -18.728 **
(0.473) (0.415) (0.081) (0.092) (0.024) (0.023)
Divesture -1.031 -0.356  - 0.138 0.237 23.597 *** 25.041 *** 18.839 ** 18.669 **
(0.786) (0.926) (0.961) (0.934) (0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.014)
Greenfield -9.935 *** -9.653 *** -12.274 *** 0.237 *** 15.414 *** 15.835 *** 14.665 14.985
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.143)
Constant 114.613 *** 117.231 *** 117.156 *** 117.255 *** 47.601 *** 47.582 *** 99.440 *** 101.349 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,141      2,141    1,202     1,202     325 325 587 587
R Squared 0.392 0.395 0.480 0.482 0.464 0.473 0.349 0.356
Energy Transport Telecommunications Water and Sewerage
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The results show that Loans, Guarantee and Equity from development partners is 
statistically significant in the telecommunication sector. By providing loans and equity support to 
a PPP project, development partners commit their financial resources to the project and thus 
signal the quality of the project. This in turn makes the project more attractive to private 
investors. Contributions by development partners through equity and loans (Ameh, Soyingbe, & 
Odusami, 2010) are valuable to telecommunication projects which tend to be highly capital 
intensive. Therefore, private investors seems to prefer loan and equity support for 
telecommunication sector. 
Development partners‘ support seems to be important in encouraging private sector 
ownership in the water & sewerage sector, with significant results found for Syndication and 
Equity. Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch and Foster (2005) find water & sewerage projects have the most 
volatile return of all the infrastructure sectors. It follows that water sector projects would require 
more extensive support from development partners through, as my results indicate, syndication 
and equity.  
Next, I investigate whether the result are robust by using a Tobit regression model to 
estimate the parameters.  Tobit regressions can be useful to estimate linear relationships between 
variables with a left- or right-censoring in the dependent variable, such as private sector 
ownership. Table 6.11 shows that using Tobit regression results does not materially change my 
previous conclusion. For example, Govt._Certification_Dummy remains significant in all 
specifications, and thus supporting H1b. The estimated coefficients for DP_Certification remain 
positive and significant in this alternative model specification, supporting hypothesis H2b.  
Consistent with my OLS regression result, I find that corruption matters less to private sector 
ownership when the project has government certification. 
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 Table 6.11 
Tobit regressions for private sector ownership 
The Dependent variable, Private_Ownership is the percentage of the PPP project company owned by private investors. 
Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the government, and zero 
otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the project receives support from the development 
partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy equals one if the project receives certifications from 
both government and development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification is the dollar value of all forms of 
support from development partners scaled by project value. DP_Reputation is the market share of a development 
partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number of support types provided by development partners. 
Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a political system. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, 
Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are 
dummies taking the value of one for the specified type of government guarantee, and zero otherwise. Loan is the 
scaled value of loan support from the development partner. Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support 
from the development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of insurance support from the development partner. 
Risk_Management is the scaled value of risk management support from the development partner. Equity is the scaled 
value of equity support from the development partner. Quasi_Equity is the scaled value of quasi equity support from 
the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value of guarantee support from the development partner. Size is 
the total investment amount under the project. GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a country‘s gross 
domestic product. Inflation is the annual average percent change in the consumer price index. Build_Lease_Transfer, 
Build_Operate_Transfer, Build_Own_Operate, Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, 
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer and Rental are dummies representing the type of project modality. Divesture and Greenfield 
are dummies representing the types of PPP projects.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 35.867
**
10.653
**
9.548 ** 9.745 ** 16.462 9.379 ** 9.354 **
(0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.298) (0.018) (0.019)
DP_Certification_Dummy 12.654 9.221
**
9.912
**
(0.195) (0.030) (0.106)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy -14.130 -6.884
(0.216) (0.533)
DP_Certification 9.464
**
3.915
(0.025) (0.409)
DP_Reputation 22.591
(0.104)
DP_Support_Number 6.397
***
(0.000)
Corruption 8.495
***
7.625
**
7.706
**
7.643
***
7.055 ** 7.576 *** 7.586 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -10.127 *
(0.094)
Corruption x DP_Certification -0.635
(0.857)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -27.901
(0.295)
Revenue_Guarantee -18.806
(0.268)
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee -5.129
(0.813)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values
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Table 6.11 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fixed_ Payments 2.559
(0.873)
Variable_Payments 2.747
(0.888)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee -42.687
(0.305)
Payment_Guarantee -42.687
(0.259)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 1.824 -3.321 -3.246
(0.680) (0.626) (0.634)
Syndication 8.163 7.117
(0.231) (0.546)
Insurance -11.227 -36.377 -37.176
(0.619) (0.197) (0.186)
Risk_Management 9.382 1749.244 1862.695
(0.645) (0.127) (0.152)
Equity 7.446 -59.082 -60.283
(0.378) (0.518) (0.513)
Quasi_Equity 13.001 362.697 * 373.985 *
(0.361) (0.072) (0.064)
Guarantee 19.774 *** 0.898 0.054
(0.002) (0.928) (0.996)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) -3.386
***
-3.013
***
-3.182
***
-3.312
***
-3.251
***
-3.301
***
-3.310
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth -1.517 *** -1.643 *** -1.617 *** -3.312 *** -1.645 *** -1.592 *** -1.592 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.290) (0.296) (0.290) (0.279) (0.263) (0.279) (0.280)
own49pct -63.767
***
-64.362
***
-64.284
***
-64.104
***
-64.082
***
-63.990
***
-63.921
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Build_Operate_Transfer -32.323 -32.176 -32.220 -32.707 -32.984 -32.711 -63.921
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.112) (0.107) (0.112) (0.112)
Build_Own_Operate -4.149 -3.756   -3.783 -4.319 -3.718 -4.111 -4.061
(0.840) (0.855) (0.854) (0.834) (0.856) (0.842) (0.844)
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer -25.360 -24.505 -24.816 -25.162 -24.120 -25.296 -25.272
(0.329) (0.343) (0.337) (0.332) (0.349) (0.329) (0.330)
Dummy 
values
Scaled values
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Table 6.11 (continued)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer -2.165
***
-2.114  -1.969 -2.351 -2.684 -1.955 -1.910
(0.917) (0.919) (0.925) (0.910) (0.897) (0.925) (0.927)
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer -79.961 -79.213
***
  -79.082 *** -80.167 *** -81.306 *** -80.165 *** -80.242 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rental 24.848 26.621 26.343 24.602 23.688 25.005 24.954
(0.347) (0.313) (0.317) (0.352) (0.370) (0.344) (0.345)
Merchant -41.731 -41.094 -41.456 -41.709 -39.769 -41.833 -41.828
(0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.109) (0.123) (0.107) (0.107)
Partial 6.988
***
8.350 8.596 7.928 -39.769 8.175 8.215
(0.792) (0.752) (0.746) (0.765) (0.707) (0.758) (0.757)
Divesture -14.296 -14.819   -15.171 -13.897 -11.076 -13.956 -13.853
(0.361) (0.333) (0.318) (0.372) (0.479) (0.366) (0.370)
Greenfield -7.552 -6.934  -7.250 -7.097 -5.044 -7.299 -7.289
(0.638) (0.661) (0.645) (0.655) (0.749) (0.645) (0.646)
Constant 152.824 *** 154.023 *** 153.846 *** 155.074 *** 155.472 *** 154.777 *** 154.713 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,255    4,255     4,255   4,255    4,255      4,255      4,255      
Pseudo Squared 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.084
Dummy 
values
Scaled values 
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I conduct an additional robustness test on the measurement of the dependent variable in 
Table 6.12, where I segregate the sample into projects with ―high‖ (> sample 25th percentile) 
and ―low‖ (< sample 25th percentile) private sector ownership. I run a logit regression with a 
dependent variable which takes the value of one for high ownership levels and zero for low 
ownership levels. Using this alternative measurement does not have material change in my 
conclusions. Consistent with my OLS and Tobit regression result, I find that 
Govt._Certification_Dummy is statistically significant and positively related to private sector 
ownership. I also find that DP_Certification_Dummy and DP_Certification remain positive and 
significant, supporting hypothesis H2b. Consistent with my OLS and Tobit regression result, I 
find that corruption matters less to private sector ownership when the project has government 
certification. 
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Table 6.12 
Logit regressions for private sector ownership  
The dependent variable, Private_Ownership, is one if the projects are high private sector ownership, and zero 
otherwise. Projects with "high" private sector ownership are identified by individual projects private sector 
ownership> sample 25th percentile. Projects with low private sector ownership are identified by individual projects 
private sector ownership<=sample 25th percentile value.  Govt._Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if the 
project receives support from the government, and zero otherwise. DP_Certification_Dummy takes a value of one if 
the project receives support from the development partners, and zero otherwise. DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy 
equals one if the project receives certifications from both government and development partners, and zero 
otherwise. DP_Certification is the dollar value of all forms of support from development partners scaled by project 
value. DP_Reputation is the market share of a development partner in a given year. DP_Support_Number is the number 
of support types provided by development partners. Corruption is an index for the extent of corruption within a 
political system. Debt_Guarantee, Revenue_Guarantee, Exchange_Rate_Guarantee, Fixed_Payments, Variable_Payments, 
Interest_Rate_Guarantee and Payment_Guarantee are dummies taking the value of one for the specified type of 
government guarantee, and zero otherwise. Loan is the scaled value of loan support from the development partner. 
Syndication is the scaled value of syndication support from the development partner. Insurance is the scaled value of 
insurance support from the development partner. Risk_Management is the scaled value of risk management support 
from the development partner. Equity is the scaled value of equity support from the development partner. 
Quasi_Equity is the scaled value of quasi equity support from the development partner. Guarantee is the scaled value 
of guarantee support from the development partner. Size is the total investment amount under the project. 
GDP_Growth is the annual percentage change of a country‘s gross domestic product. Inflation is the annual average 
percent change in the consumer price index. Build_Lease_Transfer, Build_Operate_Transfer, Build_Own_Operate, 
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer, Merchant, Partial, Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer, Rehabilate_Operate_ Transfer and Rental are 
dummies representing the type of project modality. Divesture and Greenfield are dummies representing the types of 
PPP projects.***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Govt._Certification_Dummy 1.520
**
0.404
**
0.334 ** 0.339 ** 0.671 0.333 ** 0.333 *
(0.034) (0.027) (0.048) (0.045) (0.348) (0.049) (0.050)
DP_Certification_Dummy 0.390
***
0.307 0.322
(0.009) (0.136) (0.102)
DP_and_Govt._Certification_Dummy -0.760 -0.461
(0.130) (0.334)
DP_Certification 0.497
**
0.235
(0.017) (0.280)
DP_Reputation 0.966
(0.157)
DP_Support_Number 0.301
***
(0.000)
Corruption 0.397
***
0.361
**
0.369
**
0.370
***
0.356 ** 0.368 *** 0.368 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption x Govt_Certification -0.449 *
(0.094)
Corruption x DP_Certification 0.010
(0.952)
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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Table 6.12 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Government Certification Types:
Debt_Guarantee -1.587
(0.204)
Revenue_Guarantee -0.660
(0.393)
Exchange_ Rate_Guarantee -0.775
(0.483)
Fixed_Payments -0.044
(0.950)
Variable_Payments -0.066
(0.941)
Interest_Rate_Guarantee -10.480
(0.259)
Payment_Guarantee -0.693
(0.422)
DP Certification Types:
Loans 0.066 0.128 0.132
(0.753) (0.691) (0.681)
Syndication 0.338 0.163
(0.279) (0.791)
Insurance -0.882 -2.136 * -2.154 *
(0.423) (0.087) (0.084)
Risk_Management 0.453 73.914 76.254
(0.544) (0.173) (0.194)
Equity 0.701 * 1.433 1.409
(0.085) (0.766) (0.771)
Quasi_Equity 0.370 12.006 12.222
(0.552) (0.170) (0.163)
Guarantee 0.947 *** -0.034 -0.050
(0.003) (0.947) (0.923)
Control Variables:
Ln(Size) -0.160
***
-0.144
***
-0.152
***
-0.159
***
-0.160
***
-0.155
***
-0.155
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP_Growth -0.089
***
-0.094
***
-0.093
***
-0.091
***
-0.094
***
-0.092
***
-0.092
***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.219) (0.227) (0.235) (0.221) (0.218) (0.232) (0.233)
Build_Operate_Transfer -1.823 -1.799 -1.812 -1.848 -1.856 -1.839 -1.838
(0.118) (0.120) (0.118) (0.112) (0.110) (0.114) (0.114)
Build_Own_Operate -0.601 -0.573  -.583 -0.616 -0.592 -0.604 -0.603
(0.607) (0.621) (0.616) (0.597) (0.610) (0.604) (0.605)
Build_Rehabitate_Operate_Transfer -1.251 -1.172  -1.183 -1.233 -1.216 -1.228 -1.228
(0.380) (0.405) (0.402) (0.385) (0.390) (0.386) (0.386)
Dummy 
values  
Scaled values
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Table 6.12 (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rehabilate_Lease_Transfer -0.594 -0.573   -0.579 -0.605 -0.611 -0.598 -0.597
(0.615) (0.624) (0.622) (0.607) (0.603) (0.611) (0.612)
Rehabilate_Operate_Transfer -4.345
***
-4.297
***
  -4.309 *** -4.361 *** -4.422 *** -4.344 *** -4.345 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Rental 0.727 0.802 0.784 0.715 0.708 0.744 0.744
(0.635) (0.598) (0.607) (0.641) (0.646) (0.626) (0.627)
Merchant -1.915 -1.847 -1.862 -1.911 -1.870 -1.910 -1.910
(0.179) (0.190) (0.187) (0.178) (0.186) (0.178) (0.178)
Partial -0.258 -0.178   -.177 -0.215 -0.158 -0.200 -0.199
(0.849) (0.895) (0.896) (0.874) (0.980) (0.882) (0.883)
Divesture -0.375 -0.368  -.365 -0.342 -0.274 -0.364 -0.363
(0.657) (0.657) (0.660) (0.685) (0.750) (0.664) (0.666)
Greenfield 0.023 0.074 0.069 0.054 0.099 0.047 0.047
(0.977) (0.926) (0.930) (0.946) (0.902) (0.953) (0.953)
Constant 2.898 *** 2.891 ***  2.879 * 2.966 * 3.008 * 2.934 * 2.934 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.053) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056)
Year dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,255    4,255     4,255   4,255    4,255      4,255      4,255     
Pseudo Squared 0.232 0.230 0.231 0.231 0.235 0.232 0.232
Dummy 
values 
Scaled values
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6.6  Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results. Consistent with expectations, I find 
government certification encourages private investors in a relatively risky modality. I also find 
evidence to support the hypothesis that government certification promotes private sector 
ownership in PPP projects. Similar to government certification, I find development partners‘ 
certification is significant in explaining both project modality selection and private sector 
ownership in PPP projects. 
For development partner‘s reputation, I find evidence that development partners‘ 
reputation has a positive impact on project modality and private sector ownership. The results 
are robust across different sectors.  While I find that corruption matters to both modality and 
private sector ownership, corruption matters less when the project has government certification. 
However, for development partner certification, I find limited evidence to support the 
certification effects on ownership. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This research pursued an inquiry into the role of certification in PPP projects. In an 
environment characterised by asymmetric information between governments and private 
investors, certification about project quality is important. Private investors are not likely to invest 
in PPP projects if they cannot access project information and are uncertain about project quality. 
Izaguirre and Rao (2000) argue that in future, infrastructure financiers will extensively focus on 
PPP project quality. Their study emphasises that careful project development process by the 
government can minimise project planning errors. Worldwide, government, development 
partners, and other project stakeholders are taking initiatives to improve the planning process of 
PPP projects and increase project information to the private sector investors. This motivates my 
thesis to test the effectiveness of governments and development partner's certification in PPP 
projects in the emerging economies where information disclosure is poor. 
The first research aim assesses the government‘s certification role in PPP projects. If 
governments cannot credibly communicate project quality and/or if private investors cannot 
access project information, a potential market failure of the type identified by Akerlof (1970) can 
result in PPP projects receiving low or no private sector investment. I argue that by providing 
project guarantee, and thereby signalling an intention to minimise PPP project risk, primarily 
reflects a strategic desire of the government to assure the market about the viability of a PPP 
project. This can add value to a project and increase its competitiveness by allowing the 
government to implement the project under a more risky modality. Based on a sample of 4,384 
PPP projects in 36 emerging countries, I find that certification by governments is an important 
tool for promoting PPP investment under a relatively risky modality. Among the different kinds 
of support provided by government during the modality structuring stage, I find that exchange 
rate guarantee is the most significant. I also find evidence that government certification 
promotes private sector ownership in PPP projects.  
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The second research aim assesses the effectiveness of the certification role of development 
partners in PPP projects. The literature suggests that development partners‘ support can 
positively affect the PPP project outcome (Settel, Chowdhury, & Orr, 2009). I argue that 
development partners can facilitate information transfers by certifying PPP project quality as 
they have both the technical ability and independence to assess project quality. My result 
confirms this−PPP projects with development partner support have on average 5.011 percentage 
points higher private ownership. I also find that certification by a development partner is 
important for promoting PPP investment under a relatively risky modality. Among the different 
kinds of support provided by development partners during the modality structuring stage, I find 
that loans are the most significant. 
The third research aim assesses the role of development partners‘ reputation in PPP 
projects. I argue that reputed development partners have greater access to (inside) information 
and have greater ability to manage political disputes. I find that having a prestigious development 
partner matters to project modality selection and ownership, suggesting that development 
partners are heterogeneous in their ability to certify and support PPP projects. Many reputed 
development partners have extensive experience in PPP project and coordinate with government 
and other stakeholders for a PPP project. Previously Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and 
Steffanoni (2013) find that certification by reputed lead arranging banks can add economic value 
in project financing loans. 
The final research aim explores the interaction between certification effects and country-
level institutional quality in relation to PPP project modality selection and private sector 
ownership. I argue that PPP projects financial viability depends on the legal framework, which is 
shaped by institutional quality. Therefore, in countries with poor institutions and information 
asymmetry, a government and development partner certification is especially effective at 
reducing project risk. I find that corruption matters less to modality selection and private sector 
ownership when the project has government certification. However, for development partner 
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certification, I find limited evidence to support the certification effects on ownership. While 
institutional quality can still be relevant for PPP projects, my results suggest that perhaps PPP 
projects require a different set of the institutional framework. 
My research has several important contributions. First, this thesis highlights the 
importance of government certification for the project modality selection and ownership 
decision. Past studies show that it is important to develop PPP projects carefully, especially in 
terms of planning the project sites, forming project contracts, and allocating responsibilities 
(Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005). However, planning, financing, and attracting 
private investors in PPP projects remain a challenging endeavour. Most studies use a case study 
approach to assess the PPP project planning process. This motivated me to empirically test 
whether certification by governments can signal project quality during the project planning stage. 
My thesis thus contributes to the literature by providing the first large scale empirical analysis of 
the modality selection process, which is a critical stage of the PPP project planning process. 
Vives, Benavides, and Paris (2009) claim that a significant number of PPP project failures can be 
attributed to a poor choice of project modality. My research shows that at the initial stage of the 
PPP project, government certification plays a significant role in influencing the modality 
selection process. I also find that government certification is important for encouraging private 
sector ownership. By providing certification to a PPP project, government commits its financial 
resources to the project and thus signals the quality of the project. 
Second, this research contributes to the project financing literature by examining the third-
party certification role of development partners in PPP projects. Third-party certification is 
critical when the internal and external investors have different information sets about product 
quality (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) examine 
the certification role of commercial banks in project financing loans. This study extends this line 
of research by examining the certification role of development partners in PPP project financing. 
I find that certification by development partners encourages private sector investment under a 
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relatively risky modality. My result also show that PPP projects with support from development 
partners have higher private sector ownership, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of 
development partners‗certification in attracting private investment. 
Third, this thesis highlights the role of development partners' reputation in certifying PPP 
project quality. In most developing countries, reputation can be a very valued asset in PPP 
project financing as the government, investors and domestic banks have limited experience in 
implementing PPP project. If development partners differ in their technical ability in assessing 
the project quality, then the certification effect of prestigious development partners is expected 
to be stronger. I find evidence that having a prestigious development partner (DP) influence 
project modality selection and increase private sector ownership. Therefore, development 
partners appear to be heterogeneous in their ability to certify PPP projects. 
Fourth, my contribution lies in identifying for the first time the type of support 
mechanisms by the government and development partner‘s that affects modality selection and 
contributes to greater private sector ownership. Using PPP project case studies, most of the 
existing research emphasises the important role of development partners (Settel, Chowdhury, & 
Orr, 2009), and government in PPP projects (Li, Akintoye, Edwards, and Hardcastle, 2005a). 
However, none has identified which particular form support from development partners and 
government is important in PPP projects. This research finds that among the different types of 
development partners‘ support, loan can influence project modality selection. On the other hand, 
guarantee and risk management from development partners can encourage private sector 
ownership. Among the different types of government support measures, I find that exchange 
rate guarantee contributes to greater private sector ownership in PPP projects. 
The results of my thesis will be of interest to stakeholders who wish to assess the modality 
structure of PPP projects, to governments and development partners who design PPP projects, 
and to researchers who investigate the impact of financial certification on project decision 
making. This research also has important policy implications for development partners in 
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designing future support mechanisms. Development partners have long recognised the 
importance of redesigning PPP support measures. According to the lead lawyer of World Bank‘s 
PPP group, the World Bank is currently working on a new form of guarantee for PPP projects 
(White, 2015). My findings on the certification effects of development partners have implications 
for development partners about the strategies that are effective in increasing private sector 
ownership. My research is thus expected to be of interest to governments and development 
partners who wish to promote private sector investment. 
Research into modality selection and private sector ownership of PPP projects is 
significant as PPP projects have a long-lasting impact on the society, often equating to a 
generation. PPPs are reliant on long-term relationships between the state, private investors, 
development partners, commercial banks, and the general public. The understanding of the PPP 
project financial process resulting from research can add value to all these stakeholders. PPP 
financing is an economically significant part of the financial market, worthy of empirical analysis 
in its own right.  
My study is timely in light of recent developments to increase the information flow in the 
PPP market. In particular, the recently established Global Infrastructure Hub (GIH) aims to 
share PPP project information between governments, private investors, international 
organisations, development partners, and national infrastructure institutions. In fact, one of the 
key objectives of GIH is to address key data gaps that matter to private investors. Under the 
Asian Development Bank project preparation facility, development partners are also creating 
PPP project data rooms. Through this process, Asian Development Bank aims to disseminate 
project information to potential investors.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of limitations to my research. First, I use the total 
investment amount, which reflects only investment in physical assets and payments to 
governments. Often, PPP projects receive land and/or equipment from the government as well, 
but these data are not publicly available. With a few exceptions, the investment amounts in the 
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database I use represent the total investment commitments of the project entity at the beginning 
of the project, and not the executed investment. Therefore, the reported project value is likely to 
be underestimated.  
Along the way, this thesis has revealed several opportunities for future research. First, 
future research may consider the signaller‘s  choice of when to signal (timing). The effectiveness 
of quality signalling can be improved by sending more visible project signals or increasing the 
number of signals. However, signals can be costly to the government and development partners. 
We still do not know whether different signals received from the same stakeholder are more 
effective than the same signal received from various stakeholders. 
Second, further research is needed to enhance our understanding of governments‘ 
certification of PPP projects and address market concerns about government initiated PPP 
project renegotiations. While development partners‘ certification is found significant in PPP 
projects, development partners provide certification only in a limited number of PPP projects. In 
the remaining projects, the market has to rely on the government‘s certification. It is also useful 
to research how to best communicate negative project information through, for instance, the use 
of social and environmental data. Often, governments do not provide these negative signals to 
the private sector. One possible strategy can be to establish dedicated PPP units for facilitating 
information transfer for PPP projects. Instead of multiple ministries sharing information about a 
particular PPP project, a national PPP unit can act as a credible agency for sharing PPP project 
related information. Colverson and Perera (2012) argue that PPP units can be an indicator of the 
PPP project maturity. PPP units can represent a centre of expertise and improve the PPP project 
operation. While data for the PPP unit is still limited, further research incorporating such 
institutional developments can perhaps provide valuable insights. Further research is also 
required to develop a quantitative measure of institutional quality for PPP projects. Such 
research can provide us with additional insights regarding the institutional aspects for 
encouraging PPP projects. 
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Third, future research may examine the private sector‘s feedback mechanisms. A number 
of studies highlight the importance of receivers sending information back to signallers (Gupta, 
Govindarajan, & Malhotra, 1999). The primary assumption is that the information transfer can 
work in two directions−the private sector desires information about the government‘s project 
planning process, and the government wants information from the private sector about which 
signal is most reliable and which project parameter is most important for the private sector. To 
facilitate efficient signalling, private investors therefore need to send their feedback to the 
government in the form of counter signals. In PPP projects, the government conducts road 
shows and bidder conferences, allowing the government to interact with potential investors. 
Based on the feedback received from the private sector, the government can modify the project 
planning process and signals to enhance reliability of its project quality signal. 
Reputed project managers can provide confirmation to investors of the value and the 
implementation process of a PPP project. In competing for foreign investment in PPP projects, 
governments have an incentive to present themselves as a credible stakeholder by appointing 
prestigious project managers to oversee the project planning process. This is similar to the 
notion of appointing prestigious independent directors to oversee the day-to-day operation of 
the firm. Research shows how firms appoint prestigious directors in order to signal legitimacy to 
investors (Certo, 2003). PPP project managers can play a similar role. Future research may 
investigate whether prestigious project managers are more effective in certifying PPP project 
quality to the market. Additionally, future research may explore secondary indicators of PPP 
project quality such as press note releases by governments. 
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Appendix A: The Ghana Water Company Limited PPP Project 
In order to promote efficiency in the water supply sector, the government of Ghana tried 
two separate modalities for the Ghana Water Company Limited PPP project. At first, private 
companies were invited under a lease contract modality. However, without proper project 
assessment, the government failed to attract private companies under this modality. Since it was 
the first water sector PPP project in Ghana, the private sector also lacked industry data and 
experience. The case of Ghana provides an example where planners lack information about the 
local project condition, and therefore overlooked other viable PPP modalities (Fuest & Haffner, 
2007).  
In response, the government revised the project by modifying the project modality from 
lease to management contract. The project involved a significant planning phase for the government, 
which extends to over 10 years. Along with the government, other development partners also 
supported the project, including International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
provided loan support of around USD 103 million for the project (Fuest & Haffner, 2007). 
On 22 November 2005, the Ghana government signed a management contract with Vitens 
Rand Water Services BV, which is a consortium of Vitens International BV of the Royal 
Netherlands and Rand Water Services Pty of South Africa. Under the contract, the private sector 
operated the project through a joint venture SPV project company, Aqua Vitens Rand Limited. 
In this project company, Vitens International BV is the majority shareholder with 51% 
ownership. Rand Water Services Pty had the remaining 49% ownership.  
